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Abstract 
One important area in conflict studies which has not been given adequate attention in 
the literature is intra or sub-ethnic conflict. Inadequate research in this area is further 
exacerbated by the paucity of literature on the relationship between politics and 
conflict especially at intra-ethnic level. The study prompted by these gaps, therefore, 
interrogated the impact of politics on clan identity and conflicts; examined the 
relationship between intra and inter-party clashes and communal unrest; and analyzed 
the relationship between economic and socio-cultural variables and conflicts in 
Ebiraland. The study adopted qualitative and quantitative techniques to capture the 
nature of conflicts in the area. The research method encapsulated the use of survey 
which involved questionnaire administration, and complemented with interview and 
focus group discussion. The study came up with the following findings among others: 
while colonialism laid the foundation of communal conflicts in Ebiraland, political 
competition and other economic and socio-cultural factors especially from 1979 
intensified the conflicts. The Study also found that, an average Ebira is pugilistic and 
tends to display aggressive tendency at minor provocation. It further identified a 
relationship between the unequal and lopsided political structure of Kogi State and 
violence in Ebiraland. The politicization of the existing cultural homogeneity by some 
political elements using as canon fodders the large number of unemployed youths was 
also discovered as a major trigger of conflict. Accordingly, the study recommended 
the need for youth mass employment; government regulatory measure on cultural 
activities; rotation of key political offices and justiciable distribution of resources and 
amenities among the ethnic groups in Kogi State. The study concluded that adherence 
to the proffered suggestions would mitigate the occurrence of conflict in Ebiraland. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Politics is concerned with how policies and laws are formulated, executed and 
implemented. This view is shared by Duverger (1972 cited in Ajayi and Ogoma, 
2012) as the author equates the study of politics to the study of state and exercise of 
power in governmental institutions. In addition, central to political activities is the 
allocation of values. Which is why Easton, (1965) contends that politics is basically 
concerned with the allocation of values. Resources are distributed to members of a 
society through politics.  
 
It is important to note that conflict is an element of politics. This is because 
competition for political power among individuals and groups aimed at controlling 
and distributing scarce resources, most often, is violent-ridden (Easton 1965; Ball 
1977; Harris 1979). The interplay of politics and conflict in Nigeria is worrisome. 
Little wonder that Obasanjo (2002:50-51) asserts that “we fight and sometimes shed 
blood to achieve and retain political power because for us in Nigeria, the political 
kingdom has for too long been the gateway to the economic kingdom”. In the same 
vein, Omoweh (2012) opines that politics in Nigeria is still zero-sum and brutish. This 
is because political leadership resorts to violence at all levels of political competition 
in order to remain in power. Political elites fight fiercely to penetrate the state, access 
its political power and retain it at all cost once it is captured because politics is a 
lucrative business and a dominant means of accumulation of wealth. Furthermore, 
Omoweh and Okanya (2005:303) note that “political competition for the control of 
the state and its political power is now a bloody warfare as the state holds the key to 
wealth. This explains why those who are in control of the state‟s political power hold 
on to it by all means and at all cost. Herein lies the root causes of communal 
restiveness”.  
 
The above lends credence to the assertion by Aristotle that “man is by nature a 
political animal” (cited in Rodee et al, 1983:2). The import of this is that the essence 
of social existence is politics and that two or more men interacting together are 
invariably involved in political relationship. To Aristotle, man can only find 
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fulfilment, access available resources, influence others to accept their views through 
political interaction with others in an institutionalized setting (the state). Hence, it can 
be argued that the path to state power that serves as a veritable platform for self-
expression and fulufilment is often ridden with violence because of the nature of 
competition for political power. 
 
It is important to note that Nigeria is not the only country suffused with conflict; in 
fact, conflict has been humanity‟s unending affliction, and this calls for great concern. 
Rupia (1991 cited inWorkshop on Disarmament, 1999) puts it more bluntly that as 
long as people and nations pursue different and conflicting interests, there will always 
be disagreements, disputes and conflict. This is also political because politics denotes 
competition for political authority and the control of scarce resources which 
necessarily generates tension between interests. Hence, conflict may express itself 
violently when a political system(s) fails to manage conflicting interests (Easton 1965, 
Ball 1977, Harris, 1979). 
 
 Shaw and Wong (1989) (cited in Hund, 2001) estimate that peace comprised only 
eight percent of the entire recorded history of mankind.  Over the last 5600 years, 
there have been 14500 wars. Only ten of one hundred and eighty-five generations 
have known uninterrupted peace. Mankind has managed to achieve only two hundred 
and sixty eight years without war in the past thirty four centuries (Hund, 2001). But 
these authors failed to explain how they came up with these figures. 
 
Indeed, since the United Nations (UN) was formed in 1945, more than one hundred 
(100) major conflicts have occurred in the world, leaving more than twenty million 
(20,000,000) people dead, several millions wounded, with over seventeen million 
(17,000,000) refugees and twenty million (20,000,000) displaced persons (Ghali, 
1992; Nwolise, 2004).  
 
The continent of Africa appears to be the theater of conflict of the globe, going by the 
frequency of violent conflict in the area. No wonder Osaghae (2005) contends that 
Africa has been portrayed as having the reputation as the world‟s leading theater of 
conflict, war, poverty, disease and instability. Consequently, it is not out of place that 
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scholars of ethnicity and conflict management often regard Africa as a major 
laboratory for experimentation and theory building. Conflict triggers are 
multidimensional, ranging from historical animosities traceable to land tenure system, 
chieftaincy issues and other cultural practices cum colonial legacies, to factors rooted 
in complex post-colonial realities birthing poor socio-economic conditions. 
Unfortunately, West Africa is among the world‟s most unstable regions. Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea, Cote d‟Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and others have been embroiled 
in web of conflicts in the last decade, which turned many people to refugees, rebels, 
and arms spill across porous borders of Africa. Nigeria, Mali and Niger also have 
been plagued by internal conflicts that have vitiated their capability to see to the 
security of their citizenry (Adekeye, 2004). 
 
 It is necessary to understand the fact that although conflict in Africa and in other 
places may be attributed to lots of factors which include colonial legacies, identity 
politics, cultural differences and resource struggle, to mention just a few. However, 
the fact still remains that politics is a major source of conflict. Clausewitz (1976 cited 
in Dunning, 2011) asserts that the only source of war is politics because war is simply 
a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means. Before there 
can be war it is a matter of necessity there must be conflict(s) because conflict 
prepares the ground for war.  
 
 Barron et al (2004) note that many developing countries are afflicted by high level of 
communal and inter-communal conflicts that do not take the form of civil war, but 
may yet be the source of significant destruction of livelihood and material property. 
Ikelegbe (2003) opines that Nigeria is today suffused with communal, ethnic, ethno-
religious and political conflicts that often manifest in ferocious and very destructive 
violence. In the same vein, Imobighe (2003) avers that the frequency of inter-
communal violence in Nigeria has brought it to the front burner of political discuss.  
 
The situation has assumed a dangerous dimension since the beginning of Nigeria‟s 
Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999. Within the first three years of democratic rule in 
Nigeria, the country has witnessed not less than forty violent communal or ethnic 
conflicts, while some old ones had gained additional potency. These include: Zango-
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Kataf in Kaduna State; Tiv-Jukun in Wukari, Taraba State; Ogoni-Adoni in Rivers 
State; Chamber-Ketub in Taraba State; Itshekiri-Ijaw/Urhobo in Delta State; Ife-
Modakeke in Osun State; Aguleri-Umuleri in Anambra; Yoruba-Hausa community in 
Shagamu, Ogun State; Ijaw-Ilaje conflict in Ondo State; the intermittent clashes in 
Kano, Kano State; Bassa-Egbura in Nassarawa State; Eleme-Okrika in River State; 
Hausa Fulani-Sawaya in Bauchi State; Fulani-Irigwe and Yelwa-Shendam, both in 
Plateau State; and the Hausa-Yoruba clashes in Idi-Araba in Lagos State. Ethnic and 
inter-communal conflicts have permeated the country in such a way that there is 
hardly any part of the country that has not been affected (Imobighe, 2003).  
 
The Federal Government has increased security in some of these communities, but 
government authorities have failed to break the cycle of killings by not prosecuting 
those responsible for these crimes. In all, only few cases of perpetrators have been 
brought to book (Human Right Watch, 2011). Over the years, various committees and 
commissions of inquiry have been set up by the Federal Government to examine the 
issues generating conflict, but their reports and occasional government white papers, 
have mostly been shelved. 
 
It is pertinent to state that the so called ethnic, religious, communal, inter-communal 
clashes and so on most often have political colouration. This is because politicians 
frequently are in the habit of exploiting ethnic, religious and other social divides to 
canvas for support during elections or protest their defeat which may results in intra or 
inter group conflicts. That is why elections which are an important feature of politics 
are always ridden with conflicts and violence. A reflection on past elections in Nigeria 
brings to the fore the indisputable fact that, violence has become the political culture 
of Nigeria since independence (Inokoba and Maliki, 2011).  
 
Nigeria has conducted eight general elections since independence in 1960; 1964, 
1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 and they were all virtually marred with 
conflicts and violence because of fierce competition for political power among the 
politicians. Dunning (2011) observes that political actors are faced with strategic 
subtitudes either to submit to the ballot box or wriggle their way to power through 
violence. Quite often, a good number of politicians do adopt violence means which 
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Carlos and Tommasi, (cited in Dunning, 2011) christen “alternative political 
technologies”.  Similarly, International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011) notes that elections 
traditionally offer Nigerians politicians a choice to either respect the rules and risk 
losing to an opponent or avoid the political wilderness by rigging or violence, 
knowing fully well that to do so is easy, and perpetrators are unlikely to be punished. 
That is why electoral contest usually involves intra and inter-party conflict that 
exacerbates existing communal unrest (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart, 2010). 
 
 In order to come to terms with Nigeria‟s present situation, it will be necessary to take 
a historical excursion into the origin of the country. The amalgamation of the northern 
and southern protectorates of Nigeria by the British colonial administration in 1914, 
without taking into cognizance the variegated nature of ethnic configuration of the 
polity marked the beginning of the country‟s political turmoil. Throughout the 
colonial period, the Great Britain never encouraged maximum interactions among the 
various groups; rather they exploited their differences to create distrust, suspicion and 
cleavages among them, which resulted in violent confrontations among them before 
independence (Okafor, 1997). The situation was further complicated by a tri-regional 
federalism put in place (Ezera, 1964). The north was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, 
the West by the Yoruba and the East by the Igbo.  
 
The structure also encouraged the emergence of regional political parties. The 
nationalists during anti-colonial struggle tried but to no avail to evolve a nation with 
an organic unity. Indeed, the adoption of a federal constitution originated from 
Nigeria‟s search for a common unity of its diverse ethnic groups. When it appeared 
slow in achieving the result, the military under Aguyi Ironsi legislated against divisive 
tendencies in the country, which turned out to be counter-productive as negative 
intents were read into Ironsi‟s patriotic action. However, subsequent efforts made by 
the military to tone down on divisive politics led to overarching federal arrangement 
in which resources were concentrated at the centre, resulting in intense inter-ethnic 
rivalry for the control of the centre, and the attendant natural resources at its disposal 
(Imobighe, 2003). 
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 In order to bring about ethnic equity, reciprocity, constructive and creative 
governance, the country was reorganised into six geopolitical zones. Unfortunately, 
these measures at creating a more ethnically balanced federal structure have not only 
culminated into stiff competition among the main ethnic groups in the country, it has 
equally torn apart different communities within the same ethnic group in the desperate 
struggle for power and to corner amenities to their respective sides. In fact, the 
situation has reached a ridiculous level whereby, local communities and villages 
within the same ethnic group are now claiming separate identities. Politicians have 
now capitalized on this by evolving mini-ethnic identities around which they now 
mobilize their villages and clans for selfish political gains (Imobighe 2003). This 
accounts for violence between groups over access to power and resources (Collier, 
and Hoeffler, 2004; Cohen, 1974) engineered by political entrepreneurs.  
 
 The Ebira Tao people of Kogi State is said to be a homogenous group with the same 
language, a similar culture and same mythological origin (Tenuche, 2002). However, 
repeated violent conflict within the Ebira groups has snowballed into a dangerous 
dimension. The intermittent mayhem has culminated in loss of lives and property, 
social tension, disruption of family and communal life and mistrust, with the use of 
dangerous, sophisticated and light weapons, gun running and access to drugs and 
poisonous substances like cocaine (Tenuche, 2002).  
 
This study analyses the relationship between politics and conflicts, while also 
focusing attention on other factors like economic and socio-cultural variables in 
explaning conflicts in Ebiraland. Albeit, Nigeria is the main focus of the study, similar 
developments in other parts of the world (especially in Africa) were highlighted. The 
aim is to draw lessons useful for mitigating divisive politics. 
            
 1.2. Statement of the Problem 
The prevalence of conflicts has pervasive dislocation effect on society; it undermines 
development structures, aggravates poverty, and brings states and civil societies under 
pressure (WHO, 2002; UNDP, 2006; Institute for Economic and Peace, 2010). It is 
estimated that lost of economic growth due to societal violence amounts to 10-30 
percent of GDP. For example, the Global Peace Index (2010) estimated the total cost 
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of violence for 2006-2009 at $28 trillion worldwide. A reduction of the cost of 
violence by 25 percent would yield a gain of more than $7 trillion that could be spent 
for other purposes. Violence, therefore, is a heavy structural and economic burden on 
societies as it diverts investment resources from development. 
 
            However, violent conflicts seem to permeate the Nigeria‟s socio-political landscape. 
The 1967-1970 civil war appears to be the worst of all the conflicts since 
independence. The real threat to  security in Nigeria today may not be a full blown 
national conflagration but pockets of communal conflicts erupting all over the 
country. Omoweh and Okanya (2005) argued that one grim reality that Nigeria is 
grappling with today is the resurgence of communal unrest and its threat to national 
security. Unfortunately, there are no indications at the moment that policy-makers are 
decisively committed to dealing with the root causes of community skirmishes and 
attendant threat to national security. Rather, various security committees set up are 
more focused on dealing with manifestations of community unrest as against the root 
causes, leading to administration of wrong remedies. It is not a surprise, therefore, 
that as soon as a cease fire is secured among the warring communities; they resume 
hostilities in greater intensity as evident in the protracted Tiv-Jukun and Urhobo-Ijaw-
Itshekiri crises among others. 
 
 It is important to note that as localized as some of these conflicts are, their effects 
have been felt in other parts of the country because of the multiplicity of factors that 
usually come to play (Sanda, 2003). For instance, the clash in Sagamu in July 1999 
resulted in the death of about 50 people, while a reprisal attack in Kano on 22 July 
claimed over 100 lives (The News, January, 2000), the Tiv-Jukun communal conflict 
and the subsequent killing of some soldiers resulted in military counter-attack of 
genocidal proportion (Bakoji, 2005). 
 
 Economically, these conflicts have been burdensome. In fact, a total of N150 billion 
oil revenue has been deferred and property worth billions of naira destroyed in the 
carnage arising from communal clashes nationwide (Yahaya, 2005). The government 
of Delta State in 2003 spent N200 million on soldiers stationed in Warri to maintain 
peace (Adebanwi 2004). Indeed, conflicts have led to loss of assets both by victims 
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and the diversion of public funds from developments to pay compensation to victims.  
In terms of national economic loss the roll is quite revealing of the depth of loss 
involved in communal clashes nationwide.  For example it is estimated that assets 
worth N59, 672,000 were lost to the Jos crisis in 2001, while government 
compensation to victims was about N13, 938,000; assets lost to the Kaduna crisis of 
2001 ran to about N50,625,000 with government compensation being N32,716,000. 
The Kano crisis of 2001 resulted in the loss of assets worth N59, 756,000, with 
compensation totaling about N22,658,000; assets lost to Jos crisis of 2004 was 
estimated at about N102,932,000 while N85,121,000 was paid as compensation to 
victims (to mention just a few ) (Yahaya, 2005).  
 
In short, the violence in Ebiraland can be considered a microcosm of a wide range of 
conflicts typical of the Nigerian social system. It is akin to what Bassey (2002) 
christened a dramatic and extreme manifestation of “Manifest Conflict Process” 
(MCP). Actors or their representatives pursue their perceptions of mutual 
incompatible goals by undermining one another or otherwise, the goal seeking 
capability of another (Sanda, 1986; Bassey, 2002).  
 
Conflicts in Ebiraland, however, have additional dimension of importance in terms of 
its recurring nature and implication for national security. The strategic location of 
Ebiraland as gateway to North-South-East parts of the country and its nearness to the 
capital city makes conflict in this region a problem of national concern. In fact, 
conflicts in the area have been quite destructive and disruptive to movement and 
social life.   
 
Specifically, frequent crises in the area have led to worrisome killings making some 
Ebiras to take refuge in neighbouring states like Lampese (Edo State), Akoko (in 
Ondo State) among others, political recrimination and loss of property with attendant 
implication of impoverishing the land.  Looking at the trend of conflicts in Ebiraland, 
it appears that conflict is more prevalent and severe during election times. From the 
foregoing, it is necessary to probe whether the level of conflicts in Ebiraland could be 
explained within the context of competition for political power as Jega (2002) argued 
that contest for political power among the elite in their bid to capture the state is often 
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characterized by cut-throat competition, resulting in the mobilization of sentiment and 
negative massage and manipulation of ethno-religious and communal identities for 
their selfish end (with attendant violence). This is the issue that constitutes the 
problematic of this study. Therefore, it becomes clear that discourse on nature of 
politics in the land needs to be re-examined, so that illuminating ideas on how to 
promote peace can be addressed, hence, the need for this inquiry. Further more, most 
studies on Ebiraland have not given adequate attention to the relationship between 
politics and conflict nor viewed conflict in Ebiraland and in other places from 
different perspectives.  
 
1.3. Research Questions         
The following research questions serve as guides to the study: 
 i. How has identity politics mitigated or aggravated conflicts in Ebiraland?    
ii. Of what impact are deep-seated struggles among warring groups to acquire, use 
and retain power to conflicts in Ebiraland?                                                                                          
iii. To what extent are intra and inter-party clashes a contributory factor to communal 
unrest in Ebiraland?   
iv. What are the contributory roles of economic and socio-cultural variables to 
conflicts in Ebiraland?   
                                                                                                                                                                  
1.4. Objectives of the Study        
The broad objective of this study is to find out the impact of politics on clan identity 
and conflicts in Ebiraland. The specific objectives of the study are to: 
i. interrogate the relationship between deep-seated struggles among warring 
groups to acquire, use and retain power and conflicts in Ebiraland. 
ii. examine the relationship between intra and inter-party clashes and 
communal unrest. 
iii.  analyse the relationship between economic and socio-cultural variables 
and conflicts in Ebiraland. 
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1.5 Research Propositions 
i. There is a significant relationship between identity politics and violent conflicts. 
 ii. There is a significant relationship between deep seated struggles among warring 
groups to acquire, use and retain power and conflicts.   
iii. There is a significant relationship between intra and inter-party clashes and 
communal unrest. 
iv. There is a significant relationship between economic and socio-cultural factors and 
violent conflicts.  
 
1.6. Significance of the Study 
The world over, societies experience various forms of civil unrest irrespective of their 
level of development. Granted that the severity  and casual factors may differ, it is not 
to be accepted that conflicts which happen in human collectivities, are normal and 
should be condoned, especially when they occur too frequently (Omoregbe and 
Omohan, 2005). Conflict has dysfunctional and disruptive impact on society such as 
anarchy, loss of lives and wanton destruction of properties, dislocation or 
dismemberment of family ties and the diversion of scarce resource from 
developmental to less notable ends (Imobighe, 2002; Garuba, 1998; Bouma and 
Singleton, 2004). 
 
In many developing countries, violent conflict constitutes a central political, social 
and economic problem. Unfortunately, violence research is nearly non-existent in 
many developing countries. Where such research exists, researchers themselves have 
to deal with serious challenges. It is often undertaken on an ad-hoc basis with rigid 
financial budgets but without adequate institutionalized structures. In many countries, 
there is a complete lack of empirical research. In others, it is dangerous to study 
violence because powerful groups in society or the state fear discovery of their 
involvement. For example, it is not unusual for journalists who investigate violence to 
suffer attack precisely because they shed light on forms of violence in a way that 
constitutes a threat to strongmen or formal political authorities (Imbusch and Veit, 
2011). It has also been argued by Smyth (2001) that some governments in divided 
societies perceive research on division and conflict as undesirable activity and oppose 
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it. The above results in paucity of literature on violent conflicts in developing 
countries. 
 
Looking at the contemporary world, it is not an overstatement to say that research on 
violence and conflicts and their outcomes are more advanced in and on Western 
Europe and North America, which are regions where organized political violence has 
been largely contained since the Second World War (Beaumont, 1995; Gantzel and 
Schwinghammer, 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wilki, Hippler and Zakar 2011). In 
countries affected most by political violence, academic research tends to be poor, 
whereas it is strong in countries less affected by political violence (Wilki, Hippler and 
Zakar, 2011). 
 
In essence, given the comparatively high rate, scope and problem of conflict in Africa 
continent, violent phenomena are understudied (Veit, Barolsky and Pillay, 2011). 
Despite the pervasiveness of violent ethnic and other conflicts and the commonplace 
presumption that political conflicts in Africa are generally ethnic-laden, conflict 
studies remain an underdeveloped field of study. Research in the area faces a number 
of serious problems. These range from the hostile terrain of research to paucity of 
funds and local expertise. This demonstrably has a direct implication for the 
protracted character of conflicts, and the inability to deal with them (Osaghae, 2001). 
That is why this study is a contribution to filling some of the gaps in the literature on 
conflict in Africa. 
 
 In addition, most research on violent conflicts in Africa are undertaken in institutions 
in Europe, North America, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and 
Sweden (Veit, Barolsky and Pillay 2011; Skidmore and Lawrence, 2007; Hinnells and 
King 2007; Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2009). This has serious negative consequences, 
because scientific findings from abroad are much less suited for stimulating public or 
political debates within a country. Violence research is likely to gain more attention 
and legitimacy when it comes from within the society rather than from abroad 
(Imbusch and Veit, 2011). Finlay cited in Smyth (2001) in his contribution, raises the 
issue of identity of the researcher and its impact on analysis, a theme elaborated on by 
Hermann cited in Smyth (2001). The issue of who conducts the research has 
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implications for the way the research is conceptualized, carried out, analyzed and 
subsequently used.  
 
Taking African as an example, most of the researches on conflicts in Africa are done 
by non-Africans. The limited or non-existent involvement of African researchers in 
such research severely restricts its local relevance or applicability and as a result, 
much of the research conducted has little policy impact. This research is conducted by 
an African, within Africa context in an African institution. Political and socio-
economic developments leading to civil strife remained unnoticed, sometimes for 
decades. On-going attempts to install “conflict early-warning systems” are doomed to 
failure if the quantity of scientific research is not increased (Veit and Pillay, 2011). 
 
 Most researches on conflicts in Africa are mostly qualitative based (Veit and Pillay, 
2011). This is in line of argument of Osahgae (2001) that the state of conflict research 
in African divided societies leaves much to be desired. For example, more 
scientifically oriented scholars could lament the fact that the prevalent methodology is 
more often qualitative rather than quantitative. Thus, there is need to add quantitative 
method which is why this research endeavour is worthwhile because it is a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. 
 
Many studies on violence in Africa are often undertaken by journalists (Rana, 2004) 
or by civil society and political activists (Haqqani, 2005; Roy, 2009) although such 
studies are crucial in providing basic information on events, perpetrators and victims 
but they often lack theoretical underpinnings. This study utilizes eclectic theory as an 
explanatory tool. Worst still, research are mostly supported by funding institutions 
when such conflicts have security implications on their countries (Smyth, 2001). It is 
not surprising, therefore, that research on local conflicts of this nature that has no 
security implications on donors countries hardly enjoy their support, hence the dearth 
of literature on local conflicts in developing countries which is why analysis of 
available literature on conflicts points to the fact that, sub-ethnic or intra-ethnic 
conflicts have not received adequate attention in research studies on conflict (Ibeanu, 
2003; Tenuche, 2009; Onwuzuruigbo, 2010).  
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In the same vein, Murshed (2011) emphasizes the uniqueness of local conflicts and 
argues for more studies on the drivers and consequences of conflict at a more local 
level within nation-states of the world. This is because cross-sectional approach to 
conflict studies disguise what is salient to an individual conflict in a region within a 
country. It is also often misleading, resulting in one size fits all type of policy 
prescriptions that can backfire. Cross-sectional conflict studies diminish the relevance 
of local conflicts. Internal conflicts in many developing countries are highly localized 
and confined to a few small geographical regions. These do not necessarily seriously 
undermine the central authority of the state, but continue to retard human 
development in various quarters even though the state as a whole is making progress. 
 
This study focuses on politics and conflict using Ebiraland as a case study. Although 
quite a lot of works have been conducted on Ebiraland as far as the researcher knows 
there is no significant work on the relationship between communal politics and 
communal violence and its implication on communal and national politics which is 
within the scope of this study. This study shall contribute in closing up some of the 
gaps existing in the current literature in the area of study. Some researchers and 
historians have carried out studies on Ebiraland; however, only very few of these 
works gave little consideration in relating politics with conflicts in the area.  As far as 
the reasercher is concerned there is no study on Ebiraland that combine the qualitative 
and quantitative data gathering techniques in analyzing issues in the area.  In addition, 
the region is a microsm of Nigeria  thus, solutions profer to politics and conflicts in 
Ebiraland can be applied in resolving conflicts at national level.The significance of 
this study therefore, lies in the fact that it intends to be significant contribution to the 
literature on violent conflicts in Africa, Nigeria and Ebiraland in particular. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
This section details the methods applied to carry out this study. Essentially, it focuses 
on the selection and the mix of methodology deemed suitable for the study including, 
among others, the design of the research, population, sample size determination, types 
and sources of data and the procedures for data gathering and analysis. 
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The study adopts a triangulation approach often referred to as methodological 
pluralism. Triangulation conotes mixing of data or methods such that a researcher 
uses different techniques to get access to different facets of the same social 
phenomenon (Danermark, 2002; Sayer, 2002). The mixing of methodologies, like 
survey data with interviews is a profound form of triangulation. Bouchard (1976:268) 
argues that the convergence or agreement between two methods “enhances our belief 
that the results are valid and not a methodological artifact”. Triangulation can be 
labeled as the “between or across methods” if they serve as a vehicle for cross 
validation when two or more distinct methods are found to be congruent and yield 
comparable data. There is “within-method” triangulation which uses multiple methods 
within a given method. In short, “within-method” triangulation essentially involves 
cross-checking for internal consistency or reliability. While “between-method” 
triangulation tests the degree of external validity (Todd, 1979). In a nutshell, 
triangulation is a combination of appropriate qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. 
 
Qualitative research methods simply denotes a process of investigating a phenomenon 
involving large-scale survey using in-depth interview, focus group discussion which 
can facilitate the scooping of necessary information from the living witnesses of the 
phenomenon under study. Qualitative methods make possible the building of a whole 
mass of information rich in description and explanation, as well as critical evaluation 
of informants‟ words and opinions.  
 
Conversely, quantitative research refers to step-by-step investigation of phenomena 
with the aid of survey design in data gathering and statistical techniques in analysis of 
data (Cresswell, 2003; Andrade, 2009). The two methods explicated above are 
complementary, and both may be seen in a research design. Ragin (1994:92) has 
explained one way the style complements each other: 
the key feature common to all qualitative methods can be seen 
when they are contrasted with quantitative methods. Most 
quantitative data techniques are data condensers. They condense 
data in order to see the big picture. Qualitative methods, by 
contrast, are best understood as data enhancers. When data are 
enhanced, it is possible to see key aspects of cases more clearly. 
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Thus, the study to a large extent combined these two research methods namely; a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.  
 
1.7.1 Research Design 
A research design is a plan that guides an investigator as he or she collects, analyzes, 
and interprets observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows a researcher to 
draw inferences concerning causal relationships among the variables under 
investigation. A research design also defines the domain of generalizability, that is, 
whether the obtained interpretations can be generalized to a larger population or to 
different situations (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). The research design 
adopted for this study is the survey type of research. A survey research design is one 
in which a researcher observes the object of study as they are without manipulating 
them with the aim of collecting firsthand information (Ojo, 2003). Collection of large 
and standardized data from the field-specified groups or population using well 
structured in-depth interviews and questionnaire can be facilitated through research 
design (Fawole et al., 2006). Quantitative data was generated through questionnaire 
while qualitative data was generated through in-depth interview and focus group 
discussion. In a nutshell, research design enables researcher to exploit the factors that 
can not be observed directly. 
 
1.7.2 Research Population 
Ebira people live in Nassarawa, Edo and Kogi States. However, the largest 
concentration of Ebira popularly referred to as Ebira Tao reside in Kogi state. (there 
are dialeletical differences among the different Ebira groups). In other words the 
population of the study is the entire Ebira people.  
 
1.7.3 Sample Size Determination  
The objective of research work is to draw inference from a population in order to 
make generalization on the target population. However, because of the large 
population involved, in most studies researchers hardly study the entire population.  
Therefore, sample is often drawn from the population. As stated earlier, Ebira people 
are found in Nassarawa, Edo and Kogi State. In view of the large population in this 
study, the Ebira Tao in Kogi State, Nigeria which is the largest Ebira group 
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constitutes the sample for this study. The group presently occupies four local 
governments of the state, namely; Okene, Okehi Adavi and Ajaokuta. The choice of 
Ebira Tao is based on the fact that it is the largest concentration of Ebira people. From 
which the sample was drawn based on Yamane  and Cochran formulae. 
Yamani (1964) and Cochran (1967) formula 
 n = N/1+N (e)
 2. Where 
 n = the sample size,  
N = population of study,  
1 = a Constant  
e = marginal error.  
Okene = 320, 260 
Therefore 320, 260/1+320, 260 (0.05)
2 
 = 320, 260/1+320, 260 (0.05)
2 
= 320, 260/1+320, 260 (0.0025)
 
= 320, 260/1+800.65 
n = 400 
Adavi = 202, 194 
Therefore  202, 194/1+202, 194 (0.05)
2  
= 202, 194/1+ 505.485 
n =400 
Ajaokuta & Okehi = 322, 320 
Therefore 322, 320/1+322, 320 (0.05)
2  
= 322, 320/1+322, 320 (0.05)
2  
= 322, 320/1+322, 320 (0.0025) 
= 322, 320/1+805.8 
n= 400 
Total Sample size = 400+400+400 =1200 
= 399.9 = 400 
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To this end therefore, 400 respondents constituted the sample size for Okene, 400 for 
Adavi, and 400 for Ajaokuta and Okehi combined in this research work resulting in 
1200 respondents all together.  
1.7.4 Sampling Techniques 
Given the nature of the subject and the inherent advantages of non-probability 
sampling procedures, the non-probability sampling procedures were adopted. This is 
sequel to the position that: 
Although accurate estimates of the populations‟ parameters can be 
made only with probability samples, social scientists do employ 
non-probability samples. The major reasons for this practice are 
convenience and economy, which under certain circumstances (e.g. 
exploratory research), may outweigh the advantages of using 
probability sampling (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
1992:175).  
 
In a nutshell, non-probaility sampling technique was adopted because of its advantage 
to reach a target sample quickly. As such, simple random sampling (of non-
probability method) was adopted for the survey, while purposive sampling was used 
to reach our respondents. Purposive sampling technique was also adopted to select 
participants for interview and focus group discussion. The choice of the purposive 
sampling technique in this study is premised on the fact that, the primary data 
required for this study especially interview can only be provided by traditional rulers, 
researchers that have conducted studies on Ebiraland and politicians that are well 
informed and possess adequate knowledge on the causes and management of violence 
in Ebiraland. This necessitates a conscious approach in identifying such individuals 
with such uncommon characteristics for the study.  
 
1.7.5 Research Instrument for Data Collection 
The survey data on the causes, nature and consequences of conflict in Ebiraland were 
gathered using a well structured questionnaire, in-depth interview and focus group 
discussion. The questionnaire contains both closed and open-ended questions divided 
into four sections, with each of the sections focusing on a specific segment of the 
study. The first section of the questionnaire addresses issues bordering on clan 
identity politics and conflict. The second section solicits information on competition 
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to acquire, retain and the use of political power and conflict. The third section, 
however, dwells extensively on the implications of intra and inter-party conflict s and 
communal unrest. The fourth section solicits information on economic and socio-
cultural variables exacerbating conflict in Ebiraland. The in-depth interview as well as 
focus group discussion, in like manner cover similar questions as contained in the 
research objectieves. 
 
1.7.6 Sampling  
In this study, 1200 copies of the research questionnaires were administrered to Ebira 
community. This is also called structured interview which involved asking a set of 
questions, using the questionnaire schedule, to determine respondents‟ perception on a 
wide range of issues of interest to the study. The questionnaire administration 
captured Ebira indigenes mainly although some non indigenes were equally captured 
so as to get balance information. The questionnaire addressed issues such as impact of 
clan politics on communal conflict in Ebiraland, struggle for political power, inter-
party conflict, socio-economic variables intervening between politics and conflicts in 
Ebiraland among others. The administration of questionnaire was targeted on places 
where there have been violent conflicts in Ebiraland like Ihima, Adavi, Obehira, 
Okene, Ogaminana, to mention just a few.  
 
Of the 1200 respondents, only 850 were returned. The shortfall was attributed to the 
fact that the respondent developed a lot of suspicion with regards to the intentions of 
the researcher in spite of repeated appeals and explanations. The data were used like 
that in view of the submission that: “A survey research project may include as few as 
100 participants or as many as 250 million” (Dane 1990:120). In addition, Cramer and 
Franses (1999) argue that: “Direct mail campaigns often provide sample with a small 
number of positive responses. In analyzing such samples it is often expedient to omit 
the larger part of the abundant null observation” http://www.tinbergen.nl/ 
 
The effect of non-response was however reduced through the complementary use of 
unstructured interviews of community leaders and politicians. Thus, the researcher 
supplemented and reinforced the questionnaire administration with unstructured 
interviews and focused group discussion. Basically, the purposive sampling technique 
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was used. The interview form used was the one –off type which was unstructured as 
stated before in order to be more in-dept and also allow the interviewees room to fully 
express themselves. The unstructured interview lets the interviewee tell his/her story 
which helps to some extent, the flow of the dialogue. The interview, revolved around 
the key issues as expressed in the research questions.The target interviewees were the 
leaders of Ebira community. They include the Ohinoyi of Ebiraland (paramount ruler 
of Ebiraland) Alhaji Ado Ibrahim, some traditional rulers especially where most of 
the terrible violence took place, politicians, the Chairman Ebira peoples‟ Association -
Alhaji Obeitor, victims of violent conflicts in Ebiraland, scholars that have researched 
into Ebira as a community among others. In addition, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
was equally used. The Focus Group Discussion captures both adult and youth which 
were further divided along sex. Thus, in all there were four groups and none of the 
groups was less than seven participants or more than twelve participants. 
 
In addition, several secondary sources such as books, reports of dailies and periodicals 
describing politics and conflict in Ebiraland were reviewed and analyzed. Data from 
these sources were obtained mainly to support the views and provide insights into the 
data derived from the primary sources. We also used materials from secondary 
sources to address some of the questions that have to do with conceptual and thematic 
issues that also provide the solid bases for qualitative analysis of empirical outcome. 
 
1.7.7 Validity and Reliability of Survey Instrument 
The concern of any researcher is to ensure that the instruments designed for the 
collection of data are dependable. This process is important in any research endavour 
so as to measure accurately and obtain the right responses intended.  First, the 
instrument was given to experts at the Departments of Economics, Demography and 
Business Studies who studied the instrument vis- a -vis the research questions and 
propositions. Through this, some corrections were made before submitting the 
instrument to both supervisors for final corrections. The field questionnaire was 
geared to cut across the social classes in the area as a way of obtaining first hand 
information on the issue. 
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1.7.8 Data Presentation and Analysis 
The study employed the descriptive statistical technique to analyse the data sourced 
from the administration of questionnaire. As stated earlier part of the research design 
necessitated a fieldwork. The fieldwork was in three parts. First, a questionnaire was 
designed and administered in selected areas of Ebiraland where there had been 
conflicts. Apart from the questionnaire instrument, oral interview was also conducted. 
The oral interview focused on some community leaders, elite, politicians and some 
indigenes the researcher believed could give information necessary for the study. The 
interviews offered useful insights far beyond the scope of the questionnaires and 
facilitated the gathering of first hand information on conflicts in Ebiraland. In order to 
avoid gaps, the questionnaire and interview tools were complemented with focused 
group discussion (FGD). Respondents for focused group discussion were drawn from 
adult and the youth of Ebira extraction. The groups were further stratified according 
to sex- male and female apart. The various groups were made to respond to a set of 
questions that range from the causes and nature of the conflict, the role of politicians 
and other economic and socio-cultural factors and attempts to resolve the conflicts. 
The data were presented in simple percentages using tables and chart as illustration. 
The result of the study were therefore, presented, processed and analyzed using the 
content analysis method supplemented with appropriate simple descriptive statistical 
tools such as percentage and frequency distribution. No further in-depth statistical 
analyses are involved given the fact that the study itself is, to a large extent, 
essentially historical although its major import is seen from contemporary 
perspective. 
 
1.8 Scope of the Research  
Ebira people occupy the areas North and East of the confluence of the Rivers Niger 
and Benue in Northern Nigeria. To the South of the Ebira are the Bassange, Bassa 
Kwomo and Igala; to the North and East is Nassarawa Emirate, to the West various 
groups speaking Kakanda, Eggan and Nupe of Bida Emirate and to the South-west are 
the Bini and the Yoruba Speaking people. Politically, Ebiraland is located in the 
Central Senetoral District made up of four local governments namely; Okene, Okehi, 
Adavi and Ajaokuta. It is important to note that during the state creation in 1967, the 
Ebira area fell under the administration of Kwara State and by 1991, the area was 
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carved into the present Kogi State. The population of the entire Ebiraland in Kogi 
State, according to 2006 National Population, is estimated at 844,774, though there 
are Ebiras in other parts of the country. 
 
This study examines 30 years of communal conflicts in Ebiraland 1977-2007. The 
period has been chosen for convenience. The year 1977 marked the country‟s 
preparations towards the birth of the Second Republic. The period was significant in 
Ebiraland given the turbulence of that political era and its negative impact on inter-
group relations in that society. It was also the period Ebira people closed up ranks in 
their efforts to produce the governor of the state. This culminated in the emergence of 
Adamu Attah as the first Executive Governor of the old Kwara State when Ebira Tao 
was still with Kwara State as stated before. Year 2007 was another election year, and 
Ebiraland was not left out of communal conflicts the period engendered. In fact, the 
period was significant in the sense that it birthed the idea of “Ebira Agenda” that is it 
was the turn of Ebira group to produce the governor of the state now Kogi State, 
which was not successful. This was partly because of the political structure of the 
state and also because some Ebiras were apologetic to the Igala in government for 
personal benefits. This plunged the people into war with themselves. Hence, both 
dates are very significant to our present study. The choice of Ebiraland as a case study 
is informed as by regularity of conflict in the area and strategic location of the place 
as it serves as gate way to the Northern, Southern and Eastern parts of the country. 
Our analysis made reference to the origin of the conflicts, particularly from colonial to 
the immediate post-colonial era, and their impact on the nature of the current conflicts 
and the attempts at resolving them. 
 
1.9 Limitations of the Study 
One of the limiting factors encountered in this research exercise was language barrier. 
This was addressed by hiring some research assistants of Ebira extraction that assisted 
in interpreting the responses of non-literate respondents during interviews and in the 
administration of questionnaires to non-educated respondents. Another limitation was 
that the researcher could not adopt participant observation (participating in 
masquerade festival being a non- indigene). The researcher, therefore, relied on the 
works of others, documentaries, interviews and questionnaire to address this area. 
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Further studies can adopt participant observation on issue of culture (masquerade 
festival). Another problem encountered was the scanty information on conflict in 
Ebiraland. This made literature review on Ebira conflict very difficult and made 
works of Audu and Tenuche prominent in our study. 
Apart from the challenges mentioned above which posed some limitations to the 
study, another main limitation that was identified which needed to be stated so that 
findings can be interpreted correctly within the context of the study so that future 
studies can improve on it has to do with periodization. The present study covers 
politics and conflicts in Ebiraland from 1977-2007, further studies can focus on the 
issues discussed beyond the period covered.  
 
1.10 Operational Definition of Terms 
Central to this study are certain concepts that need clarifications in other to provide a 
focus for the senses in which they are to be understood in this study as perhaps against 
other usage or their general usage in the literature of the genre. These concepts are: 
Politicization: In the context of this study, politicization means parochial or 
sentimental view and interpretation of issues for personal or group benefit. 
Community: refers to a group of people having the same culture. 
Communal Conflict: is construed in the study as a conflict within a homogeneous 
group. 
 
1.11 Chapter Outlines   
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two 
dwells on literature review and theoretical framework and, while chapter three focuses 
on the geography of conflicts in Africa. The fourth chapter examines communal 
conflicts in Nigeria and the geography of Ebira, and the fifth is the presentation, 
analysis and interpretation of data.Chapter six is the summary, conclusion and 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Quite a number of studies have been undertaken by researchers on conflict, focusing 
on its different dimensions. This chapter reviews previous and related studies, 
observation, opinions, ideas and comments mostly on causes and management of 
conflicts. This becomes imperative so as to situate this study in a proper context, and 
also to establish a link between the existing or previous studies and this research work 
with a view to identifying knowledge gaps in the literature with respect to the focus of 
this study. The essence of this is to shed light on where to intervene by providing the 
missing link and by updating and contributing to the existing body of knowledge in 
the field. Thematic method is adopted in the effort to review literature on the concept 
of politics, conflict, good and bad sides of conflict, identity politics and conflict, 
relationship between democratization, economic, religion, culture and conflict among 
others. Attempt is also made to examine conflict resolution mechanism and also to 
situate the study within theoretical framework relevant to the study. 
 
2.1 Conceptual Discourse 
 2.1.1 On Politics 
Political conflict is an endemic feature of most political systems in the world. This is 
particularly true of developing countries including Nigeria where conflicts, crises and 
violence have become essential characteristics of its political process, especially after 
independence (Anifowose, 2006). Before going into the review of literature, it is 
essential to consider some definitions of the key concepts- politics and conflict. It 
must be noted that the word politics does not seem to lend itself to any universally 
accepted definition. This is because of the ideological, cultural and historical 
contextualizations that underpin its several meanings. According to Appadorai (1974), 
the term politics is derived from the Greek word polis, a city-state. This definition 
sees politics from the angle of political organization and the relationships between 
individuals and the state. Apadorai‟s definition of politics is shared by Ayam (2004) 
who argues that the term “politics” originated from the Greek word “polis” which 
hinges on the political communities and the debates on matters of public interest. In 
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their own contributions, Kaplan and Lasswell (1950: xiv) define politics as “the 
shaping, distribution and exercise of power”. Lasswell (1936) sees politics as who 
gets what, when and how. To Dahl (1976) politics encapsulates any form of human 
interactions that involves, to a great extent, power, rule or authority. Easton 
(1971:129) aptly captures the concept as authoritative allocation of values for society. 
In this context, politics is viewed as an activity in society through which values are 
delivered and people having higher authority for the distribution of those same values 
among people who may have different interests and objectives. In otherwords, 
political power is necessary to qualify in the distribution of values. 
 
Onyekpe (2003) is of the view that politics is directed towards and anchored on the 
achievement of power.  It is not a surprise therefore, that Max Weber cited in 
Bentham (1974) defines politics as striving to share power, or influence its 
distribution either among states or among groups within a state. Weber‟s definition 
validates the fact that politics involves power struggle which has intra-national, 
national and international dimensions. The intimate relationship that exists between 
politics and power has been illustrated by Nnoli. He argues that: 
Power exists in practically all institutions. It follows the same 
dynamics. But when we talk about power in politics we talk about 
state power. Politics is an attempt to be in the highest position 
possible so as to wield state power. All other forms of power yield to 
it and are, or can be controlled by it. This explains its attractiveness. 
Those who are very wealthy and thus expected to be contented must 
still strive for control of state power because without this control, 
their wealth may not be secured as state power could be used to take 
their wealth away (Nnoli, 1986:81). 
 
It can be deduced from the above that state power is a very useful instrument to have 
and control as access to state power guarantees access to almost every thing in life. 
The volatility usually generated by political activities in comparison with economic, 
social and cultural activities is an eloquent testimony to the fact that, the usefulness of 
state power to groups and individuals is widely recognized.  According to Nnoli 
(1986), people scheme, jostle and sometimes kill in a manner that is not seen in the 
other spheres of life in order to gain political power. This trend of thought is quite 
different to the position of Plato (1968) who insisted that individuals interested in 
moderating the affairs of men must be endowed with certain cardinal virtues. These 
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are temperance, fortitude, sense of justice and prudence. Tocqueville the American 
political scientist had a similar understanding of power. Power to him must seek: 
To bring glory and well being to humanity, power without glory is 
hollow and without meaning. The glorious nature of power is in 
the sense that the exercise connotes the positive traits which power 
must seek to acquire. Power in all its manifestation should be 
exercised with restraints; power without restraints lead to chaos 
and disorder (Tocqueville, 1955). 
  
 This negative dimension of power destroys the very essence of humanity by returning 
man to the state of nature. Whereas when power exhibits a positive trait it brings glory 
by uplifting humanity to its highest point. This further promotes a communitarian 
form of living and social interaction among the distinct nationalities that constitute a 
given state (Ekeocha, 2003). 
 
 Hague and Harrup (1992) see politics as the process by which groups make collective 
decision which affects and commits those who belong to the group. This definition is 
in line with that of Sodaro (2001:27) who sees politics as “the process by which 
communities pursue collective goals and deal with their conflicts authoritatively by 
means of government”. Process in this sense means a continuous sequence of events 
among actors, such as individuals, organizations, and government. It also by 
implication means the political interaction that takes place generally within the 
structure of rules, procedures, and institutions rather than haphazardly. A community 
can be any collective interactions of individuals, from the tinniest village to the world 
as a whole.  
  
This definition also sheds light on the manner in which resources are allocated 
“authoritatively” as it places central importance on government in political life. 
Politics from this perspective is looked at as conflict management. Society is made up 
of different micro and macro nationalities, religions and interests (professional or 
otherwise), bringing to the fore conflicts in the course of competing for the scarce 
resources in the society (Puke, 2007). The resolutions of such conflicts constitute the 
central theme of politics. Hence, Harris (1976:100) argues that politics is: “concerned 
with the management of conflict, the toning down of quarrelsome activities and noise 
in a regulated order that allows for the continued existence of human beings capable 
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of reaching decisions collectively”. In their own contributions, Kaplan and Lasswell 
(1950: xiv) define politics as “the shaping, distribution and exercise of power”. 
Lasswell (1936) sees politics as who gets what, when and how. To Dahl (1976) 
politics encapsulates any form of human interactions that involves, to a great extent, 
power, rule or authority. Easton (1971:129) aptly captures the concept as authoritative 
allocation of values for society. In this context, politics is viewed as an activity in 
society through which values are delivered and people having higher authority for the 
distribution of those same values among people who may have different interests and 
objectives. 
 
William (1965) looks at politics as a social process characterized by activity involving 
rivalry and cooperation in the exercise of power and culminating in the making of 
decisions for a group”. Grazia (1965) sees politics from institutional perspective. 
“Politics or the political” includes the events that happen around the decision-making 
centers of government”. However, the way and manner politics is practiced in Nigeria 
lends credence to the definition of politics credited to Alexandria Beirce cited in 
Richard Pius (1986) as strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles, the 
conduct of public affairs for private advantage. Little wonder that Ujo (2003) argues 
that, if questions are posed to people on their views on politics, their answers is likely 
to be a negative one. That is they are not interested in politics. 
He continues: 
Thus, it is commonplace to hear people making the following 
statements: “don‟t play politics with this issue keep politics out of 
the matter. “He is above politics”, “politics has destroyed him”. 
Politics is therefore seen as a bad thing whose stock-in-trade is 
blackmails, manipulation, double-dealing, violence and 
assassination (Ujo, 2003:1). 
 
The various definitions above presuppose that politics to some extent involves 
conflict and it revolves around the concept of power, influence and authority which 
are often used interchangeably. The reason why politics is associated with conflict is 
not far-fetched; members of a group often disagree at least initially before they agree. 
This disagreement is premised on scarcity of resources and natural differences in likes 
and dislikes of men. Limited resources imply prioritization of goals which invariably 
are to the advantage of some groups and disadvantage to the other groups.  
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The second aspect of politics revolves around the concept of power, influence and 
authority which are the central currencies of politics. In a nutshell,  politics by its 
nature often brings to the fore an unequal power relationship between or among 
people or groups and the person or group(s) that control greater resources ipso factor 
control others.  
 
2.1.2 On Conflict  
The word conflict is taken from the Latin word “conflictus” meaning “struck 
together”. Conflict means clash, contention, confrontation, a battle or struggle, 
controversy or quarrel (Nwolise, 1997:28). Conflict as an element of social interaction 
has evoked a lot of arguments. Suffice to say that there are as many definitions of 
conflict. Coser (1956) defines conflict as a struggle over values and claims over 
status, power and resources, in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, 
injure or eliminate their rivals. To Donohue and Kolt (1992), conflict has to do with 
the expression of differences by interdependent people in the course of achieving their 
needs and goals. To Deutsch (1973:10), conflict exists “whenever incompatible 
activities occur: an action that is incompatible with another action prevents, obstructs, 
interferes, injures or in some ways makes the latter less likely to be effective”. 
Bernard (1953 cited in Bassey, 2002) has contended that conflict arises as a result of 
incompatible or mutually exclusive goals or aims or values espoused by human 
beings. This definition sees conflict from goal perspective. 
 
 However, Pruit and Rubin (1986) see conflict from perceptual point of view (cited in 
Bassey, 2002). To them conflict denotes the perceived divergence of interest(s), or 
aspirations that cannot be achieved simultaneously. Ross (1993:14) notes that conflict 
“occurs when parties disagree about the distribution of material or symbolic resources 
and act because of the incompatibility of goals or a perceived divergence of interest”. 
Some other scholars see conflict as a natural occurrence in man, not necessarily in 
contest for resources, but still a deference of interest. Abel (1941), Bernard (1957) and 
Hobbs (1974) identify with this group. McCrery (1985) sees conflict as the overt 
coercive interactions of contending collectivities. Sills (1965) submits that conflict 
could arise in an atmosphere in which each party is likely to seek a maximum 
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advantage that cannot be achieved without reducing the advantage of the other part.  
This materialist idea of conflict has been dominant among some scholars (See Post 
and Vicker, 1973; Nnoli, 1978; Sharma, 1982; Barongo, 1987; and Anugwom, 1997).  
It has also been noted that conflict arises as a consequence of the striving of a man, 
the social being who in the course of promoting some of his objectives, either 
intentionally or unintentionally upsets or direct to negative uses, instead of 
strengthening along beneficial line, some of the arrangement that ought to be for the 
benefit of man. Hence, conflicts come up as a result of negative contradiction and are 
such irresolvable by peaceful means (Igwe, 1997; Nwanegbo, 2005). 
 
Omotosho (2004) avers that it is widely believed by scholars that a conflict situation 
crops up when two or more parties could not agree on an issue. The parties involved 
may not necessarily be governments or nations. Ekanola (2004: 34) posits that “the 
term conflict embodies notion of strife, struggle, differences, and disagreement”. It is 
indeed the struggle for mutually exclusive rewards or the use of incompatible means 
to achieve a goal. Horowitz (1985:101) sees conflict as a “struggle in which the aim is 
to get objective and simultaneously neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals”. Daugharty 
and Falzgrart cited in Omotosho (2004), view conflict as a situation in which one 
identifiable group of human beings which could be tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
religious, socio-economic, political or otherwise is in a state of conscious opposition 
to one or more other identifiable human groups. This could be because those groups 
are pursuing what appears to be incompatible goals. 
 
Though there exist avalanche of perspectives of the concept, but an examination of 
the various definitions and views shows that conflict is a fact of life. It is indeed an 
integral aspect of social existence brought about by contradictions arising from 
difference in ideas, perceptions, goals and competition for acquisition of scarce 
resources. This lends credence to the statement credited to the Marxists in extant 
literature that to understand society is to understand social conflict.  Thus, an ideal 
society is not noted for absence of conflict but rather its ability to manage conflicting 
interests constructively so that it will not snowball to violence that will threaten the 
continued existence of such a society. Opinions are divided among scholars as regard 
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whether conflict only has negative aspect or there are some positive benefits derivable 
from conflict?  
 
2.1.3 Values of Conflict 
Although conflict is found in almost every realm of human interaction and can be said 
to be newsworthy events of human life, it would be a mistake to assume that 
interaction necessarily involves conflict or that conflict usually takes a heavily 
escalated form. More often than not people manage to get along remarkably well with 
other individuals, groups, and organization. This is often done with little evidence of 
conflict along the way. When conflict does arise it is settled, even resolved with little 
acrimony and to the mutual satisfaction of the parties involved (Pruitt, 2004). 
 
In terms of its positive values, it is ironical that just as conflict is detested and feared 
by some people, there are others that desire and enjoy it. This is predicated on the fact 
that they see conflict as serving occasionally as propeller of positive change, growth 
and development in human, state and international affairs. It is not surprising that 
Pruit and Kim (2004) see conflict as the seedbed through which social change is 
nourished.  They assert that people who regard their situation as unjust or 
uncomfortable with some policies must confront them for a change; otherwise, old 
policies that may advance only a few people‟s interests will prevail. This is in 
agreement with Coser (1956:197) that “conflict prevents the ossification of the social 
system by exerting pressure for innovation and creativity”.  At the state level, there 
are examples of conflicts that easily come to mind this include the ethnic cleansing 
policy embarked upon by President Milosevic‟s government in Yugoslavia against 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1998-1999. The Yugoslavia war was characterized by 
mass killing, burning and burying of hundreds of Albanians; and the burning of their 
homes which were quickly occupied by the ethnic group members of the invading 
forces.  NATO‟s violent and continuous bombardment of Yugoslavia for eleven 
weeks (April-June 1999) brought the wanton destruction of lives and property to an 
abrupt end (Nwolise, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, apartheid would have lasted than it did in South Africa if it was not 
violently challenged by the people and the international community (Nwolise, 2004). 
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Evidence at international level also shows that conflict does have good side. For 
instance, the racist theory of Aryan race supremacy would have been imposed on the 
world by Hitler‟s Nazis army and their supporters- Italy and Japan if it had not been 
violently challenged by the allied forces led by the United States of America in the 
Second World War (1939-1945) (Nwolise, 2004).   
  
Thus, from the above, one can see why some people or groups take to violent conflict 
and recommend it as something desirable and enjoyable. Little wonder, that Burton 
(1987:137-138), advocated that (violent) conflict is creative and should, like sex, be 
enjoyed: 
Conflict like sex is an essential creative element in human 
relationship. It is the means to change, the means by which our 
social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for 
personal development can be achieved. Indeed conflict like sex is 
to be enjoyed. 
 
Contrarily, conflict is seen as a negative outcome. If conflict is actually productive 
and creative, inspires innovation and competitive spirit, serves as instrument for the 
protection of human rights, and securing justice, why do human beings fear and abhor 
it?  Why the elaborate arrangement for its management? The answer is predicated on 
the fact that people caught in conflict often suffer from a wide range of psychological 
and physical health problems including a weakened immune system (Kiecolt – Glaser 
et al., 1997), depression (Christian Herman et al., 2001), and eating disorders (Van 
Den Broucke et al., 1997). 
 
Heavily escalated conflict, such as warfare, leaves a far-reaching residue on society in 
general (Pruitt and Kim (2004). During wartime, violent acts become socially 
acceptable, legitimate, or even heralded as heroic. Conflict can snowball to war, and 
war destroys life and property, principles and values, and wakes up beastly elements 
in man. Nwolise (2004) opines that war can lead to environmental pollution and 
degradation. It kills human beings in their millions depending on the magnitude, and 
forces people to become refugees either in their own country or outside their country. 
Conflict and war divert the developmental resources of a state to defence and war. It 
retards the rate of development of a people and a state, at least in the short run. It 
spreads pestilences, destitution, hunger and starvation. In fact, it can create the 
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atmosphere of insecurity. It is indeed a very costly venture. At a point, the coalition 
forces spent about $3 million per hour during the Vietnam War, and the coalition 
forces spent about $100 billion in the 1991 Gulf War (Momah, 1993). Conflict often 
may result into war if it is not well-managed. 
War in its totality is evil it destroys, ruins, maims, changes 
boundaries, topples governments, humanities, peoples, brutalizes 
the human psyche, wrecks the precious family togetherness, and 
most regrettably, often sows the seed of other wars (Momah, 
1993:34). 
 
The prevalence of violent conflict and its numerous negative consequences made it 
inevitable for man to always make frantic efforts to seek the quickest and best way to 
manage conflict around the world. The ability to monitor and prevent conflict is very 
essential to prevent it from escalating to violent proportion.  Where conflict, 
invariably breaks out, and becomes violent, then steps should be taken immediately to 
keep the peace (Nwolise, 2004). 
 
From the analysis above, the paradox of conflict appears visible- that is conflict has 
both beneficial and harmful effects. What often happens is that the negative 
consequences of conflict always overshadow the seemingly beneficial aspects of it. It 
is pretty difficult to see any positive functions in the throes of conflict leaving in its 
wake heavy casualties, wanton destruction of properties, inexpressible post-traumatic 
stress disorder and attendant famine. 
  
2.2 Conflict in Africa  
However, in recent time, Africa seems to be the worst hit as far as conflict is 
concerned. Suffice to say that the case of Africa is that of a war-ridden continent that 
is fast becoming the bedlam of the globe. Violence, social disorder and ethnic 
internecine feuds have emerged as dominant features of political life of Africa. 
Among the layers of the horrific cases that have drawn international attention and 
concern were the genocide in Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Burundi 
and all states that have come to be tagged “collapsed” or “failed” states. Another layer 
consists of those that have wriggled out of the conundrum and convolution of failed 
states to newly reconstructed states which include Chad, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Mali (Adekeye, 1999). He noted that the nature of 
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conflict a society faces is determined by its location along the homogeneity – 
heterogeneity continuum. 
Since conflict is ubiquitous, one may ask: what are the sources of conflict? To put it 
differently, what are the causes of conflict? Quite a number of scholars have viewed 
the source of conflict emphasizing different aspects. 
 
2.3 Causes of Conflict 
2.3.1 Identity- Based Politics and Conflict 
Although the destruction of human groups on the basis of their religious affiliation, 
national identity or other group membership has a long history, it seems that “identity-
based” conflicts have occurred more frequently in recent decades. Violence is 
increasingly perpetrated against individuals on the basis of their belonging to a 
particular group (e.g. ethnic, religious, national, clan, caste), often by individuals 
apparently acting on behalf of another group. Perhaps most disquieting is the 
increasing number of “ordinary” civilians who are involved in this violence as both 
victims and perpetrators. In some cases, people who have lived side-by-side in peace 
for many years, engaging in friendships and even matrimonial relations, suddenly turn 
against each other with astonishing brutality (Hilker, 2008). 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, Africa became a theatre of violent conflicts from 
Burundi to Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo to Sierra Leone, Somalia to 
Rwanda and Guinea to Sudan. The indelible mark of the new wars is that they are 
linked to identity, particularly ethnic identity. While there are many identity markers 
such as race, nationhood, kinship, class, religion, language, gender, age, geographic 
location, cultural preferences, and occupation-such as military function or herders and 
tillers- by and large ethnicity is identified as the dominant axis about which conflicts 
have revolved (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007). In analyzing what she called the “new 
war”, Kaldor (1999) argues that the new conflicts are not wars in the modernist sense 
between states or organized political groups for political ends. Rather they are 
connected with the resurgence of identity politics after the collapse of the Berlin wall. 
In this regard, primordial identities have pursued claims to power within the arena of 
the modern nation-state. The ubiquity of identity wars is based on the fact that, ethnic 
identity is indeed particularly strong in traditional societies- embodying the deeply-
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embedded sense of belonging to a group with unique identity markers, such as myths 
of common ancestry, shared memories, cultural values, traditions and symbols, and 
ownership of territory (Endalew, 2002). 
 
There are numerous studies on ethnicity and religion in Africa, but they are not 
theoretically grounded in current research on identity. For example the works of 
Rasmussen (1993) and Adekanye (1995) while both of these studies are useful, 
neither of them is conceptualized in terms of identity. A notable exception to this 
claim is Lemarchand‟s case study of identity construction among the Hutus and the 
Tutsis in Burundi (Lamarchand, 1994). Much of the literature on the relationship 
between identities, violence and (in) security has tended to polarize the two 
perspectives. The first variously sees “identity-based” conflicts as a product of 
“primordial” cultural differences (Geertz, 1963); pre-existing kinship or religious ties 
(Smith, 1986); longstanding antipathy between different “ethnic” or other groups 
(Kaplan, 1993); or insurmountable differences between civilizations such as “Islam” 
and “the “West” (Huntington 1996). To varying degrees, these authors see “ethnic” 
and other identities as culturally determined, immutable or essential aspects of human 
societies.  
 
The second perspective comprises those who argue that such violence is not really 
about identity but competition between groups over access to power and resources 
(e.g. Cohen, 1974; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;). Proponents of this perspective argue 
that ethnic, nationalist or other identities come into being and endure for a purpose 
and are only relevant as far as they can be exploited for political or economic 
advantage in interaction with other groups. Some authors highlight the role of ethnic 
entrepreneurs–political leaders that strategically instrumentalise cultural values, ethnic 
and religious symbols to mobilize support for their claims (Brass, 1985, Turton, 
1997).  
 
Both perspectives might lead to the conclusion that it is not necessary to pay much 
attention to the politics of identity. The first, because conflict on the basis of identity 
differences is seen as inevitable, thus the focus should be on intervening to prevent 
the use of violence. The second, because identity differences per se do not matter, 
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thus the focus should be tackling underlying grievances and mediating competing 
interests between groups in ways that do not result in violence. In relation to the first 
perspective, however, there are now numerous studies of violent contexts, which have 
shown that there is nothing inevitable either about the nature of the identity 
differences purported or their articulation through violence (e.g. Bringa, 1995, 
Mamdani, 2001, Valentine, 1996). Equally, the absence of violence in many contexts 
with sharp cultural, religious or other group differences suggests that this perspective 
is flawed. In relation to the second perspective, although there is little doubt that 
collective violence is largely rooted in competition over power, resources, territory 
and livelihoods, these instrumentalist arguments often fail to question where specific 
“ethnic”, “religious” or other identities originate or why “ethnic” or “religious” 
symbols have such appeal to the wider population (Turton 1997). Indeed, there is 
evidence to suggest that struggles over ideas, beliefs and values are important in their 
own right – not just in an instrumental sense (e.g. Bartov and Mack, 2001). 
  
Furthermore, the accent on ethnicity as a cause of conflict is problematic in at least 
two ways. First, ethnic identity does not sufficiently explain communal war. Some 
homogenous nations like Somalia have been engulfed in civil war while many 
heterogeneous societies live in peace as argued by (Osman, 2007). In addition, the so-
called African traditional identities are often recent constructions, either by colonial 
powers or by their post-colonial successors, resulting in mythologies of Africanist 
cultures (Bayert, 2005; Banega, 2006). Why then has the ethnic identity become so 
combustive? 
 
In an attempt to account for the explosion of ethnic-based violence, Apadurai (1998) 
links the preponderance of identity conflict to the force of globalization, noting that 
ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusions and chaotic 
environments created by economic globalization. Hagg and Kagwanja (2007) argues 
that many analysts understood ethnic identity as a new trend by the leaders of one-
party, vintage to resort to recruiting surrogates and clients to organize violence against 
rebellious citizens. Salih (1989) unveils how the Sudanese state recruited tribal 
militias to terrorize civilian populations in a move that contributed to the “re-
tribalisation” of politics. The use of tribal authorities as agents of political violence 
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has become widespread in countries as diverse as Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi 
and South Africa. Our argument in this work is that without politicizing identity, it 
will be difficult to generate conflict. In view of the above position, it will be pertinent 
to take a quick look at politics and identity-based conflict in pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial. 
 
Historical analyses of conflict enchant the pre-colonial period as the golden era of 
identity relations, pointing to the low politicization of ethnic or other identities in 
society. Mixing of identity groups often occurred during trade, wealth and provision 
of skills (Bayert, 2005). But the distinct mark of pre-colonial African societies was 
not the absence of multiple identities or conditions that could ignite conflict. Rather, it 
was the absence of the elevation of a single identity- ethnicity, clan, gender or age gap 
(Hagg and Kagwanja, 2005). 
 
Political “tribalism” as opposed to “moral ethnicity” which can form the basis of a 
civic order is rooted in colonial politics. Part of Africa‟s problem is what Eke (1975) 
identifies as the dichotomy between civic public and the primordial public. The 
former is perceived as amoral zone of rights and the latter as moral and governed by 
customs. Africa is still struggling to bridge the gap created by these bifurcated spheres 
inherited from the colonial society, which has produced two patterns of rights and 
obligations. 
 
Drawing from Eke‟s position, Mamdani, (2002) argues that the ethnicisation of 
politics started with the construction of ethnicity as a legal entity that was elevated 
over otherwise fluid and loose characteristics of populations. This process turned race 
and tribe into fixed denominators in the colonial legal project. Ethnicity became axial 
to the colonial divide- and-rule device used for the purpose of political control, 
enforcement of taxes and the extraction of wealth (Broch-Due, 2005; Rubin, 2006). 
The colonial state drove a wedge between ethnic groups by giving preferential 
treatment to some identity groups through appointments of local authorities or 
administrative staff in the colonial offices. For example, the Belgian and French 
ascribed the Hamitic “race” identity to the Tutsis in Rwanda as against the “Bantu 
tribal” identity of the Hutus. This flaw classification laid the foundation for ethnic 
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rivalry and conflict which would culminate in the 1994 genocide (Prunier, 1997). The 
colonial manipulation of ethnicity bequeathed Africa‟s post-colonial societies with the 
polarities of settler (migrant) and the native (indigenous) categories. These have 
become the axis about which ethnic violence in Rwanda or more recently in Kenya 
rotates (Mamdani, 1996). The violent conflicts between Ife-Modakeke; Tiv-Jukun; 
Hausa- Berom in Jos among others also fall into this category. 
 
Africa‟s post-colonial states inherited these ethnic stereotypes and divisive patterns of 
power between and within specific ethnic identities, thus sowing the seed of 
competition and conflict along fault-lines. It did not help the matter that many post-
colonial patrimonial elites continued this legacy of divide- and-rule to protect their 
power. 
 
The argument that ethnic differences often breed conflict has been contradicted by 
some authors. Moe‟s (2009) analyses of works of Paul and Collier (1998, 1999) 
contends that though strife often occurs along ethnic lines, evidence indicates that 
ethnicity itself is seldom the “root” cause of civil wars. That fractionalization 
influences the likelihood of civil war cannot be fully substantiated. This is because 
societies fractionalized into many ethnic groups or heterogonous societies are likely to 
have less civil war. Heterogeneous societies contain many ethnic groups with no 
single group dominating. The analysis of their works according to Moe (2009) shows 
that, ethnic diversity actually helps to deter civil war in Africa. This is premised on 
the fact that as heterogeneity increases; the variety of competing interests hampers 
rebel efforts to organize. However, Nnoli (1978); Osaghae (2001) and Suberu (2001) 
do not agree that ethnic differences do not result in conflict and that rather identity has 
been at the heart of conflict in Africa. Despite the link between ethnic identities and 
violent conflict, some believe according to Hagg and Kagwanja (2007) that identities 
have a role to play in conflict resolution. Organization like UNESCO (2005) and the 
Africa Union (2005) have embraced cultural diversity and expression of different 
identities as important assets in peacemaking and nation building.  
 
Indeed, authors like Tan (2006) celebrate the diversity of identities as an asset in the 
re-engineering of the civic order. It is necessary to state that ethnic or sub-ethnic 
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identity may not necessarily lead to conflict if such differences are not politicized. 
Onuoha (2011) postulates that although conflict may seem to be ethnic or religious in 
nature, yet they are often staged at the parameter of the political. Suffice to say that 
exploitation of ethnic or sub-ethnic differences by political actors is responsible for 
violent conflict. This is in tandem with the findings of Human Right Watch (1995) 
that communal tensions are not the immediate cause of many violent and persistent 
communal conflicts. While communal tensions are obviously a necessary ingredient 
of an explosive mix, they alone are not sufficient to unleash widespread violence. 
Rather, time after time the proximate cause of communal violence is governmental 
exploitation of communal differences.  
 
Scholars do not agree as regards the causes of conflict. While some emphasize 
economic benefits as the major source of conflict some situate it within the context of 
colonialism. Still others heap it on structural conditions, injustice, religion, 
marginalization, democratization, ethnicity, culture, electoral competition and so on. 
The contention of this work is that while the aforementioned factors are very 
important in explaining causes of conflict, they are often determined and influenced 
by politics. Political power according to Stewart (1998) is both an end and a means to 
an end. Political power is an important instrument of economic power. At this 
juncture, the controversy as regard the causes of conflict will be analyzed further. 
 
To Nwolise (2004), conflicts emanate generally from socio-economic and political 
injustices in society either at the inter-personal level, inter-group or state interaction. 
These injustices may hinge on sharing of resources including leadership positions, the 
way human rights and freedoms are handled, or on the handling of demands, and 
jointly owned assets. These can bring about clash of interests, opinion and values. 
This argument is in line with that of Stedman who asserts that “conflict arises from 
problems basic to all populations, the tugs and pulls of different identities, the 
differential distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions 
of what is right, fair, and just” (Nwolise, 2004:5). 
 
It can be gleaned from the above that perpetration of injustices or violation of human 
rights pave way for conflict because justice and human rights are more valued by 
 
 
 
44 
 
human beings than peace. This validates the veracity of words of wisdom credited to 
Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, that: “Injustice and Peace are in the 
long run incompatible. Stability in a changing world must mean ordered change 
towards justice not mechanical respect for the status quo” (Nyerere, 1973:215). Agree 
that injustice can bring about conflict, but the point must be made that selfishness, 
greed, avarice, unbridle quest for power in an illegitimate way can generate conflict. 
However, the benefit of Nwolise‟s analysis to this study is seen in the fact that, 
sharing of resources likes political leadership in an unacceptable way to a group or 
groups in a community or state can bring about conflict. More so, it is also our 
contention in this work that although identity politics does matter, we argue that if we 
are to combat violent conflict at the local, national and global level, we need to take 
identity politics seriously, to look deeply into the processes that lead to the 
perpetration of violence in the name of identity in specific contexts, and to explore 
possible measures to prevent and respond to this violence. In particular, we need to 
understand under what circumstances identity politics is exercised in ways that are 
exclusionary or violent rather than inclusive and empowering. The point must be 
stressed that identity politics is not the only factor that gives fillip to violence, 
colonialism has also been implicated. 
 
2.3.2 Colonial Induced Conflict 
Some scholars have heaped the blame of conflict especially in Africa on colonialism. 
That is to say, colonialism bequeathed on its victim debilitating legacies and 
destructive post-colonial disruptions. Zela (2008) notes that, there is hardly any zone 
of conflict in contemporary Africa, which cannot trace its sordid violence to colonial 
history and even the late nineteenth century. For instance Kastfelt (2005) maintains 
that the region, from the Sudan and fomerly Northern Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and 
Congo, was scene of brutal civil wars and genocide. It is interesting to note that this 
region has a long history of colonial violence in the form of slave trade, slave labour, 
plantain labour, plantation terror and a violent gun culture, which have to be taken 
into account when explaining the contemporary situation. 
 
It is noteworthy that colonialism and its brutality orchestrated the stage for liberation 
struggles. In addition, Africa massive contributions to the two World Wars created the 
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conditions and contradictions that galvanized anti-colonial nationalism (Page, 1974; 
Miller, 1974; Osuntokun, 1979; Sainsbury 1979; Kerslake, 1997; Kilingray and 
UNESCO, 1985; Rathbone, 1986; Oberst 1991; Page, 2000; Akurang-Parry, 2002a, 
2002b). Although colonial experience may be responsible for conflict in some regions 
in the sense that the imprecision of the delimitation and the inordinate apportionment 
of territory principally along the lines of mere convenience of colonial rule, have 
produced untold confusion, conflict, tension and wars among African peoples 
(Oduntan, 2011).  
Colonialism according to Nnoli (1978) heightened ethnic consciousness. In the search 
for the crumbs from colonial production, competition among Africans reinforced 
common consciousness among the various competing ethnic groups. At times the 
historical and and competitive aspects of this consciousness were linked. Nnoli argued 
further that although historical competition among groups may have reinforced their 
varied identity, however, contemporary competition according to him may have also 
reinforced inherited historical identification.  Ethnicity is expressed through inter-
ethnic discrimination in jobs, housing, and admissions into educational institutions, 
marriages, business transaction, and distribution of social services. In a nutshell, 
tribalism or ethnicity in Nigeria is a creature of the colonial and post-colonial order.  
 
While this perspective deals with a very important aspect of African political history, 
it does not completely explain the causes of conflict because some countries like 
Liberia and Ethiopia were never colonized but were at different times embroiled in 
violent conflicts. Agreed that colonialism through aggregating people of different 
ethnic backgrounds into a monolithic whole and disaggregating monolithic entity 
among disparate entities exacerbated conflicts in Africa but the fact still remains that 
pluralism is a universal phenomenon.  Analysis on conflict should therefore, be 
situated within the context of political and socio-economic factors that often give 
impetus to violent conflict.   
 
Another source of conflict was the Cold War in which Africa was enmeshed directly 
and indirectly, ideologically and militarily, politically and economically (Zela, 2008). 
Africa desperately trying to forge nation-states out of the cartographic contraptions of 
colonialism and to rid itself of the last vestiges of colonialism found itself divided 
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between the two polar powers. Scholars noted that from the Congo to the Horn of 
Africa to Southern Africa, the cold war fomented or facilitated destructive wars and 
conflicts (Kalb 1982; Noer, 1985; Borstelmann 1993; Harbeson and Rothchild, 1995; 
Munene et al 1995; Oyebade and Alao 1998; Gordon et al. 1998; Akinrade and Sesay 
1999; Issa-Salwe 2000; Percox 2004). This position did not so much explicate the 
manipulation of ethnic and sub-ethnic differences by cynical and bankrupt political 
class as a major cause of conflict. 
  
Armed inter-communal insurrections are often episodic eruptions of violence sparked 
by specific incidents that stoke long simmering, antagonisms, anxieties and 
aggressions. These could result into loss of life and if unchecked, it can mutate into 
prolonged warfare between ethnic and regional militias, which can in turn develop 
into guerilla armies that could threaten the viability of the nation-state. The periodic 
explosions of genocidal violence in Rwanda and Burundi demonstrated most 
horrifically in the Rwanda 1994 genocide, depicted the potential destructiveness 
inherent in inter-communal conflict abetted by the state and reinforced by the 
devastations of economic stagnation, politicized and manipulated by the political class 
(Zela, 2008).  
In other to have a full grasp of the phenomenon of conflict it is necessary to look 
beyond colonialism. Countries of Africa seem to have witnessed more conflicts in 
post-colonial era. In fact, democratization that occasioned decolonization with 
attendace stiff competition for political power appears to have been characterised with 
surge of violence. 
 
2.3.3 Democratization, Political Competition and Conflict 
It is very important to note that scholars do not agree as regard the role of democracy 
in peace and conflict. While some argued that democracy fosters peace, some argued 
exactly the opposite that democracy precipitates violent conflict. Some scholars have 
tapped into the relationship between democracy, democratization and armed conflict. 
A prevailing assumption both within theory and practice has been that peace and 
democracy are mutually reinforcing. While more democracy is probably the answer to 
political violence in the long run, an expanding body of scholarly work has contended 
that democratization processes- in particular post-conflict societies-are highly 
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conflictual. In deed under certain conditions democratization will make a return to 
war more likely (Snyder, 2000; Mansfield and Snyder, 2001; Paris, 2004). Let us look 
at the argument in detail. 
 
We are led to believe that democracy and peace are inexorably linked; that democracy 
leads to and causes peace; and that peace cannot be achieved in the absence of 
democracy. Woodrow Wilson was one of the earliest and strongest proponents of this 
view. He said in his “war message” on April 2, 1917: 
A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a 
partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could 
be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be 
a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its 
vitals away; the plotting of inner circles who could plan what they 
would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at 
its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their 
honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind 
to any narrow interests of their own (Cited in Ostrowski 
http:docs.google.com). 
 
Thus, scholars and statesmen draw inferences and expectations from democratic 
peace theory to make predictions about the global system (Hermann and Kegley, 
1996; Starr, 1992). It has been established that the probability of two democratic 
states engaging one another in militarized conflict has been repeatedly proven to be 
extremely low (Russett, 1993; Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon, 2000). Increasing the 
number of democratic regimes in the international system (and the number of 
democratic dyads, assuming a constant system size) should result in a more peaceful 
international system. Therefore, one possible path to global peace is democratization. 
Quite a number of studies show that militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) rarely 
occur between democratic states after the Second World War (Bremer, 1993; Moaz 
and Russett, 1993; Rousseau et al., 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997; Huth and Allee 
2002, 2003). Theses authors typically attribute this to domestic norms and institutions 
that exist in democratic polities and that constrain their recourse to force when 
conflict arises between them. 
 
Democratic-peace theory, as Russett (2007:2) observes is “a statement about pairs of 
democratic countries”.  Its claims apply to interactions between democratic polities. 
Its premise is that the democratic norms and institutions of democratic states interact 
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in such a way that neither state will resort to violence to settle any conflict of interests 
that arises between them (Moaz and Russett, 1993; Morgan, 1993; Dixion, 1994; 
Remmer, 1998). No such constraints operate, however, when a dispute engages other 
states. 
 
Cross-national variation in norms governing domestic conflict resolution plays a 
prominent role in democratic-peace theory. In democratic states, the prevailing norm 
requires citizens to settle disputes between themselves/among themselves without 
using force. In other states however, force is more often the weapon of choice (Maoz 
and Russett, 1999:388). Because each national leader “externalizes” domestic norms, 
the latter also affect international conflict resolution: voters and their leaders 
recognize “that it is unnecessary and therefore unwise to get into violent conflict with 
another country whose government and people are accustomed to the non-violent 
resolution of conflicts in their country and have the ability to extend that capacity to 
resolving international conflict” (Russset, 2007:2-3).  It is therefore not surprising 
when Stewart and O‟Sullivan (1998) argue that the sudden espousal of democracy by 
so many disparate countries was because it was proclaimed to provide a foundation 
for the resolution of both domestic and international problems to mutual advantages.  
 
 The above position especially transferring expectations from dyadic democratic 
peace to system-level behavior has been criticized by Ray (1997, 2001) as an exercise 
in ecological fallacy. In the same vein, Ellingsten (2000); Sambanis (2001), Hegre et 
al (2001), and Reyal-Querol (2002) find out that partly democratic countries are more 
prone to civil war than full democracies and full autocracies. Therefore, it seems the 
likelihood of preventing or reducing violence in the context of potentially conflict -
ridden societies does not hinge on the democratic status of a country alone rather it is 
necessary to explore the links between social conflict and inclusiveness of the 
political systems. Reyal-Querol (2005) opines that inclusiveness is the ability of a 
system to avoid political exclusion and democracy is just one dimension of this 
concept. Democratic governments with multiple decision makers are more inclusive 
than democratic governments with just one decision maker. It must be understood that 
although democracies may not be fighting one another but the fact that they do fight 
other non- democratic countries cannot be disputed. Hence, the U.S war against 
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Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea among others. In that circumstance democracy cannot be 
said to promote peace. 
 
Some of the questions that beg for answers at this juncture are: Is there any basis to 
assume that democracy will bring domestic peace and stability to countries who 
embrace it? Are democracies really less likely to suffer internal strife? Scholars have 
come to understand that democratization in a militarized ethically divided society has 
been seen as another cause of conflict. Militarized ethnicity as evident in many 
countries currently undergoing democratization, often give rise to tensions and twists 
arising from the competitive politics of democracy which often find articulation in the 
entrenched identities, idioms and institutions of ethnic solidarity. In Nigeria, for 
instance, democratization has led to the resurgence of ethnic identities and the 
proliferation of regional and local struggles over the entitlements of citizenship 
expressed in the language of “Indigenes” and “settlers”. These struggles have 
increasingly spilled into the formation of ethnic militias that have wrought havoc on 
Nigeria‟s civil society, unleashing periodic convulsions of inter-communal violence 
(Osaghae, 1996; Vickers, 2000; Agbu, 2004).  
 
Competitive elections are integral features of democracy and a way of dealing with 
the issues of governance. Ideally, they allow for the peaceful transfer of power and 
make it possible to assign accountability to those who govern. Alternative ways of 
providing for a succession of governance are either through heredity or through 
violence (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). Elections facilitate communication between 
politicians and citizens, and also have symbolic purpose by giving vote to the public. 
In fact, the right to vote has been enshrined in international law (Hoglund, 2006). In 
democratic societies, violence in connection to elections “attract attention precisely 
because they seem extraordinary and scandalous in a system that is supposed to be by 
definition nonviolent” (Reif, 2005:1). However, the increased importance of election 
in conflict societies has given electoral violence new and intriguing dimensions. It is 
interesting to note that election has become part of the strategy for international 
peace-building, which strongly links peace to democratic development (Paris, 2004). 
This means that most internationally sponsored peace agreements today often 
stipulate the conduct of free and fair elections.  
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Ideally, democratization opens up new channels for groups with political demands to 
be accommodated by peaceful means. However, Gurr (200:85) says that “the process 
of transition creates threatening uncertainties for some groups and opens up a range of 
transitory political opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs”. Some scholars (Dahl 1971; 
Paris 2004:168) note that societies coming out of violent conflict usually do not fulfill 
the conditions that are considered conducive for democratization and that would help 
alleviate the uncertainty of the process such as a strong economy and stable 
institutions. 
 
Indeed the opening up of political competition, which is a basic prerequisite for 
democratic elections, brings in its wake new dimensions to organized violence. 
Competitive elections- to actually be deemed free and fair of necessity must be 
accompanied with fundamental human rights such as freedom of movement and 
freedom of speech. These rights can be abused as they can serve as a vehicle for 
militant political organizations. In particular, the competitive nature of elections may 
aggravate existing conflicts and societal cleavages. In countries that have experienced 
protracted conflict, political mobilization is likely to be along the conflict lines (Paris, 
2004). Differences rather than similarities are brought to the fore to win votes. 
Moreover, in electoral processes the use of military metaphors is common: “the 
parties wage “campaigns”, employing “strategies and tactics”. Party member are 
called “cadre”, and areas with many supporters are called “stronghold” or “citadel” 
(Rapoport and Weinberg 2001:31). During election campaign, party candidates must 
appear in public, which also increased the possibility of being attacked or killed 
(Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001).  
 
In a nutshell, electoral competition has been identified by some scholars as one of the 
causes for conflict. Bates (1983:161) for instance argued two decades ago that in 
Africa, “electoral competition arouses ethnic conflict”. The Human Rights Watch 
(1995) concluded on the basis of a worldwide survey of ethnic violence in the 1990s, 
that ethnic riots and pogrom are usually caused by political elites who play on existing 
communal tension to entrench their own power or advance a political agenda.  
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Election-related conflict or violence can be explained as: 
Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm 
perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context 
of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral 
process, violence may be employed to influence the process of 
elections, such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll – and to 
influence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive 
races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of 
referendum questions (Fischer, 2004:4). 
 
The question to ask at this juncture is why are conflict and violence always associated 
with the conduct of elections in some countries? The reason is not far-fetched. 
Election processes are contests through which political power is retained or pursued, 
and social differences are highlighted by candidates and parties in campaigns for 
popular support. These differences often degenerate into violence. Tension may rise 
in the run-up to election processes as some candidates mobilize along extremist lines 
to win support, as rival factions vie for votes and parties or factions seek to weaken or 
even eliminate opponents in efforts to seek or retain political power (UNDP, 2009). 
 
A clear finding from recent experience is that electoral processes can stimulate 
conflict; Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Sri Lanka and 
Zimbabwe are just a few examples of countries where electoral processes have been 
persistently violence-ridden. In most destructive instance  such as the 1992 
presidential elections in Angola or parliamentary polls in Algeria the same year and 
their outcome can often be a strong stimulant for violence that escalate to the level of 
civil war (UNDP, 2009). 
 
Another important factor in the evaluation of the conditions under which elections 
stimulate violent conflict is the strong impact specific types of electoral systems have 
on conflict management (Reilly and Reynolds, 2000; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 
2005). The relationship between the rules of electoral competition and the likelihood 
that they will either ameliorate or generate conflict has been the subject of 
considerable scholarly analysis (Reilly and Reynolds, 2000; Reilly, 2001; Lijphart, 
2004; Norris, 2004; Reilly, 2006). It has also been observed by Hoglund (2004) that 
when parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially 
when they expect to be “permanent minorities” (to lose not just once, but again and 
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again due to patterns of identity voting), the post- election violence stemming from 
the controversial 2005 elections in Iraq seems to fit this pattern. When a party or 
faction expects to be systematically excluded from political power they may well turn 
to violence to either prevent their exclusion or to prevent the election success. 
 
In addition, how election process and administration is designed, managed and 
implemented has strong bearing on electoral violence. Those elections considered to 
be free, fair and transparent are less likely to experience electoral violence than those 
where allegations of mismanagement or deliberate cheating are prevalent (Lehang, 
2003; Sisk and Timothy, 2006).   Expectations about winning and losing elections and 
the incentives that the electoral process creates, or how the rules of the electoral game 
may provide reward or return for certain behaviour or action is very important. When 
winning a state office is the key to livelihood, not just for an individual, but for his or 
her entire clan, faction, or even ethnic group, parties and candidate often refuse to 
contemplate the consequences of failure (UNDP, 2009). 
 
Sisk (2008) in analysis of election-related violence in the Philippines notes that 
observers attribute a pattern of election-related violence in the country to several 
factors such as history of intense rivalry among political clans, stark competition for 
government posts that carry the potential for power and access to resources and state 
largess, and a broader culture of violence in which small arms are plentiful and often 
in use. According to the police, powerful politicians often have their own private 
armies and some members of the security forces were also acting to protect or serve 
political bosses.  Additionally, armed insurgencies in parts of the country also stepped 
up attacks during the election process in the Philippines and many other countries in 
early 2007. Such as Nigeria‟s much watched elections that also unfolded during this 
time, political violence is an endemic feature of electoral processes. 
 
Although there is no common database on election-related violence, or overall on 
“political violence,” evidence from these and many other cases suggests that election-
related violence is widespread and, according to at least one study that sought to 
quantify the extent of the problem in cross-national research, at least half of the 
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electoral processes observed in 2001 featured significant election-related violence 
before, during or after the pivotal days of the election (Fisher, 2002). 
 
Election-related violence is more prominent in fragile states. The focus on this form 
of violence stems from an appreciation that electoral processes are inherently conflict -
inducing; Ethiopia, Burundi, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe are 
good examples of countries where electoral processes have been chronically violence-
ridden. Many observers argue that such processes introduce new uncertainties and that 
they make countries in transition or war-torn, fragile societies deeply vulnerable to 
new tensions and ultimately in the worst- case scenario to the escalation of civil war 
(Snyder, 2000; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005). Snyder and Mansfield contend, for 
example that the expansion of political participation in democratization process, 
especially where the state institutions is weak, give opportunities for elites to appeal 
to exclusionary nationalism and the concomitant identification of internal or external 
enemies in order to gain or retain power. It is necessary to state that conflict 
associated with political competition is not limited to competing politicians; it can 
gravitate to fractionalization, intra-party and inter-party conflict.  
 
Some scholars like Elkit and Svensson (1997) do not agree with the idea that election 
induces conflict rather they see election as a mechanism for peaceful management of 
social conflicts. They argue that election processes offer safe, predictable, rule-bound 
method for arbitrating social conflict through the selections of representatives or the 
definitive resolution of questions before the community (as in referenda). When 
elections are putatively free and fair, they imbue the government with legitimacy 
garnered by the consent of the people, improving the capacity of the state to ensure 
human security through legitimate authority under the rule of law, and to improve 
levels of human development through effective service delivery. Procedurally, fair 
elections create legitimate governments that enjoy popular support for programmes 
and policies. In their conclusion, they seem to agree that although there are also cases 
in which the electoral process can be procedurally fair and yet still violence-inducing 
as a function of the stakes of electoral competition. This depict the situation in Nigeria 
in which elections of 1993 and 2011 that were acclaimed to be free and fair still 
generated conflict and violence. 
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.When citizens are provided a direct “voice” in political life; society‟s trust and 
willingness to cooperate with the state in achieving development is strengthened. As 
such, electoral processes are very much about the peaceful management of social 
conflict through public dialogue, vigorous debate, and, and authoritative selection of 
leaders through electoral rules. This is, a good electoral process will allow society on 
its own to determine the nature of its similarities and differences (Ellis, 2006); 
representation may be geographic, ideological, identity based (religion, ethnicity, or 
gender) or along other lines. In some situations, it is true that ethnicity or religion may 
be a salient basis of representation, whereas in other situations issues such as the 
alleviation of poverty, gender equality, geographic representation, or economic/class 
interests may be more important. 
 
Whether any given electoral process fulfils the functions of voice and decision is a 
consequence of its overall quality often described in terms of an election being either 
free or fair or not. As Reynold and Elkit (2005:3) argue, “the greatest failing of 
election assessment to date has been the tendency to see election quality in bimodal 
terms. The election is either good or it is bad, or when fudge (qualification) is require, 
it is “substantially free and fair.” But there is no doubt that the quality of elections 
across cases and across time can be seen as existing on a continuum. In essence, one 
needs to look at the process and outcome to gauge a full picture of election quality”. 
Clearly those elections that are substantially free and fair, and serve as a pedestal for 
new coalitions with legitimacy and a mandate to act, democracy takes a step closer 
toward consolidation (Sisk, 2008). At this point it is necessary to give a purview of 
election in Nigeria. 
 
In Nigerian context, election is always characterized by violent conflict among parties 
as well as contending candidates. The genesis of electoral crisis in Nigeria is traceable 
to the 1964 general elections. According to The Guardian (2007:53), an estimated 
2,000 people died in violence that erupted in the Western Region. The crises were as a 
result of unbridled ambitions of politicians wanting to go beyond their electoral 
capacity, to claim victory in areas where there was pathological intolerance to the 
opposition. It was these that plunged the First Republic of 1963 into chaos. The 
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violent engagement was mainly characterized by arson, looting and the lynching of 
perceived opposition supporters or sympathizers. The uproar worsened the bad 
reputation of the Western Region as the “Wild Wild West” and the hub of electoral 
violence in the country. What informed this derogatory remark is not far-fetched. The 
major theatre of the post 1964 election disturbances was in the region where official 
election results contrasted sharply with the expectations of majority of the people. 
Due to reluctance of the then prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Belewa‟s government 
to arrest the situation despite a state of emergency declared in the area; the military 
capitalized on this, among other reasons, to remove the government in January 1966. 
 
In addition, according to Gurdian (2007:5), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) 
victory in 1983 polls was violently protested in different parts of the country 
especially in the West where vicious protest rocked Ondo, Oyo and other states in the 
region. The case in Ondo was so violent that angry mobs set ablaze the buildings of 
perceived opponents. In the result released for Ondo State in 1983, Akin Omoboriowo 
was returned as the winner of the gubernatorial elections, which put Michael 
Adekunle Ajasin in the second position. The people saw this as a daylight robbery and 
hence, took to violence which eventually led to military intervention and the collapsed 
of the Second Republic. 
 
 Human Rights Watch observed that the national and state wide polls, in 1999 and 
2003 were marred by wide spread fraud and violence (The Guardian, 2007:67). The 
2007 elections also tow the same line (Ajanaku, 2007). The 2011 general elections 
were worse than the previous experiences. Comenting on 2011 Nigeria post-electoral 
violence, Alemika (2011:5) observes that: 
Electoral violence in the country is primarily due to the perception 
of politics and political office as investment and as an avenue for 
the acquisition of extraordinary wealth through corruption, which 
is otherwise not possible through any form of legitimate vocation 
and enterprise. As a result of this perception and reality, Nigerian 
politicians turn electioneering and elections into warfare in which 
violence and ethnic, religious and other forms of primordial 
sentiments and prejudices are employed. It is against this 
background that the former President Olusegun Obasanjo 
counselled his party members to see the 2007 election as a do or 
die affairs 
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Agbaje (2007) attributes electoral violence to thuggery sponsored by desperate 
politicians. It can be gleaned from the discussion above that violent conflict 
associated with electoral contest can be located within the context of electoral 
competition; frustrating identity voting that put a certain party(ies) and candidates 
from a particular region in a disadvantage position; election management (whether 
free, fair, or not); gains of winning and the incalculable loss associated with losing. 
When the fate of an entire clan, faction, or ethnic group, parties and candidates, are 
inexorably tied to this, it provide incentives for violent conflict before, during and 
after elections. The problem with the arguments above is that it sees democracy and 
competition for political offices (politics) as the major source(s) of conflict while 
looking away from political organization or structural conditions of the society. 
 
 
2.3.4 Structural Condition and Conflict  
Structural conditions are those in which the social, economic and political 
organization of society, specifically the existence of structural inequalities and 
victimization among groups are seen as the causes of conflicts. It is necessary to state 
that while objective realities or interests do indeed generate conflict, some scholars 
argue that material conditions and inequalities are not enough reasons to explain the 
intensity, ferocity and duration of conflicts. They often provide “proximate causes”, 
and psycho-cultural dispositions, or subjective factors, most especially the psychology 
of victimhood and persecution, constitute the indispensable fuel. Thus, conflict can 
erupt or persist when the memories of humiliation, oppression and marginalization 
both real and mythologized are triggered by new threats (Azar and Moon, 1986; 
Deutsch, 1991; Ross, 1993; Brown, 1993; Namwambah, 2004). In other words, 
conflicts arise out of the combustible interplay of objective and subjective factors 
brought about by combination of material, socio-cultural conditions, political and 
psychological dispositions. 
 
The role of structural and subjective factors, history and mythology in generating 
protracted conflict is evident in the Sudanese conflict. Analyses of the Sudanese 
conflict seem to be tailored towards dichotomy. It is often presented as a conflict 
between the North and the South, Muslims and Christians, Arabs and Africans, and 
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oppressors and oppressed (Zela, 2008). However, Ahmed (2008 cited in Zela, 2008) 
notes that, although there may be elements of all of these dichotomies, none of them 
explains the conflict. He observes that analysts often ignore the rural urban divide, 
and more essentially, the role of the country‟s opportunistic elite in fomenting ethnic 
and regional division that are at the root of the Sudanese conundrum. Ahmed agrees 
on the multiple complexities of the Sudanese conflict and also emphasized the 
historical legacies of colonialism, which left behind underdevelopment and uneven 
development and acute socio-economic and political marginalization for groups in 
peripheral regions who have been fighting for inclusion since independence. He 
however, places primary responsibility on the elite, tracing the development of this 
class from the colonial period and the role it has played during various phases of 
violent conflict in postcolonial Sudan (Zela, 2008). The defect of structural 
explanations of conflict as seen above is that it ignores economic and other factors as 
conflict propellers.  
 
2.3.5 Economic Factor and Conflict 
Economic and social factors play an important role in setting the scene for potentially 
violent ethnic conflict. These consist of economic problems, discriminatory economic 
systems such as; a system of cultural division of labour with job opportunities 
determined by ethnic background, and uneven or preferential economic development 
and modernization, which can contribute to the mobilization of ethnic groups and 
their formation into conflict groups ready to fight for equality of economic 
opportunity, redistribution of resources, or the preservation of a privileged status quo 
(Wolff, 2006). 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998), in their own view, argue that ethnic conflict occurs if the 
incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large vis-à-vis the costs. In their study they 
investigated the relevance of a range of other opportunities such as the availability 
and cheapness of military equipment, military skills among the population at large, 
weak governments, and a terrain favourable to rebels (such as forests and mountains). 
Their findings again emphasize the importance of economic factors: the presence of 
natural resources that can be used in financing rebels‟ movements, diaspora support 
and low costs in terms of foreign earnings and the availability of conflict – specific 
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capital (equipment and skills). In a nutshell, the only significant non-economic factor 
that they found was ethnic dominance, where one ethnic group has monopolized the 
state and its resources whilst others remain excluded from meaningful political, 
economic, and social participation.  
 
 Collier (1999, 2000); Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 1999) posit that economic agendas 
are at the heart of violent conflicts in Africa. They argued that the bulk of Africa‟s 
major conflicts since the mid- 1960s are driven by economic greed rather than 
political grievances, which may be related to economic inequalities, ethnic and 
religious cleavages, or political repression. Before emphasis was on economic scarcity 
and inequality as the cause of war, but recent studies stress the role played by resource 
abundance, the rise of self-financing rebel movements, and the emergence of civil war 
economies that are parasitic, illicit, predatory, and independent of external criminal 
financial and commodity networks (Seck, 2004). 
 
While few would dispute the fact that economic problems, struggles and inequalities 
constitute “root causes” of many violent conflicts across the continent of Africa, 
economic explanation like those proposed by Collier and his associates have been 
vigorously contested on methodological, theoretical and policy grounds (Zela, 2008). 
The concept of civil war in their analysis among others has generated definitional 
disputation. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) and Pugh and Cooper (2004) punctuated 
the argument among others that neo-liberalism provides the context that creates 
conditions for both conflict and predation through increased poverty and inequality 
and by weakening state capacity and strengthening regional and global markets and 
networks that rebel movement can access. Others have questioned the applicability of 
the economic thesis to many of Africa‟s wars and conflicts. Mlambo (2004) avers that 
the war of liberation primarily motivated by the desire for emancipation rather than 
the looting of resources, and land struggles in Southern Africa that seek the 
redistribution of scarce resources is rooted in inequalities of settlers colonialism. He 
argues that there is more to conflicts in Africa than simply economic greed and that 
the sharp contrast drawn between economic and political motivation is unproductive 
analytically in terms of devising effective conflict resolution policies. 
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 Many scholars have pointed out that even economic agenda of wars in Sierra Leone, 
Angola, Mozambique, the Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo negate the 
economic analysis of war and conflict because the aforementioned crises were driven 
by struggle for political power than resources control. Ballentine and Sherman (2003) 
have equally criticized economic factor of conflict. They stressed the inseparability of 
political and economic factors, contextual specificities and fluidity of conflict, the role 
played by the process of regionalization, privatization and globalization among others.  
Ballentine (2003, 259-260) in his analysis put it this way: 
Very few contemporary conflicts can be adequately captured as pure 
instances of „resource wars‟ or conflict caused by „loot seeking‟. 
Economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or even 
the primary cause of these armed conflicts; rather, to varying degrees, 
they interacted with socioeconomic and political grievances, 
interethnic disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering the outbreak 
of warfare. However, combatant access to economic resources has 
been a salient factor shaping a permissive opportunity structure for 
sustaining hostilities and has had important effects on the duration, 
intensity and character of conflict”. 
 
Omoweh (2010:4), in analyzing the crisis in the Niger-Delta, argues that, “it is 
not simply an economic crisis; rather, it is fundamentally a crisis of the 
Nigerian state, indeed, a political crisis. It is a crisis heightened by the 
resource rights struggle that is rooted in the state‟s policy towards the 
governance of natural resources” 
It is necessary to stress that although some conflicts may not be linked to economic 
factors, yet the role of the economy in conflict cannot be denied. For instance, very 
few people will dispute the fact that violent conflict in the Niger-Delta in Nigeria has 
economic undertone. Toyo (2000: 6) offers a perspective that helps in understanding 
the crisis in Niger Delta. According to him: 
why the crisis in the oil producing areas? The answer is this: foreign 
capitalist firms came to that part of Nigeria, discovered oil and 
started exploration. Then two things happened; one, there was 
environmental degradation. Two, the local people began to protest 
and the Nigerian government in the name of peace and order and in 
the name of oil revenue sent a force against them in an attempt to 
silent them. The last aspect of the crisis is the local communities 
themselves, because of their misunderstanding and because of the 
various agents using them for divide and rule tactics and the oil 
greed of the bourgeoisie amongst them, started fighting and killing 
themselves over land.  
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It is in the same vein that Alemika (2008) avers that in many parts of the world, places 
endowed with mineral resources experience prolonged conflicts and civil wars 
generated as a result of conflicting local, national and international interests in the 
exploration of the resources, management of the impact as well as distribution of the 
benefits of mineral exploration. It is necessary to stress that without political 
entrepreneurs driving such war for their political objectives, the so-called economic 
war may not even emanate. Analysis based on economic models like that of Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998, 1999) and some others that see economic as the only major cause 
of conflict neglect political, social and cultural variables impacting on conflict 
unjustifiably. 
 
2.3.6 Socio-Economic Factors of conflict 
 Murshed (2002) and Senghaas (2002) focus on socio-economic bias and exclusion as 
the primary cause of conflict and even situate culture within the prism of socio-
economic framework. Murshed is of the view that economic factors are the basis of 
conflict, and that poverty and socio economic conditions facilitate conflict. To them, 
most conflicts that look like ethnic and cultural are economic in nature as ethnic and 
culture most often only serve as ralying point to fight socio-economic injustice. 
Another observation made by Murshed and Gates (2003) hinges on inequality 
(horizontal inequality among groups as conflict precipitant). Some of the salient 
aspects of horizontal inequality noted are briefly described below: 
Asset Inequality: Land inequality, the dispossession of peasant communities, and 
the limited poverty reduction associated with economic growth in highly unequal 
societies provide fertile ground for insurrection particularly when the dispossessed 
belong to separate and distinct groups drawn along caste, ethnic or religious lines. 
Unequal Access to Public Employment: Discrimination in the allocation of public 
employment is particularly resented in societies in which it represents the principal 
avenue for personal advance. 
Unequal Access to Public Services and Over-taxation: The over taxation of 
smallholders encourages insurrection, and indigenous peoples often face 
discrimination in access to schooling, health care, and public-sector jobs. Where there 
are inter-group fiscal transfers, which may take the form of spending on education and 
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health for disadvantaged groups or including them in government employment, 
commitment to the transfer by those in power may be imperfect. 
Economic Mismanagement: The risk of civil war is greater in low-income 
developing countries where poverty and poor human development indicators abound. 
Societies characterised by poor governance and widespread corruption, especially 
amongst the elite, are also more prone to conflict. The absence of economic 
opportunities, associated with low growth rates, landlessness, unequal access to 
education and skills can contribute to the risk of war. In fact, the lack of normal 
economic occupation amongst young males has been found to significantly contribute 
to the risk of city.  
 
To Senghaas (2002), conflict always revolves around distribution of income, 
education, upward mobility and political participation. Denial of access to material 
needs leads to frustration, which may give fillip to conflict . This approach is 
problematic in the sense that it failed to take into consideration the identity and human 
agency dimension of conflict. These theorists discussed above ignored the complex 
relationship among culture, economic, political and social factors that influence 
construction of identity which may result in violent conflict. 
 
Stewart (2000:248) recognizes the interconnection between political, cultural and 
economic elements in conflict but jettisons the complexity of identity formation. The 
author argues that “socio-economic inequality and disparities of political power create 
relative economic, political and social hierarchical and exclusionary positions that 
underlie conflict”. However, differentiation in identity leads to formation of distinct 
groups, which serve as mobilizing force to challenge the perceived inequalities 
(Stewart, 2000). Political power is a veritable instrument of economic power as it set 
the rules and determines allocation of employment, social investments and incentives 
for private investment. That is why prospect of possible loss of political power often 
acts as motivation for state-spnsored violence because conflict is used for maintaining 
power and supressing opposition (Stewart 1999).  The author, however, glosses over 
the complexity of identity formation. 
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Imobighe (2003) observes that conflict in Nigeria is brought about by some factors. 
The first factor has to do with neglect of the principle of broad public participation in 
the management of public affairs in the country and the fact that the control of the 
country‟s resources is over-concentrated at the centre. This results into incessant cry 
of marginalization by the various ethnic groups in the country and a bitter contest to 
control the centre. 
 
Imobighe (1998) analysis appears very relevant to Nigerian situation. One can add 
that publications in the news dailies on the looting of political office holders cannot 
but set on edge the fray nerves of the jobless youths. It will be difficult for youth in 
abject poverty to co-exist with monumental wealth of public officers gotten through 
fraud, without crisis.  Conflict can also persist or erupt when the memories of 
humiliation, oppression and marginalization, both real and mythologized, are 
triggered through new threats (Azar and Moon 1986; Deutsch 1991; Ross, 1993; 
Brown, 1993; Namwambah, 2004). Shils (1981) and Schwartz (1991) have debated 
the relationship between the present and the past specifically whether the present is 
predominantly shaped by the past or vice versa. If a group of people has been 
subjected to humiliation and oppression for a long period of time, an attempt to bring 
them under subjection again can trigger memories of what they had suffered before, 
thereby galvanizing them into action that can be violent in order to prevent it. 
According to Smith (1993), what make a group of people to be called an ethnic 
community among other things are shared memories. In fact, memory may not only 
play an important role in creating or recreating conflict, it can also reactivate it from  
the form in which it may have lain dormant, perhaps for several generations 
(Montville, 1993). This is because such groups are left with a sense of “victimhood” 
that stems from unacknowledged and unreconciled historic losses. These in turn 
present a powerful barrier to traditional methods of peacemaking and diplomacy and 
create new senses of wrong and injustice; thus, creating the potentials for future 
conflict. 
 
The potential for conflict is present because ethnic conflict often leads to violence that 
in turn invites collective revenge (Chirot, 2001). This revenge does not necessarily 
have to be based on a quarrel (although it may be); it can just as easily be based on a 
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quarrel that is only one generation old. However long the time-scale, ethnic conflicts 
are always grounded in the past. The problem is that when one community takes 
revenge on another, this in turn sows the seed for continued violence. For these 
reason, if ethnic conflict is to be brought under control, it is necessary to understand 
the role of the collective past in the collective present. The next section focuses on 
land and conflict. 
 
2.3.7 Land and Conflict 
Land conflict was a significant driver of social political and environmental change 
throughout the 20th century. During this period, monumental political transformations 
including the Chinese and Russian revolutions were sparked in part by inequitable 
distribution of land. The struggle for land has also been identified as a source of 
internal strife in countries, such as Bangladesh, the Philippines, South Africa, and 
Israel and the precipitate factor of war between Senegal and Mauritania and El 
Salvador and Honduras (Homer-Dixen, 1999). Land is increasingly becoming a 
source of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, where land access had traditionally been 
characterized as relatively egalitarian. It has been shown that local land conflicts can 
erupt into large scale civil strife and political movement (Andre and Platteau, 1988; 
Dandelin, 2003).  
Komey (2009) in his analysis on conflicts in Sudan, the Nuba question argued that the 
root causes of many state-community conflicts worldwide are complex. However, at 
the center of these multifaceted root causes is the question of communal land rights, 
particularly in Africa and the Middle East. The centrality of land in conflicts stems 
from the fact that, rights to land are intimately tied to membership in specific 
communities, ranging from a nuclear or extended family, clan, or ethnic group to the 
nation-state (Shipton 1988; Lentz, 2007). 
At the various levels of social identities and organizations, people seek land as 
collective rights and not just as material satisfaction. It is also a source of power, 
wealth, and identity (Komey, 2009). To Komey nothing evokes deeper passions or 
gives rise to more bloodshed than disagreement over territory, boundaries or accesss 
to land resources. At national level, land is a symbol of a nation‟s political 
sovereignty and power and a base for the national economic wealth. At the local level, 
 
 
 
64 
 
land is also a symbol of collective socio-cultural and political identities, and a basis 
for their survival and economic livelihood. 
The management of land and natural resources is one of the most critical challenges 
facing developing countries today. This is because of increasing competitions over 
diminishing renewable resources such as land are on the rise. Land conflicts tend to 
be dynamic: the relationship between land and conflicts often changes over time.  In 
period of insecurity, land-related dispute can turn increasingly violent and may result 
in some population displacement. The conflicts between the Itsekiri and Urhobo; Tiv 
and Jukun attested to the fact that economic importance of land can be a causative 
factor of conflict. 
Allied to the issue of land is that indegeneship and setllership; citizenship and 
tenantship. Citizenship/indigeneship controversy is common in all multi-ethnic states 
and should be accorded recognition given its potential as a conflict inducing factor 
(Nwosu, 2008). In Nigeria for example, an ethnography survey has assigned as many 
as 80 nationalities to Adamawa State, Bauchi 50, Plateau 52, Taraba 39, Kaduna 32, 
Cross River 30, Bornu 25, Kebbi 19, Kwara 4, Gombe 17, (and Kogi 8). Multiplicity 
of ethnic nationalities within a formation is no problem by itself. Problem arises when 
symbols associated with them are used to compete for resources (Nwosu, 2008).  
 
 This aligns with the position of Egwu (2005) that pre-colonial Africa has flexible history 
of identity formation, which enabled the absorption of migrants into their host 
communities and ensured their participation in social, civic and political life. Relations 
within such formations were harmonious because the spaces of competition were 
minimal. Identity crisis as regards the citizenship issue is the competition for resources 
connected with the benefits of modernization. 
 In the context of scarcity and competition, and the readiness of “ethnic” entrepreneurs” 
to resort to ethnic mobilization as well as the context offered by democratization and 
political liberalization, the consequences are communal conflicts (Egwu, 2005). 
2.3.8 Religion and Conflict 
The role of religion as a source of conflict, in objective and subjective terms, 
institutionally and ideological, and at local and transnational levels and the many 
point, in between, cannot be overemphasized (Panitch and Leys 2002). Throughout 
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history religion has provided a powerful vehicle for instigating war, and also giving 
meaning and legitimation to war.  Kastfelt (2005:1) argues forcefully and 
convincingly, “many African civil wars have religious dimensions which are 
sufficiently important to deserve to be studied in their own right without, of course, 
thereby ignoring their social, economic and political context”. Avalos (2005), 
contends that all religions are inherently prone to violence. In other words, religion 
causes violence. In the same vein, McTernan (2003), stresses that, religion needs to be 
acknowledged as an actor in its own right. For instance, Algeria is afflicted by 
arguably the worst conflict in Arab Africa. The conflict is between Islamists and the 
military secularists. Religion is also at the root of the conflict in Egypt (Ansari, 1984). 
 
Since the creation of 12 states in 1967, the northern part of Nigeria has witnessed 
quite a number of violent clashes between Muslims and Christians. At the Northern 
peace conference held in Kaduna in 2004, Isawa Elaigwu, President of the Jos-based 
Institute of Social Research, put the number of crises between 1980 and 2004 at 50. 
The region has recorded many other cases since then (Abimboye, 2004). The 
Kano/Kaduna axis is notorious for the worst inter-religious crises in the country. The 
bloodiest of such confirmations took place in Kano in 1976, 1977, 1980-1981 and 
1990. Kaduna witnessed three major riots between 1987 and 2000. The worst is the 
February 21 to 25, 2000 riot which was triggered by the plan to introduce Sharia, the 
Islamic code, by the state government. In the mayhem between Christians and 
Muslims, more than 2,000 lost their lives, even though the police tried to downplay 
the casualty figure to 609. Four policemen died in the crisis, about 1,944 houses and 
746 vehicles were burnt. The police nabbed 559 suspects and recovered two grenades, 
two medium-sized bombs and two military rocket launchers. These series of conflicts 
has led to population dislocation. The living pattern was drastically altered. Adherents 
of the two religions began to live in separate areas out of fear of outbreak of another 
crisis (Abimboye, 2009). 
 
The incessant crisis in Jos has added to the list of religious violence in the country. 
The crisis started in Jos the capital of Plateau State in 1994. One erupted in 2001, 
2008, January 2010, May 2010 and 2011 and has continued since then. Some of the 
reasons advanced for religious crises are reminiscence of the Kaduna Sharia saga 
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which include: lack of trust between various ethnic and religious groups as a result of 
deep-rooted misconception and stereotyping, lack of tolerance, poverty and fear of 
socio-cultural domination, media reporting, government failure to take action in 
previous happenings, lack of infrastructure, excruciating poverty and manipulation of 
the people by retired military officers to achieve their ambition (Fwa, 2003). Other 
factors identified by Imobighe (2002, 2003); Bassey (2002); Otite (1990) include 
Religious differences; demographic explosion and expansionist tendencies to sustain 
ethnic-bond occupation; social fragmentation and decay; commercialization of 
political practices; unguarded utterances or inflammatory statements and provocative 
speeches; land ownership and control (resources control); kingship/chieftaincy 
disputes and proliferation of small arms. 
   
A good number of works exist on ethno-religious crises in Nigeria (Ihonvbere and 
Falola, 1985; Otite, 1990; Otite and Albert, 1999); for specific crisis situation by case 
studies (Fwa, 2003; Egwavoen, 2003; Babajimi, 2003; Akpotor, 2002; and Ibeanu, 
2003) and seriousness of incessant outbreak of ethno-religious disturbances in Nigeria 
(Enwerem, 1995; Bassey, 2002; Imobighe, 2002. 
 
Jega (2002) sounded a word of caution when he said there were many causes of 
ethno-religious tension and conflicts in Nigeria and quite a number of them are 
actually interrelated. He also observed that the pervasive nature or spread of ethno-
religious conflicts gained unprecedented momentum since the emergence of 
democratic government on May 29, 1999. Jega (2002:35) notes: 
It seems as if decades of bottled up anger under military rule 
has suddenly exploded and found expression in violent, 
ethnic, religious and communal conflicts, in the context of the 
little democratic space which has opened up since May 29, 
1999, furthermore, Nigerians now spend much energies trying 
to redefine their national identities, as a consequence of the 
emotive feelings and perceptions which these clashes have 
engendered. Where conflicts have not occurred, or have some 
how abated, associated tensions have remained high with all 
the attendant negative consequences on the socio-economic 
and political development in the country. 
. 
From the ideas expressed above, one can make the following deductions: first, that the 
long years of military rule in the country was characterized by excessive repression 
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and dehumanization; that democratic dispensation created the latitude for all and 
sundry to rediscover themselves and make excessive demands on the system. And 
lastly, the failure of the Nigerian state to meet the excessive demands of the teeming 
population basking in the euphoria of emancipation found expression in violent 
conflict with devastating consequences. 
 
Agreed that harping on religious differences and other associated factors can result 
into ethno-religious conflict that are mostly violent, yet one cannot gloss over the fact 
that most ethno-religious conflicts have political undertone. Onuoha (2011) avers that 
most of the conflicts in Africa, even when they seem religious are staged within the 
parameters of the political: most times because, directly or indirectly most of the 
conflicts are responses to the struggle for access, control and management of political 
power. A deep reflection on Sharia issue in Nigeria portends the fact that what are 
often regarded as ethnic and religious conflicts are indeed political. 
 
Fayemi (2000:17) argues that beyond all the arguments about ethnic and religious 
crisis, the bane about Sharia lies at the heart of politics in Nigeria and the centrality 
that “identity” politics has assumed. Fayemi put it more pungently: 
There can be no doubt that the Sharia issue is clearly a reaction to 
perceived or real loss of power by an elite stratum that is 
predominantly “northern” and also “muslim”. What is happening is 
a contest over raw political power. Who lost power, who won 
power, and who wants power back. The processes that threw up 
General Obasanjo as the candidate of this elite stratum were 
intimately bound up with the political crisis that has gripped the 
northern political class. 
 
He continues: 
Obasanjo, who they had supported, refused to play their game, 
prompting some northern political leaders Datti Ahmed, himself a 
former presidential candidate to allegedly claim the president had 
allowed himself to be hijacked by South West politicians. Since 
General Obasanjo as a politician does not have a political base, not 
in the army, nor in his ethnic group, nor anywhere else, it would 
seem understandable that the forces in retreat dusted up the 
dormant Sharia issue, confident of its populist value, to challenge 
him, to intimidate him, to force him to back down and play things 
their way. 
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 The Boko Haram insurgence, though religious in nature, has political undertone. The 
group official name is Jamalatu Ahllis Sunna Lidda‟awati Wal Jihad, meaning people 
committed to the propagation of the Prophet‟s teaching and Jihad. It earned the 
nickname from the teachings of its founder, Mohammed Yussuf in the early 2000s, in 
the restive northeastern city of Maiduguri, the capital of Bornu State. Yusuf argued 
that Western education, or “boko” had brought nothing but poverty and suffering to 
the region and was therefore forbidden, or “haram” in Islam. He began peacefully 
mostly preaching and quickly gained a followership among disaffected youths in the 
northeast. In 2009, the police clamped down on the sect members and killed its 
leader. Since then, the sect has been a major security challenge to Nigeria. The group 
has killed several people and had burnt down several religious buildings and 
government properties among others through improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
(Okpaga, et. al 2013). “Boko Haram” according to Quadri (2013) is not an agent of 
Islam, but the handiwork of the destructive Nigerian politicians, and   added that if 
Nigeria must know peace, the Nigerian politicians must resolve to achieve it not 
through manipulation of religion but by becoming nation-builders. For northern 
politicians who have always been in power, it is quite strange for them to cope with 
the huge challenge powerlessness poses. From the position of Fayemi as expressed 
above, although religion is an instrument of violence in Nigeria, but the invisible 
hand of politics in the so called religious violence is evident. 
 
In addition, Lipschutz and Crawford (1996) argue that ethnic and sectarian conflicts 
are fundamentally conflicts about power. What we have come to call “ethnic and 
sectarian conflict” is neither Ethnic nor sectarian per se. Rather it is about struggles 
over the levers of power and wealth within societies and countries in which ethnicity 
and religion provide the cultural and historical resources for mobilizing  support for 
particular elites. These countries almost always are caught in the throes of economic 
and political transformations, brought by external factors and forces. 
 
The question to ask at this juncture is that why political power is so important that 
people would have to incite ethnic and religious conflict or violence to express loss of 
power or as a means to pave way for their electoral victory? The reason for this is not 
far-fetched. Political power brings with it many opportunities for attaining wealth 
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especially in an African context noted for extreme scarcity and poverty as well as 
private accumulation. Tangri (1999) notes that to be in key administrative and 
political position is to have access to the major means of acquiring coveted material 
resources. Thus, through the state, top office holders controlled an extensive array of 
resources and could influence their distribution and accumulation often with an eye to 
political advantage as well as personal gain. 
 
Puniyani (2005) an Indian economist, argues that the majority of violence today is 
really politics clothed in language of religion. Pointing to his own country, Puniyani 
says that religious ideologies are being exploited on a grand scale by the elite of 
Indian society. The Hindutva movement, which insists that India must be governed by 
Hindu religious teachings, makes use of ancient ideologies not to glorify Hinduism 
but rather to re-establish the political and social power of the upper caste and justify 
demonization of all no- Hindus. Puniyani (2005) opines that on the world stage, the 
government of the United States also uses religion to mask its true agenda. The 
scholar perceives that, the U.S. government war on terror is nothing but a façade for 
globalization and economic domination. According to Harvard Sociologist, Tambiah 
(2005), civilian riots are a mode of conducting politics by other means. Tambiah 
added that ethno-religious violence in India shows evidence of careful planning and 
tends to be carried out by people from a wide range of the population with direction 
from politicians and members of the professional classes. 
  
In a similar vein Pape (2005), a University of Chicago political scientist, argues that 
religion is not the motivating factor behind most suicide bombings and that more than 
half of all suicide terrorist attacks, all over the world since 1980, are not associated 
with Islamic fundamentalism. The author concluded that what over 95 percent of all 
suicide terrorist attacks has in common is not religion but a specific strategic goal 
which is to compel a modern democracy to withdraw combat forces. Jonathan (2004),  
averrs that, religion can be used to intensify ethnic conflicts and is increasingly being 
employed in this way. Burn (2008) argues that a number of recent publications 
examine the question of religious violence in relation to politics and conclude that 
religion itself does not cause violence. Like Jonathan Fox‟s cited in Burn (2008) 
argues that religion is a secondary factor in the generation of bloodshed. The theorists 
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argue that sometimes religious ideals are co-opted as a consequence of the need to 
rally support for political goals and that sometimes religious rhetoric is deliberately 
used in order to mask political agendas.  
 
Having looked at some of the factors responsible for violent conflict it is necessary to 
beam a searchlight on the nexus between culture and conflict. 
 
2.3.9 The Interface between Culture and Conflict 
Culture is the learnt, socially acquired traditions and lifestyles peculiar to members of 
a society, which is reflected in their patterned, repetitive ways of thinking, feeling and 
acting (Harris, 1993). In his analysis of culture, Baron (2004) opines that culture 
limits as well as liberates us; it differentiates as well as unites us. It defines our 
realities and shapes the way we think, feel and act. In the same vein, LeBaron and 
Pillay (2006) observe that culture is a series of lenses that shapes what we see and 
don‟t see. It determines how issues are perceived and interpreted and where we draw 
boundaries. It shapes our opinions of what is important, impact on our attitudes and 
values and also animates our behaviour. From the work of LeBaron and Pillay one 
can also deduced that there exist an inexorable link between culture and conflict. To 
them conflict cannot be defined without a reference to cultural context. This is 
because culture is embedded in every conflict. In fact, culture is inextricable from 
conflict, though it does not cause it. They argue that culture permeates conflict; at 
times it pushes forth with intensity making it to be noticed; at other times it quietly 
sneaks along without its presence being noticed until people accidentally stumble on 
it. Culture shapes and reshapes conflict by framing the outer boundaries of our minds 
vision in such a way that culture of outsiders that lies beyond our horizon is difficult 
to recognize. Culture makes us unfamiliar with people outside our cultural milieu. We 
tend to equate this unfamiliarity with strangeness, polarizing relationship between 
“us” and “them”. Thus, culture frames the universe of our conflict behaviour.  
 
Galtung has listed six cultural domains which legitimize structural and direct violence 
as religion, ideology, language, art, and empirical and formal science. He stated that 
some religions, particularly the Judaeo-Christian religions have a strong concept of 
“chosen people” which is the source of racism and negation of other culture and 
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religions (Rupesinghe and Rubio, 1994). Similarly, Aurel and Christoph (2009) see 
cultural conflict from language, religion and from historicity perspectives. To them 
culture revolves around identity, not interest based conflict item. 
 
Soeter (2005) sees the rise in violence and conflict as a result of differences between 
national cultures, which indeed have a presumably large influence on the rise of 
conflict and violence in the world. This is in line with the position of Huntington 
(1993) who states that the world was going to see a “clash of civilizations”. To him 
the dominating source of conflict in this new world will not be ideological or 
economic but cultural. Conflict between civilizations will be the last phase in the 
evolution of conflict in the modern world. He argued further that differences among 
civilizations are real and basic. Civilizations are differentiated on the lines of history, 
language, culture, tradition and most importantly religion. People of different 
civilizations have different views. Although differences may not necessarily lead to 
conflict and conflict may not be synonymous with violence, however, over the 
centuries differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and 
violent conflicts. 
In fact he put it pungently in this way: 
Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence 
less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic 
ones. In former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, 
the rich can become poor and the poor can become rich, but 
Russians cannot become Estonias and Azeris cannot become 
Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was 
“Which side are you on?” and people could and did choose sides 
and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is 
“What are you?” That is a given that cannot be changed. And as 
we know, from Bosnia to the Caucaus to the Sudan, the wrong 
answer can be a bullet in the head (Huntington, 1993:27).  
 
 It is essential to know that differences as highlighted by Huntington either within a 
state or among states may not necessarily lead to conflicts if there are no political or 
economic undertones. Thus Cohen (1974:94) argues that: 
Men may do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre 
customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs 
are different from their own. But they do not fight over such 
differences alone. When men do, on the other hand, fight across 
ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some 
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fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of 
power, whether economic, political or both. 
 
It is clear from the above that Huntington‟s thesis glosses over the reality that 
economic and political injustices could instigate violent conflict. His analysis failed to 
provide explication on specific linguistic, cultural, or religious characteristics of the 
civilizations that have tendency to cause violent conflict. Aylward (2007) also 
criticized Huntington‟s thesis for relying on fixed and static notions of culture and 
identity that do not take cognizance of the fact that, identities are socially constructed 
and change over time. 
 
Back to Soeter‟s analysis, one can glean that apart from differences in culture that can 
bring about conflict; some national cultures promote conflict and violence. In 
Scandinavian countries, the law forbids professional boxing and in other Western 
European countries they are also contemplating doing same, while in the United State 
the same sport is a big business. In one country defence expenditure is several times 
the amount of money other countries are willing to spend for this purpose (Soeter, 
2005). 
 
In order to understand how national culture lies at the root of violence and conflict, it 
may be helpful to gain an insight into the work of Dutch social scientist (Hofsted, 
1991). He has been able to establish the difference between national cultures by using 
the so-called value standards of more than 100,000 respondents in over 50 countries. 
The underlying idea was that culture- “collective mental programming”- can be 
represented by the opinions of people about the fundamental aspects of life and work. 
People have acquired these values and opinions in their formative years, which are the 
years between the sociological birth” and the beginning of the maturity roughly at the 
age of 20. After this age, these fundamental opinions hardly change anymore. This is 
why stable differences arise between groups of people in the way in which they look 
at the various questions of life. These different “orientations of life”, the crux of 
understanding culture, can be recognized in the way people behave in various kinds of 
circumstances. 
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Hostfed (1991, 2001), avers that culture can be divided into masculinity and 
femininity, or tough and soft. Masculinity cultures aspire to a tough achievement 
oriented society, in which “going for gold” and “the winner takes it all” are popular 
expressions. Feminine cultures on the other hand, stress the importance of prosperity 
for all, the quality of life, the environment and mutual solidarity. In feminine 
countries the roles of men and women overlap, both genders are relatively modest and 
aimed at cooperation.  
 
In masculine countries, there are important differences between how men and women 
function in society- men are expected to be dominant, ambitious and tough, whereas 
women are expected to be modest and focused on a relationship. Examples of 
masculine countries are Japan, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Great Britain, Germany, the 
United States, and Mexico. Countries under feminist culture are the Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands. In countries with a masculine culture, there is more 
political violence. This effect is unrelated to other factors such as population size and 
economic development (Van de Vliert, et al, 1999 cited in Soeter, 2005). The more 
masculine the culture, the larger the part of national budget that goes to defence and 
the armed forces. Masculine countries are more inclined to solve conflict by fighting 
and military actions (the UK in Northern Ireland, the USA and the UK in Iraq, 
whereas feminine countries will try to do so by negotiating and making compromises. 
Another aspect considered by Hotsfed (1991) is what he called uncertainty avoidance, 
collectivism and power distance. Uncertainty cultures are inclined to reject others in 
general and strangers in particular. Hatred of strangers and racism are more 
widespread in uncertainty-avoidance countries than elsewhere. Uncertainty avoidance 
is tersely described in the expression what is different and strange, is dangerous. 
 
Although Africa‟s domestic conflicts are often assumed to be largely ethnic in nature, 
there are competing findings on the relationship between cultural factors and conflict 
in African region. For example, Barrows (1976) found that neither linguistic nor 
ethnic fractionalization had a consistent significance impact on domestic violence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Later, Collier (1998) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998) suggest 
exactly the opposite between ethno-linguistic homogeneity and civil war in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The most likely candidates for civil war in Africa are those that are 
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ethnically polarized with two relatively equal but distinct cultural groups accounting 
for the most of the state‟s population. Their basic contention is that coordinating 
insurgency is facilitated where rebels are bound by common identity distinct from that 
of their adversaries, and common culture- especially common language- is assumed to 
provide a basis for such self-identification. 
 
The above position focuses on the fact that conflict often erupt when people of 
different culture coexist in a political enclave or contact between different national 
cultures. In addition, the masculinity or femininity of a culture determines whether it 
will result into violent conflict or otherwise. However, the emphasis is on its 
implications on the different gender. Thus, the above analysis lacks explanatory 
power to explain culture within a small community. It has nothing to do with 
ceremonies, festivals etc peculiar to a particular group of people be it male or female 
and how this can bring about conflict or cooperation. 
 
Galtung (2002) contends that people who know little about culture often believe that a 
shared culture will tie them together. By extrapolation Galtung avers that the fact that 
a group of people shared similar culture which ordinarily should have united them 
together does not serve as immunity to conflict among such. It is the contention of this 
research work that some cultural practices may foment violent conflict .This is in line 
with orientation of some scholars. For example Bond (undated) argues that: 
We are taught to love; we are taught to hate. We build we destroy. 
We give life we kill. These human activities are the consequences 
of culture, our birth culture and the individual translation of that 
cultural heritage we all absorb and carrying into our future, further 
socializing those who associate with us. Culture is profoundly 
implicated in all we do, and is responsible for legitimizing the 
violence we perpetrate against another. 
 
Berger and Lukmann (1967) postulate that culture provides essential support to 
collective violence people wreck on one another. Although culture is not the agent of 
carnage; it is human beings acting in concert and providing the daily, proximal 
supports for orchestration of collective violence. Culture proposes; man (usually) 
disposes. To them without culture there is no collective violence. Collective violence 
is a group orchestration, relying for its expression and unfolding on how each cultural 
 
 
 
75 
 
group has socialized its members to meet the basic concerns addressed by all cultures 
everywhere, anytime. 
 
In line with our study, culture and conflict can also be linked with competition for 
political power. LeBaron and Pillay (2006) argue that when people are jostling for 
power or influence, they often use cultural differences to manipulate and polarize 
relationships, shaping and reshaping their sense of who “we” are and who “they” are. 
In addition, awareness of cultural differences, reinforced by sterotype, further 
polarization which deepen the cleavage between “us” and “them”. Since culture set 
the standards of what is good and evil, just and unjust, moral and immoral, 
manipulation of cultural differences facilitates the psychological process where 
people come to believe that “we” are good and “they” are bad. Thus, one can add that 
politicians use cultural differences to polarise groups for political support. 
Having considered the various causes of conflict, it is necessary to take a look at 
conflict resolution. 
 
2.4 Conflict Resolution, Management and Transformation 
 Conflict management by peaceful means has been very much in vogue for a long 
time. In almost all African societies there is preference for peaceful settlement of 
dispute along the lines prescribed by the institutions and values of the community.  In 
a few instances where it may be tolerated, the community and not individual has to be 
the sanctioning authority. In fact, there exists a wide range of non-violent methods of 
managing conflict either at individual, family, group, community and international 
levels. 
 
There are quite a number of approaches to conflict resolution and management which 
covers both personal as well as public dimensions as experienced in the developing 
and industrialized worlds.  Fundamentally, two main approaches to conflict resolution 
are discernable they are peaceful negotiation or arbitration and use of force. The use 
of force may include war, genocide, forced mass population transfer, partition and/ or 
secession (self determination), integration or assimilation. On the other hand, peaceful 
conflict resolution implies approaching the conflict in a problem-solving ,constructive 
and non-violent way, taking the value of the identify of all parties in the relationship, 
 
 
 
76 
 
their human needs and interest, rather than a violent, destructive” solution” or a mere 
settlement that “ freezes” the current power distribution between opponents 
(Oyeshola, 2005 ). 
 
2.4.1 Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution encapsulates activities geared towards maintaining and promoting 
peace and security. It is the process that involves bridge building between hostile 
communities, clarifying issues which represent point of confrontation between them 
and creating new opportunities for developing renewed relationships, based upon a 
process of peaceful change and grassroots reconciliation (Committee on Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men, 2004). Miller (2003:8) sees it as “a variety of 
approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of 
problems, distinct from management or transformation of conflict”. Miall et. al (1999) 
argue that by conflict resolution, the deep rooted sources of conflict are expected to be 
addressed and resolved in such a way that behavior is no longer violent, nor are 
attitudes hostile any longer, while the structure of the conflict has been changed 
 
According to Mitchel and Banks (1996) cited in Best (2006: 94), conflict resolution 
denotes first, an outcome in which the issues in an existing conflict are satisfactorily 
resolved in such a way that is mutually acceptable to the parties, self-sustaining in the 
long run and productive of a new, positive relationship between parties that were 
previously hostile adversaries; and second, any process or procedure by which such 
an outcome is achieved.  
 
Conflict resolution denotes the idea in which the parties to a conflict are mutually 
satisfied with the outcome of a settlement and in true sense the conflict is resolved. 
However, it is necessary to stress that not all conflicts can be resolved to mutual 
satisfaction of the warring factions. Best (2006) notes that, from the point of view of 
needs, it is possible to resolve conflict when the basic needs of parties have been met 
with necessary satisfiers, and their fears have been allayed. But others like over 
values, may not be resolved and can best be transformed, regulated or managed. The 
crisis in Sudan is a good example of the fact that not all conflicts can be resolved; 
some can at best be managed or transformed. 
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2.4.2 Conflict Management 
Every society manages her conflicts through a framework of laid-down conventions 
or rules. Either traditional or modern, each has a body of rules that defines and 
qualifies people‟s relationship with each other and the state. These rules and 
regulations constitute the law of the land (constitution). In societies where there are no 
written constitutions, the basic set of standards in which individual member has been 
socialized from youth to conform to and from which other standards in the culture 
derive become the framework of conflict management (Oyeshola, 2005). 
 
 Conflict management is the process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity 
of conflict through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties 
involved in that conflict (Best 2006). The concept of conflict management comes to 
the fore as a result of the fact that conflict is inevitable and not all conflicts can be 
resolved, hence the need to manage or regulate them. 
 
Africa‟s societies have different means of managing conflict. In Chad for instance, the 
traditional chiefs/ ruler are vested with power to intervene and effect conciliation 
between the parties in conflict residing within their own area of jurisdiction. In 
conflicts between nomads, cattle rearers and settled farmers, there exists a structure 
whereby traditional rulers quite frequently participate in the management of such 
conflicts. Through that platform, the traditional rulers do not limit themselves to 
conciliatory efforts; they equally carry out enlightenment campaigns and undertake 
measures to prevent future conflicts. Other traditional mechanisms for resolving 
conflict in Chad include Peace Dialogue Committees. 
 
Associations/Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the Role of Assemblies 
(Cofono) are well recognised. The “Cofono” is a fully representative gathering, which 
brings together not only the traditional rulers, but also customary council members 
from the surroundings, all interested men-young and old, as well as women groups of 
all ages (Zamtato, 2003). In Cameroun, the traditional method of conflict management  
involve three stages Before then, it is  necessary to state that there  is what is called  
“African Palaver” which is widely used in quite a number of communities to settle 
conflict “Palaver” simply mean talking things over, or the settlement of conflict 
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through dialogue. The first stage is to persuade disputants to bring their case to the 
“Palaver” the second stage is hearing phase and the final stage is the point at which 
the elders, after taking evidence from witnesses and listening to all the contributions 
from the floor, retire to a secluded place to take a decision on the conflict. As soon as 
they are ready with their decision, they return to give it and conclude the “palaver”. 
The palaver system is also used in Mali as a popular conflict management technique 
(Zamtato, 2003). 
 
Imobighe (1997) has evolved a model of integrated conflict management system in 
which all the vital modes by which conflict can be responded to can be 
comprehensively depicted as a process in an integrated conflict management cycle 
(cited in Obeihiegbon, 2005). The figure is shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Obiehagbon (2005) 
 
2.4.3 Conflict Transformation  
Conflict transformation, according to Best (2006), is traceable to John Lederach of the 
Eastern Mennonite School of Peace Building. The assumption is that it goes beyond 
conflict resolution as it aims at building longer standing relation through a process of 
change in perception and attitudes of parties. In essence, the aim of conflict 
transformation is to change the parties and relationship and the very condition that 
created the conflict. In a sense, conflict transformation entails the coming into being 
of new situations involving conflict issues, perception relationship and 
communication patterns (Jeong, 2000). 
Lederach put it more pungently that constructive transformation of conflict is: 
Conflict Prevention, Peace Promotion and Consolidation 
possible response: Democratic practice, Behavioural code, 
confidence building measuring and   integrative activities. 
Conflict control and abatement possible response: 
passing resolutions making appeals, using neutral 
forces to keep hostile parties, apart. 
Conflict resolution possible response: The 
use of mediatory organ conciliatory 
activities intensive negotiations. 
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comprehensive set of lenses for describing how conflict emerges 
from, evolves within and brings about  changes in the personal, 
relational, structural and cultural dimensions and for developing 
creative response that promote peaceful change within those 
dimensions through non-violent mechanism (Lederach, 1987; 
Bassey, 2002).  
 
According to Academic Associates Peace Work (AAPW), 2008:8 (cited in Bassey, 
2002:2) conflict transformation involves three stages. The first stage has to do with 
attitudinal transformation “by change and redirecting negative perceptions, a 
commitment to see the other with goodwill, to define the conflict in terms of mutual 
respect, and to maintain attitudes of collaborative and co-operative intent” . Thus, the 
quotation continues: 
 
by limiting all action to collaborative behavior, and interrupting 
negative cycles. This requires a commitment to seek non-coercive 
process of communication, negotiation, and dispute resolution 
even when there has been intense provocation. The commitment on 
both sides to act with restraint and mutual respect changes the 
dynamics of negotiation from mistrust to trust” (AAPW2000:9 
cited in (Bassey 2002:2). 
 
The third stage as explicated by (Bassey, 2002) involves seeking to discover, define 
and remove incompatibilities by creative design to facilitate mutual gain. Bassey 
(2002:20) and Otite (1999:10) argue that in destructive conflicts negative attitudes 
and “behaviour” sustained by goal becomes divisive and alienating, a product of 
individual‟s socialization and acculturation that is present in “most person‟s 
behavioural repertoire from childhood”. Thus, conflict transformation in this context 
is geared towards peace building through a shared vision of new patterns of 
sustainable relationship which go beyond “resolving or “ending particular conflict. 
 
From the above it can be deduced that conflict resolution, management and 
transformation is not an ad hoc arrangement, neither is it a punitive measure that 
satisfies a short term emotional demand (Uji, 2005) in the management of conflict 
there are certain procedures of ideas that can be of vital use as postulated by Wilmot 
and Hocker (1998:48-49 cited in Otite, 1999:11-12): 
These include clarification of communication and checking of 
perceptions which in turn involve the following: speaking out what 
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is on one‟s mind or heart, listening carefully, expressing strong 
feelings appropriately, remaining rational, asking questions, 
maintaining spirit of give and take, avoiding harmful statement, 
asking directly what is going on, telling others one‟s opinion, 
looking for flexible “shades of grey” solution, recognizing the 
process of initiating co-operative move, identifying conflict pattern 
and engaging in negotiations of agreements and settlements. 
 
In the case of Nigerian governments, the approach of conflict handling is not different 
from that of colonial state which deals essentially with the use of coercive force in 
suppressing crisis and violence. Thus Albert (1999:38-39) stated that: 
Once a community becomes violent in Nigeria, the first thing 
government does in line with its constitutional duty of maintaining 
law and order is to deploy some policemen to keep the peace in the 
area. Once the violence dies out, the Police is withdrawn from the 
area based on the assumption that the conflict is over. In many 
cases, the violence escalates few days, weeks or months after the 
departure of the police. In some desperate situations, the 
government permanently stations a contingent of “peace keeping” 
policemen and even soldiers in the conflict-prone area. Cessation 
of physical violence in the feuding communities in Nigeria is 
usually followed by setting up commissions of inquiry to look into 
the civil disturbance. Such a commission would take evidence 
from all parties to the conflict. 
He continues: 
The report of the commission is presented to government at a 
widely publicized occasion and the people never hear anything 
after that until another round of violence breaks out in the area. As 
members of the public wait endlessly for the report of the panel to 
be released, those who want to keep the conflict alive would go to 
town once again with an analysis of “insider knowledge” of the 
content of the report. The party that considered itself to have been 
disadvantaged by the report will therefore start once again to 
mobilize towards redressing the “injustice” done to them. This 
popular way of responding to conflict shows that not much 
attention is given to problem-solving procedures by the Nigerian 
government. For example to experience sustainable peace, it has to 
change its attitude to conflict. 
 
The handling of Tiv-Jukun crisis (1992-2002) and the ethno-religious crisis in Jos 
Plateau among others buttress this fact. This is why resolving conflict has been a 
continuous challenge in Nigeria. 
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2.5 Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical frameworks/theories are very important in any research work as they 
provide context for research. As posited by Hauss (2001), theories help to organize 
research as it point researchers toward some information or issues and away from 
others, thereby giving scholars intellectual cubhyholes into which to put the 
information gathered and an order in which to analyse it. In other words, situating a 
study within a theoretical construct provides a linkage among the range of facts to be 
investigated. It is essential to state that behavioural revolution brought about the 
development and adoption of theories in political studies. Thus, quite a number of 
theories have been evolved by scholars in analyzing political phenomena. However, 
conflict studies cut across various disciplines, which have made scholars of different 
persuasions to come up with various theories to explain conflict phenomana based on 
their orientations. 
 
It is necessary to state that the essence of conflict theory or theories is to scientifically 
explicate the general contours of conflict in society: how conflict starts, its varieties 
and the effects. However, the central concerns of conflict theory are the unequal 
distribution of scarce resources and power. What these resources are might be 
different from each theorist, but conflict theorists quite frequently do follow the line 
of Weber‟s three systems of stratification: class, status and power. Thus, conflict 
theorists generally see power as the central feature of society rather than seeing 
society been held together by collective agreement via a cohesive set of cultural 
standards, as argued by the functionalists. Where power is located and who uses it 
(and who doesn‟t) are very fundamental to conflict theory (htpp: 
//www.pineforge.com/upm-data/13636-chapter7.pdf). Nevertheless, other factors like 
economic and socio-cultural can not be jettisoned in order to grapple with the various 
complex dimensions of conflicts.  
 
From this premise we are going to look at some of the theories relevant to our studies, 
highlighting their strengths and weaknesses and then come up with a model that will 
serve as explanatory tool for our analysis. 
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2.5.1 Psychological Theories of Conflict 
According to Anifowose (2006), psychological theories dominate explanations on 
political violence among the social scientists. While there are differences in 
interpretations, definitions, concepts and conceptualization, however, the general 
consensus is that frustration leads to aggressive behavior. Dollard John and his 
research associates initially developed this theory in 1939 cited in (Faleti, 2006). It 
was later expanded and modified by scholars like Berkowitz (1962) and Yate (1962) 
there are many strands of these theories. For example while Feierabend et al (1969) 
emphasizes “want-get-ratio that is the distance between expectation and achievement 
Davies (1962) focuses on the gap between “expected need satisfaction” and “actual 
need satisfaction.” Gurr (1969) is concerned with relative deprivation hinges on the 
gap between expectations and capabilities. In other words, the gap between men‟s 
value expectations and the actual value capabilities orchestrate violent conflict.  
 
For Gurr, relative deprivation as explained by Anifowose (2006) is perceived within 
the context of thwarting circumstances. He argues that when one‟s effort(s) to get 
something is thwarted, one is likely to get angry and when this is so, the most 
satisfying inherent response is to strike out at the source of such frustration. In this 
circumstance, frustration is no longer seen as the blockage of present goal-directed 
activity, but rather anticipated frustration brought to the fore by discrepancies 
between what is realistic in terms of attainment, given the social context, and what is 
sought. This notion that distance between current status and aspiration form the basis 
of argument of Feierabend et al and Davies earlier mentioned. The kernel of 
expectational theory is that hope, not despair instigates violent political behavior. 
Feierabend et al (1969) in their study use systematic frustration hypothesis. They 
argued that collective violent political behavior is caused by systematic frustration. 
To them systematic frustration is a collective frustration experience within a society.  
In a nutshell, irrespective of whatever angles frustration arises, either from failure to 
empower or from the process of disempowering could lead to conflict. Also unequal 
power relationship for instance can generate frustration which in turn breeds conflict 
at various levels. The above position forms the fulcrum of Galtung analysis of general 
patterns of conflict. 
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Conclusively, Alkanji (2005) opines that most works on economically related 
explications of conflict hinges on the premise that asymmetric relations in power, 
income, and wealth among others inevitably provide a fertile ground for 
manifestation of conflict. 
 
An analytical dissection of the validity of psychological models brings to the fore 
quite a number of shortcomings. For one, this approach is a celebration of the sanctity 
of human nature- biological, physiological and psychological aspects as the major 
determinant of violent conflict at all levels. The models are also accused of 
extrapolating from the individual and applying it to an aggregate analysis of the 
political enclave (political system). Akanji (2005) and Anifowose (2006) postulate 
that this has been the point of contention of Lupsha (1971) who admit that although 
generalizing from micro concept to macro analysis is possible, however, he stated that 
it is difficult, requiring a number of intervening steps and operationalization. 
 
Khan 1978 (cited in Akanji, 2005) averrs that the models are more applicable to 
individuals, compact groups and sub segments or disparate groups but less applicable 
to collectivity of a society. Lastly, the models may equally be faulted for neglecting 
the dynamism of human behavior as well as conflict itself. These flaws 
notwithstanding, we cannot just discard these models since human beings are the 
parties to conflict and it is a matter of necessity to understand their behaviours which 
is the basis of these models. 
 
2.5.2 Group Conflict Theory  
Another model put forward to explain violent conflict especially within a political 
system is the group conflict models. Theorists that subscribe to this theoretical 
construct view conflict as a product of a struggle for power among various groups 
within a society. Scholars like Esses and Jackson (2008) argue that group conflict 
theory apart, from dealing with the origins and functions of inter-group conflict, tends 
to place particular emphasis on the role of either socially prevalent ideologies or 
situational factors which work together to create and exacerbate perceptions of inter-
group competition and tension. The assumption of this model is that political violence 
for instance, is as a result of conflict between different actors within a given political 
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enclave. In that circumstance, all politics is inherent in conflict between political 
actors premised on the authoritative allocation of values. For example, the power 
approach or theory focuses on the role of competition in fomenting inter-group 
hostility. Hewstone et al (2008) contend that groups in proximity are often groups in 
conflict. Neighboring groups often pose potential threats, to social identity, to 
numerical superiority, to locally held power, even to the existence of one‟s own 
group. Even in conflicts that appear on the face to be ethnic clashes (such as Hutus-
Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi) competition for power and resources may be 
as important as ethnic differences. 
 
Similarly, there is another strand of group theory which is sub-cultural division. The 
main argument of this strand is that political instability is a function of cultural 
pluralism of heterogeneous nations in which the focal point of political identification 
and socialization is based on sub-national communities with different cultures and 
history as against the nation (Powel 1992). This position has been corroborated by 
Morrison and Stephenson (1972) that cultural pluralism increases the possibility of 
conflict between members of communal groups as well as elite instability. This is 
similar to power approach position that “racial and ethnic groups compete for power, 
prestige and privileges, hostilities will arise and increase with intensity of 
competition” (Giles and Evans, 1986:471). 
 
According to the instrumentalist perspective, elite in the course of contending for 
power often manipulate social divisions and blowing them out of proportion with 
threat, fear, hate discourse, propaganda and with no-compromise, aggressive, crisis 
politics. Thus, elite create opportunities with issues and crises to advance their 
interests and goals. Conciliation is difficult when rival leaders demonize their 
adversaries as opponents who can never be trusted and must therefore be defeated, 
dominated or ethnically cleansed (Obserschall, 2010). Elite competition for scarce 
resources is hinged on three assumptions. These are: (1) the initiative for ethnic 
mobilization originates with the elite, (2) ethnic nationalist movements are led by the 
elite, and (3) ethnic mobilization is primarily, if not totally, for the benefits of the 
elites (Isumonah, 1997). 
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However, Isumonah disagrees with the last assumption on the ground that although 
some ethnic nationalists movement were led by individuals of high social 
backgrounds, but the motive along this effort was not material gains. He cited the 
case of Basque nationalism in Spain. Huntington (1996) in the same vein sees 
preservation of ethnic, culture and traditions ties among others as a major factor in 
inter-group conflict. The group conflict theory has been punctured by some critics.  
Looking at the theory critically, one can infer that ethnic diversity in itself does not 
result in conflict. It is its manipulation by the political elite that causes conflict. This 
is evident in many plural states of the world that are not conflict-prone (e.g the United 
States of American). Rotchild (1970) even argues that fractionalization reduces the 
possibility of violent conflict, as this can lead to divergent groups learning skills to 
live together in spite of their recognized diversity. Akanji (2005) posits that it is 
possible the failure of this learning process exacerbate conflict and increase the 
possibility of serious hostility precisely because it provides convenient platform for 
political mobilization as it was in the case of Yugoslavia in the 1990 before 
disintegration. Anifowose (2006) equally raises the issue of inability of the group 
theories to explain some forms of intra-ethnic or (inter-group) conflict. Lastly, the 
group conflict theory may not singly and sufficiently explain the incidence of ethnic 
conflicts and armed conflict without recourse to power inequalities and asymmetric 
view which contribute to ethnic mobilization (Akanji, 2005). Having looked at the 
strength and weaknesse of the aforementioned theories we now look at eclectic 
approach. 
 
2.5.3 Eclectic Model 
In view of the disparate theories explaining the causes of conflict, the study here 
identifies and discusses some relevant ones, suitable to explain the interplay of forces 
underlying the complex and cynical nature politics and violent conflicts in Ebiraland 
have assumed. It is essential to note that it is now generally accepted in conflict 
literature that conflict “grand theory” is illusive (Akanji, 2005). Consequently, the 
position taken in this study is that a mono-factor based explanation is inadequate for 
understanding politics and communal conflicts in Ebiraland and also any incidence of 
conflict at whatever level. 
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Oberschall (2010) argues that no single theoretical framework can be expected to 
encompass conflicts. The non-acceptance of a monocausal explanation of conflict is 
further buttressed by the view of Ricmond (1987:12) that “there is a growing 
dissatisfaction with sweeping generalizations, but an increasing recognition of the 
dependent variable and of the factors correlated with it”. He opined that multivariate 
causal models are replacing the search for universal explanations in which particular 
processes are seen as contingent outcomes formulated as statements of probability. 
He concludes that such paradigms only provide a more realistic basis for 
understanding the complex nature of social phenomena. 
 
As a result, eclectic model of conflict is adopted in this study. The central tenet of the 
eclectic model is that civil conflicts are the products of confluence of factors- cultural, 
economic, historical, political, and social among others which necessitate combining 
multiple theoretical approaches in order to arrive at acceptable explanations. This 
simply means they are used mechanically without any real effort at integrating them 
or assessing the logical implications of adhering to one view while simultaneously 
endorsing another (Sanderson, 1987). Eclecticism holds that any particular problem 
must be explained from different angles so as to bring to bear diversity of approaches.  
 
This is essential because each approach only provides partial insight into the nature of 
the problem, whereas the combination of approaches gives a complete picture of the 
problem (Sanderson, 1987). That is, given the complexity of civil conflicts, a single 
variable or factor is insufficient to explain the causes of these phenomena (Kieh, 
2002).  Miner (1990 cited in Kieh (2002:12) argues that “at the heart of the 
(Sudanese) conflict has been an amalgam of religious and racial, political and 
economic tensions defying easy description.” He contends further that it is the 
synergy of these factors that occasioned the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in 
1956. Copson (1991) attributes civil wars in Africa to a combination of factors. 
Accordingly to him, poverty based on individual and regional disparities, for 
example, manifest in the degradation of unemployment and underemployment, works 
as an inducement in persuading people to engage in violence. Politically, Copson 
cites repression, the abuse of human rights, and the concentration of power at the 
political center as conflict precipitants. Stedman (1997) cited in Nwolise  (1997:39) 
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asserts that “conflicts in Africa arise from problems basic to all populations: the tugs 
and pulls of different identities, the distribution of resources and access to power, and 
competing definitions of what is right, fair and just.” In other words, he posits that 
there is a broad universe of ethnic, economic, political, and moral factors that 
occasion conflicts in Africa. 
 
Garuba (1998) identifies an array of factors that contribute to civil conflicts in Africa.  
The paucity of resources brings even the most equitable sharing arrangements under 
acute stress. Also, the level of ignorance among the masses makes them highly 
susceptible to both internal exploitation and external manipulation. Moreover, the 
African peoples are more economically vulnerable. Treading a similar path, Imobighe 
(1998) describes a host of factors that precipitate civil conflicts in Africa. He cites 
inequalities in access to power and resources. In conclusion, the precipitants of civil 
conflicts can be divided into two major categories which are: the contingent and 
proximate (Kieh, 2002). The former consists of those long-term deeply rooted 
conditions that date back to the very formation of the society; however, they are not 
sufficient to precipitate a civil conflict. The latter serves as “trigger mechanism” for 
the outbreak of civil conflict. As “lighting rods,” they are dependent on the contingent 
factors. 
 
The above arguments authenticate the necessity of eclectic approach to conflict 
studies. Researchers in the field of sociology and anthropology appear to have 
produced scholarly works that advocate eclecticism.  These include (Dahrendorf 
1959; Stinchcombe 1968; Goody 1973, 1976; Harris, 1979; Klass, 1980). In fact, 
Merton (1981) advocates a type of eclectic approach christened theoretical pluralism. 
Unfortunately, there seems not to be a significant studies adopting eclectic approach 
in conflict analyses. 
 
Some critics are of the opinion that eclectic approach suffers from several crucial 
defects. Sander (1987) averrs that acceptance of diverse theoretical perspectives 
which the theory connotes, eclecticism obviously leads to hopelessly self-
contradictory argument that generate far more confusion than insight. It is antithetical 
to the widely accepted scientific aim of simplicity as its arguments increase rather 
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than decrease the number of explanatory concepts and principles that must be relied 
on in analysis. The theory frustrates efforts at seeing the world as fundamentally 
unified and coherent but rather as complex and disjointed (Maxwell, 1974). 
Eclecticism often leads to adoption of theories which are not linked together or inter-
penetrate each other as they are often mutually exclusive (Harris, 1979). Finally, 
eclectic theory runs counter to the basic mechanism of rationality and progress in 
science. This is because the idea of testing and evaluating theories before coming up 
with the best one to adopt is made impossible and as such undermines that which 
makes science uniquely successful (Sander, 1987). 
 
Merton (1981) argues exactly the opposite that although theoretical orientations of 
eclecticism necessitate different perspectives to a problem but it always engendered 
complementarity rather than contradiction. 
 
Despite the criticisms against eclecticism, the approach provides a framework for the 
analysis of politics and conflict in this study. The superiority of this model to other 
theories examined above is seen in its comprehensiveness and inclusiveness, 
providing the basis for the analysis of multifactors etiology of conflict. Suffice to say 
that eclecticism is the only framework that can produce thorough explanations of the 
confluence of factors precipitating conflict. An individual theory can only give a 
partial understanding of reality, hence the need for joining together several theories to 
have a true complete understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
  
2.6 Gaps in the Literature 
In summay, the chapter has shown some of the factors responsible for conflicts which 
cut across political, economic, cultural, and social among others, although political 
competition cum economic appear more visible. It is clear from the chapter that 
conflict is more or less part of human beings as it manifests in the different aspects of 
people. Similarly, it has shown that no singular variable can account for the incidence 
of conflict at whatever level, rather but a multiplicity of factors. The Nigerian state 
has been fingered not to be doing too well in conflict resolution in the country. 
Furthermore, it is obvious in the literature that the various precipitant factors of 
conflict are often treated singly without adopting a holistic approach. Thus, Aylward 
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(2007) observes that in the past decade, scholarship about the causes of civil wars or 
(conflicts) has not greatly explored the complex mix between economic, political, 
social, ethnic and cultural dimensions of identity construction and how they relate to 
violent conflict. Many studies focus on these variables in isolation, though few 
studies do acknowledge an existing relationship between two or more of the variables 
mentioned above. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) focus exclusively 
on economic elements to analyse causal factors, probability and duration of civil wars 
or (conflicts). They use quantitative economic modeling to show “empirically” that a 
handful of economic factors are responsible for conflict. These authors dismiss 
political, cultural and social factors in their analysis of civil wars and conflicts 
because they use economic models (logit regressions) that do not incorporate these 
variables in the first place. Analyses based solely on economic models as stated 
before unjustifiably neglect, political, social and cultural variables that influence 
causes of violent conflict. 
 
Other theorists such as Huntington (1992:25, 27) avoid political and economic factors 
and focus exclusively on cultural features that cause violent conflict and civil war.  
According to Huntington, violent conflict and civil war can be attributed to “basic” 
linguistic, cultural and religious differences among actors. For Huntington, “cultural 
characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised 
and resolved than political or economic ones” and therefore lead to conflict. 
Huntington‟s thesis ignores the reality that competition for political power and 
economic benefits inherent in political power acquisition can be a driver or 
mobilization factor in violent conflict. In addition, this author does not provide any 
explanation of specific linguistic, cultural, or religious characteristics of the 
civilizations that will inherently cause conflict and violence. Furthermore, his theory 
is also flawed because it relies on fixed and static notions of culture and identity that 
do not take into account that identities are socially constructed and change over time. 
Lastly, his analysis cannot explain conflicts among people of the same cultural and 
historical background. 
 
Other authors such as Murshed (2002) and Senghaas (2002) disagree with Huntington 
and focus on socio-economic discrimination and exclusion as the primary cause of 
conflict and situate culture primarily within a socio-economic framework. However, 
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Senghaas‟ and Murshed‟s arguments are problematic because they gloss over the 
complexity of identity and human agency as well as culture as causative agents of 
conflict while focusing on socio-economic factors. Stewart (2000:246) argues “it is 
rarely possible to disentangle political, cultural and economic elements, as each is 
embedded in the other.” His analysis is also incomplete because it does not address 
the complexity of identity formation. In summary, the various scholars examined do 
not take into account the complicated relationship between political, economic, social 
and cultural factors that influence conflict and the construction of identities that 
perpetuate violence. Oshita (2007) accentuates that any engagement with conflict 
phenomenon in present day Nigeria must as a matter of necessity grapple with the 
multiple impacts of the complex nexus among historical, economic, political, cultural, 
religious and psychosocial dimensions of conflict. This is why this study is very 
relevant because it tries to bridge the existing gap(s) in the literature as it provides an 
integrated approach to conflict analysis by combining the entire aforementioned 
factors as holistic whole rather than treating them in isolation. 
 
Another knowledge gap noticed in the literature which this research intends to fill to 
some extent is the fact that most analyses on conflict are qualitative. Thus, there is 
need to combine both qualitative and quantitative methods in conflict analysis. Lastly, 
most analysis of literature on conflict either lack theoretical foundation or adopts 
single theory and it has been demonstrated in our study that mono-theory approach 
hardly captures the various dimensions of conflict which underscore the need for this 
study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
References  
Abel, T. (1941) “The Element of Decisions in the Pattern of War”, American 
Sociological Review, 1(6):853-859 
Abimboye, D. (2009) “The Damage Religious Crises Have Done to the North” Tell, 
Lagos pp. 10-21 
Adebanwi Wale (2004) “Democracy and Violence: The Challenges of Communal 
Clashes” In Agbaje, A., Diamond, L., Onwudiwe, E. (eds) Nigeria’s Struggle 
For Democracy and Good Governance: A Fetschrist For Oyeleye Oyediran, 
Ibadan: Ibadan University Press 
Adekanye, J. (1995) “Structural Adjustment, Democratization and Rising Ethnic 
Tensions in Africa Development and Change 26: 335-374 
Adekeye, A. (2004) “Introduction” In Oyeshola, D. (ed) Conflict and Context of 
Conflict Resolution, Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University. 
African Union (2005) Charter for the Cultural Renaissance of Africa (Draft Revised) 
First African Union (AU) Conference of African Ministers of Culture, 
Nairobi, Kenya. http:// ocpa.irmo.hr\resources\docs\ Au cultural renaissance 
charter 2005. Wn.pdf accessed 20 Oct. 2007 
Agbe, A.G. (2001) The Ife-Modakeke Crisis: An Insider View. Ife Psychologia 9 
(3):14-20. 
Ajibola, A. (1978) Foreign Policy and Public Opinion, Ibadan: Ibadan University 
Press. 
Ahmed, A. G. M. (2008) “Multiple Complexity and Prospects for Reconciliating and 
 Unity: The Sudan Conundrum In Nhema, A. and Zeleza, P and T. (eds) The 
Roots of African Conflict, the cause and Costs, Zimbabwe, Lesoth, Kenya, 
Sudan, Uganda,The Horn of Africa, Oxford: James Currey Ltd 
Akanji, O.O. (2005) Migration, Communal Conflicts and Group Rights in the 
Nigerian State: The Case of Ife-Modakeke. Unpubished Ph.D Thesis, 
Department Of Political Science, University of Ibadan. 
Akinrinade, S and Sesay, A. (1995) Africa in the Post-cold War  International System. 
London: Casse  Academic. 
 
 
 
92 
 
Akokpari J. (2008) “You Don‟t Belong Here” Citizenship, the State and Africa‟s 
Conflicts; Reflections on Ivory Coast. In Nhema, A. and Zeleza P.T. (eds) The 
Roots of African Conflicts, The Causes and Costs, Addisa Ababa: OSSREA 
Akokpori, J. (1998) “The State, Refugees and Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
International Migration Review 36(2): 211-231. 
Akpan, E. N. (2006) “The Concept of Conflict in International Relations” in 
Adegbulu F. (ed) Topic and Issues in International Relations, Ilishan-Remo: 
Babcock University Press.  
Akporto, A.S. (2002) “Warri Crisis Survey Report: Urhobo Perspective” In Imobighe, 
T. A C.O Bassey and J. B Asuni eds Conflict and Instability in The Niger 
Delta: The Warri Case. Ibadan: Spectrum 
Akurang-Parry, K.O. (2002) “Africa and World War I”, in Toyin Folola, ed. Africa. 
Vol. 3, Colonial Africa, 1855-1939. Durham, NC: Cardina Academic Press. 
Albert, I. (1999) Ife-Modakeke Crisis. In Otite, O. and Albert, I.S. (eds) Community 
Conflict in Nigeria: Management Resolution and Transformation. Ibadan: 
Spectrum Books. 
Albert, I.O. (1999) “New Directions in the Management of Community Conflicts in 
Nigeria: Insights from the activities AAPW” in Albert, O.I and Otite, O. (eds) 
Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management Resolution and 
Transformation, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd 
Alemika, E.E.O. (2008) Resolution of the crisis in the Niger Delta: Constraints and 
Opportunities. Nigerian Sociological Review, 3 (1and 2) 11-25 
Alemika, E.E.O. (2011) “Post-election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trend and 
Lessons”. CLEEN Foundation. Tuesday 5th July. 
Alexander, T. (1955) The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday Anchor Books  
Anderson, B. (1993) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso Publications. 
Andre, C and Plateau, J.P. (1998) “Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda 
Caught in the Malthusian Trap,”   Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization, 34(1): 1-47. 
 
 
 
93 
 
Angsburger, D.W. (1992) Conflict Mediation Across Culture: Pathway and Pattern. 
Alouisville, Kenturch: West Minister John Knox Press. 
Anifowose, R. (2011) Violence and Politics in Nigeria the Tiv Yoruba Experience and 
Niger Delta. Lagos: Sam Ironuasi Publications 
Anifowose, R. (2006) Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba 
Experience Lagos: First Academic Publishers. 
Anifowose, R. (2003) “The Changing Nature of Ethnic Conflicts: Reflections on the 
Tiv- Junkun Situation in Babawale, T. (ed) Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias 
and the Challenge of Democratic Consideration in Nigeria, Lagos: Malthouse 
Press Limited. 
Ansari, H. A. (1984) “Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of 
Religion”, The Middle East Journal 38 (Summer): 18-39 
Anugwom, E. (1997) “Ethnic Conflict and Government in Nigeria: Lesson from the 
Past” (PRIN‟s Paper Presentation on Inter-group Conflicts and Resolution), 
Nsukka, 3-5, December. 
Appadorai, A. (1974) The Substance of Politics, Oxford : Oxford University Press 
Appadurai, A. (1998) Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization, 
Public Culture 10 (2): 225-247 
Ardrey, R. (1967) “The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal 
Origins of Property and Nations cited in Akanji O. O (2005) Migration, 
Communal Conflicts and Group Rights in the Nigerian State: The Case of Ife-
Modakeke, Unpubished Ph.D Thesis, Department Of Political Science, 
University of Ibadan. 
 
Asiyanbola, A. R. (2007) Urban-ethno Communal Conflict in Africa, Nigeria: A 
Paper Presented at the Union for African Population Studies (UAPS) 17th 
African Polpulation Conferences, Arusha, Tanzania: December, 10-14 
Ayam,  J. (2004) “The Nature, Scope and Methods of Political Science” in Ayam 
John (Ed) Introduction to Politics, Ota: Department of Strategic Studies, 
Covenant University. 
 
 
 
94 
 
Aylward, L. (2007) “Understanding Civil War: Causes of Violent Conflict and the 
Social Construction of Indigenous Identity in Guatemala”. Dialogue 5(1):45-
64 
Azar, E. and Moon, C. I. (1986) “Managing Protracted Social Conflicts in the Third 
World: Facilitation and Development Diplomacy”, Millennium Journal of 
International Studies 15 (3) 393-406 
Babajimi, P. (2003) Ife-Modakeke Conflict in Osun State” in T.A Imobighe (ed) Civil 
Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum 
Badmus, I. A. (2003) “Federalism, Multicultural and Multiethnic Challenge: The 
Nigerian Experience”, African Journal of International Affairs and 
Development 8 (1): 25-47 
Bakoji, M. A. (2005) “Military Professionalism and Conflict Management in Nigeria: 
A Case Study of Tiv-jukun Conflict Since 1980” in Yakubu, A.M. et al (eds.) 
Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980. Vol. 2 Governance 
and Conflict Mangement, Kaduna: Nigeria Defence Academy Book Series 
No.1. pp: 721-740 
Ball, A. (1971) Modern Politics and Government 2nd Ed, London: Macmillan 
Ballentine, K. (2003) “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic 
Dynamics of Armed Conflict” in Ballentine, K. and Sherman, J. (eds) The 
Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder, 
Co: Lynne  
Banegas, R. (2006) Cote d‟ivoire: Patriotism Ethonationalism and Other African 
Modes of Self-Writing, African Affairs 105(4.21): 535-552 
Banton, M. (1994) “Modeling Ethnic and National Relations” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 17 2-19 
Baran, S.J (2004) Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future, 
Australia: Thomson Wadsworth. 
Barongo, Y. B. (1987) “Ethic Pluralism and Democratic Stability: The Basis for 
Conflict and Conflict and Consensus” in S.E Oyovbaire (ed), Democratic 
experiment in Nigeria : Interpretative Essay, Benin Omega publishers. Pp:65-
80 
 
 
 
95 
 
Barrow, W. (1976) “Ethnic Diversity and Political Instability in Black Africa” 
Comparative Political Studies 9(2): 139-170 
Bassey, C. O. (2002) Framework for the Conflict Transformation Project in Warri 
in Imobighe, T.A.; Bassey, C.O. and Asuni, J.B. (Eds) Conflict and Instability 
in the Niger-Delta: The Warri Case, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Pp:1-
35 
Bayart, J. F. (1993) The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. London: Longman. 
Bayert, J .F. (2005) The Illusion of Cultural Identity, London: Hurst and Company. 
Beaumont, R. (1995) Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 541:20-35 
Benthan, D. (1974) Max Weber and Theory of Politics, London: George Allen and 
Unwin. 
Berger, P.L. and Lukmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
in The Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday 
Berkowitz, L. (1962) Aggression: A Sociological Analysis, New York : McGraw Hill 
Bluhm, W. (1965) Theories of Political System, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
Princeton Hall Inc. 
Bond, Micheal Harris http// BondCultuireCollectiveViolence-pdf Retrieved 
18/06/2010 
Borstelmann, T. (1993) Apartheid’s Reluctant Unclear: The United States and 
South Africa in the Early Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bremer, S. (1993) Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict 1816-1965, 
International Interaction 18: 231-249 
Brewer, M. B. and Campbell, (1976) Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes: East 
African Evidence. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Brewer, M.B. (1968) Determinants of Social Distance Away East African Tribal 
Groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10, 279-289. 
Brink, R. V., Daniel, D. B. and Jean- Paul C. (1995) “The Economics of Cain and 
Abel: Agro-Pastoral Property Rights in the Sahel”, Journal of Development 
Studies, 31: 373-399. 
 
 
 
96 
 
Brouch-Due, V. (2005) Violence and Belonging : Analytical Reflections In Brouch-
Due, V. (ed) Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post- Colonial 
Africa, London: Routledge. 
Brown, M.E. (1993) Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Brown, M. B. (1995) Africa Chances: After Thirty Years of the World Bank, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Burton, J. (1990) Conflict Resolution and Prevention, London: Macmillan 
Burns, C.P.E. (2008) More Moral Than God: Taking Responsibility for Religious 
Violence U.S. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Burton, J.W. (1993) “Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy” in  Sandole, D.J.D 
and Vander Merve, H. (Eds) Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice 
Integration and Application, Manchester University Press. 
Chandhoke, .N. (1999) Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious Minorities, Delhi 
(OUP) 
Chafe, K.S. (1994) “The Problematic of African Democracy: Experience from the 
Political Transition in Nigeria”, Africa Zamani, (Special Issue on Historical 
Heritages and Democratization in Africa). New Series, No.2 (July) 
Chirot, D. (2001) Theories of Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An Introduction in D. 
Chirot and M. Seligan (eds) Ethno Political Warfare: Causes, Consequences 
and Possible Solutions, Wahington D.C: American Psychological Association,  
Christian- Herman, J. L., O‟Leary, K.D, and Avery-Leaf, S. (2001) The Impact of 
Severe Negative Events in Marriage on Depression, Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 20, 24-40 
Cochran, W.G. (1977) Sample Techiques 3rd edition, New York: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Cohen, A. (1974) Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power 
and Symbolism in Complex Society, Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” Oxford 
Economic Paper 56: 563-595 
 
 
 
97 
 
Collier, P. (2000) “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective” In Mats 
Berdal and David M. Malone, (eds) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas 
in Civil Wars, Boulder, Co and London: Lynne Rienner. 
Collier, P. (1999) “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War”.  Report of the 
World Banks in Collaboration with the University of Oxford 
Collier, P. (2000) “Policy for Post-Conflict Society: Reducing the Risks of Renewed 
Conflict. Paper Prepared for the Economics of Political Violence Conference. 
Princeton  University/Centre of International Studies, Princeton University, 
and the Development  Research Group, World Bank. 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1998) “On Economic Causes of Civil War” Oxford 
Economic Papers 50:563-573 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1999) Justice Seeking and Loot Seeking in Civil War. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, February. 
Copson, R. (1991) “Peace in Africa? The Influence of Regional and International 
Change” in Deng, F. and Zartman, I.W (eds) Conflict Resolution in Africa, 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution. 
Coser, L.A. (1956) The Functions of Social Conflict Glencoe III: The Free Press. 
Cramer, J.S. and Franses, P.H. (1999) “Omitting Superflous  Nonrespondent 
Observation in Binarry Respondents Analysis cited in Akanji. O.O (2005) 
Migration, Communal Conflicts and Group Rights in the Nigerian State: the 
Case of Ife-Modakeke. Unpublished Ph.d Thesis, Department of Political 
Science, University of Ibadan 
Dahl, R. (1976) Modern Political Analysi, London: Princeton Hall. 
Dahrendorf, R. (1959) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Dandeline, J. (2002) “Land as a Source of Conflict and in Post-Conflict Settlement,” 
World Bank Regional Workshop in Land Issues in Africa and the Middle East, 
April 29-May 2, Kampala, Uganda. 
Dane, F.C. (1990) Research Methods. California: Books/Cole Publishing 
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S.  (2000), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Second 
ed. Sage Publications 
 
 
 
98 
 
Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New 
York: Human Rights Watch and International Federation of Human Rights. 
Deutsch, K.W. (1980) Politics and Government How People Decide Their Fate, 
London: Houghton Mifelin Company. 
Deutsch, M. (1972) The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive Processes, Yale: New 
Haven. 
Deutsch, M. (1991) “Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, 
Social and Cultural Influences In Varynen, R. ed., New Direction in Conflict 
Theory: Conflict Resolution and Transformation. London: Sage. 
Dixion, W. J. (1994) “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Conflict”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(6): 818-833 
Donovhue, W.A. and Kolt, R. (1992) Managing Interpersonal Conflict Newberry, 
Park Calif: Sage Publications 
Dougherty, J. and Pfaltzgraf, R. (1981) Contending Theories of International 
Relation: A Comprehensive Survey, New York: Harper and Row   
Duley, B. J. (1965) “Violence in Nigeria Politics, Transition, 5 (21): 21-24. 
Dudley, B. J (1973) Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, 
Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. 
Easton, D. (1971) The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, 
2nd ed., New York: Alfred Knopf. 
Eguavoen, A.N.T. (2003) “Urhobo-Itshekiri Conflict in Delta State” in T.A Imobighe, 
ed Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria, Ibadan: 
Spectrum 
Egwu, S. G. (2001) Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria AFRIGOX. 
Egwu, S.G. (2005) “Beyond “Native” and “Settler” Identities: Globalization and the 
Challenge of Multicultural Citizenship in Nigeria”, The Nigerian Social 
Forum, Retrieved from www.nigeriasocialforumorg/Download/nsf.pdf 
2/8/2008. 
Egwu, S.G. (2004) “Ethnicity and Citizenship in Urban Nigeria: The Jos Case, 1960-
2000. An Unpublished PhD Thesis of the Department of Political Science, 
University of Jos. 
 
 
 
99 
 
Ekanola, B. A. (2004) Beyond Isolation, Towards Cooperative Relations and the 
Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Society. CODESRA Bulletin, 
No.3&4:35-37 
Eke, P.P. (1975) Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 17(1), 91-112 
Ekeocha, O. (2003) “The Reality of State Power” In Dukor M. (ed) Philosophy and 
Politics, Discourse On Values, Politics and Power In Africa, Lagos: 
Malthouse Press Limited. 
Elaigwu, J. I. (1994) “Ethnicity and the Federal Option in Africa” the Nigerian 
Journal of Federalism, 1: 69-85 
Elklit, J. and Reynold, A. (2005) “A Framework For the Systematic Study of Election 
Quality”, Democratization 12 (2): 1-16 
Elklit, J. and Svensson, P. (1997) What Makes Elections Free and Fair? Journal of 
Democracy 8 (3) 32-46 
Ellis, A. (2006) Dilemmas in Representation and Political Identity, in Judith Large 
and Timothy D. Sisk (Eds). Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further 
Readings (Vol.11) Stockholm: International IDEA. 
Ellingsten .T. (2000) “Colourful Community or Ethnic Witches Brew”? Journal of  
Conflict Resolution 44, 228-249 
Eltigani, S. and Ateem, M. (2007) The Root Causes of Conflicts in Sudan and the 
Making of the Darfur Tragedy (NEPAD and Regional Integration Division, 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Conflict Prevention and 
Development Co-operation in AFRICA: A Policy Workshop, Wilton Park, 
Sussex, 8-11 November. 
Endalew, T. (2002) Conflict Resolution Through Cultural Tolerance: An Analysis of 
the Michu Institution in Metekkel Region, Ethiopia, Social Science Research 
Series No 25 Addis Ababa OSSREA 
Esses, V.M. and Jackson, L.M. (2008) “Applying the Unified Instrumental Model of 
Group Conflict to Understanding Ethnic Conflict and Violence The Case of 
 
 
 
100 
 
Sudan in Essese, V.M and Vernon, R.A (ed) Explaining the Breakdown of 
Ethnic Relations Why Neighbours Kill, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 
Esman, M.J. (1990a) “Political Psychological Factors in Ethnic Conflict” in J.V. 
Montvile, (ed), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Lexington 
Books Lexington. 
Faleti, A. S. (2006) “Theories of Social Conflict” in Best, Gaya, S. ed, Introduction to 
Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 
Fayemi, J.K. (2000) “Sharia, Democracy and the Constitutional Reform Agenda in 
Nigeria” Quarterly Journal of the Centre for Democracy and Development 
(CDD), Vol. 2 Num 5 January-March, P. 23 
Fearon, J. D., and David, L. (2003) Ethnical, Insurgency and Civil War, American 
Political Science Review 47 (1):75-90 
Feierabend, T.K, Feierabends, R. and Nesvold, B.A. (1969) “Social Change and 
Political Violence: Cross National Patterns in Graham H.T and Gurr, T.R (eds) 
The History of violence in America. New York 
Fischer, J. (2002) “Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and 
Prevention” IFES White Paper 2002-01. Washington, DC. International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems 
Fishers, R. (1969) International Conflict for Beginners, Oxford: The Clarendon Press 
Fred-Mensah, B.K. (1999) “Capturing Ambiguities: Communal Conflict Management 
Alternative in Ghana,” World Development, 27(6):951-965. 
Freud, S. (1961) Civilization and Its Discontent (English Translation by James 
Strachery). New York: Norton. 
Fwa, K. L. (2003) “Ethno-Religious Conflict in Kaduna State” in Imobighe, T.A ed 
Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum 
Books Limited 
Gallie, W.B. (1962) Essentially Contested Concepts” in Max Black (Ed.) The 
Importance of Language. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Galtung, J. (1969) “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” Journal of Peace Research 6: 167-
191 
Galtung, J. (1990) Cultural Violence. Journal of Peace Research, 27 (3), 291-305 
 
 
 
101 
 
Galtung, J. (2002) Rethinking Conflict: The Cultural Approach. Intercultural 
Dialogue and Conflic Prevention Project. Council of Europe.  
Gantze, K. J., and Torsten S. (2000) Warfare Since the Second World War, Trans. 
J.P.G Bach New Brunswick and London Transaction.  
Garuba, C. (1998) Crisis in Africa and the Challenge of Capacity Building for Crisis 
Management in  Africa. Lagos, Nigeria: Gabumo Publishing Company. 
Gayer, L. and Christophe, J. (eds) (2009) Armed Militias of South Asaia: 
Fundamentalists, Maoists and separatists London: Hurst 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books  
Giles, M.W. and Evans, A. (1986) “The Power Approach to Inter-Group Hostility” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 30(3): 469-486 
Giora, E. (2009) Radical Islam in the Middle East and Southwest Asia: A Comparison 
in De Borchgrave, Arnand, Sanderson Thomas and Gordan David (eds) 
Conflict, Community, and Criminally in Southeast Asia and Australia 
Assessments from the Field. A Report of the Centre for strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) Washington DC: CSIS. 
Glick, P. (2008) “When Neighbours Blame Neighbours: Scape goating and the 
Breakdown of Ethnic Relations in Essers, V.M and Vernon, R.A. (eds) 
Explaining Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbours Kill, USA: 
Blackwell  
Gordon, D. F., David, M. C and Howard, W. (1998) The United States and Africa: A 
Post Cold war Perspective, New York: W.W Norton 
Goody, J. (1973) “British Functionalism” in Raoul, N. and Freda, N. (eds) Main 
Currents in Cultural Anthropology. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts  
Goody, J. (1976) Production and Reproduction. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Grazia, A. (1965) Political Behaviour, New York, Free Press. 
Gurr, T. R and Barbara, H. (1994) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Boulder. C.O  
Westview  
Gurr, T.R. (1969) The History of Violence in America. New York 
 
 
 
102 
 
Hagg G. and Kagwanja, P. (2007) Identity and peace: Reconfiguring conflicts 
Resolution in Africa. African Journal on conflict resolution in Africa. Special 
issue 7 (2): 9-35 
Hague, R. and Harrop, M. (1992): Comparative Government and Politics, London, 
Macmillan  Press. 
Hamber, B. (2009) Transforming Society After Political Violence, Truth, 
Reconciliation, and Mental Health. New York: Springer 
Haqqani, H. (2005) Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, D.C 
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace 
Harberson, J. W. and Rothchild, D. (1995): Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold 
War Challenges. 2nd ed Boulder, Co: Westview Press. 
Harris, M. (1979) Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture. New 
York: Random House   
Harris, M. (1983) Cultural Anthropogy, New York: Harper. 
Hariss, B.P. (1779) Foundation of Political Science, London: Hutchinson 
Hauss, C. (2001) International Conflict Resolution in International Relations for the 
21st Century. London: Continuum 
Hegree, H, Ellingsen, T., S and Gleditsh, N.P (2001) “Towards A Democratic Civil 
Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War”, 1816-1992, American 
Political Science Review 95, 33-48 
Hetcher, M. (1995) “Explaining Nationalist Violence”, Nations and Nationalism, 
1:53-68 
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M. and Willis, I. (2002) Intergroup Bias Annual Review of 
Social Psychology, 53:575-604. 
Hewstone, M. Taussch, N, Voci, A., Kenworthy, J., Hughjes, J. and Cairus,.E.D 
(2008) Why Neighbours Kill: Prior Intergroup Contact and Killing of Ethnic 
Outgroup Neighbours in Esses, V. M and Vernon, R.A (eds) Explaning the 
Breakdown of Ethnic Relations Why Neighbours Kill. USA: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. Pp: 61-91 
Hibbs, W.C. (1974), “The Defective Pressure Cooker: Dispute Processes in the 
University”.  Journal of Higher Education, 65 
 
 
 
103 
 
Hilker, L.M (2008) Why Identity Politics Matter For Security and What Follows For 
Research and Policy, Working Paper Series. Global Consortium On Security 
Transformation. Dec. No.7. 
Hinnells, J. R., and Richard, K. (eds) (2007) Religion and Violence in South Asia: 
Theory and Practice, London: Routledge 
Hofstede, G. H. (1991) Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind, London: 
McGraw Hill. 
Hosfstede, G. H. (2001) Culture’s Consequences. Comparing Values, Behaviours, 
Institutions and Organizations Across Nations, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Hogland, K. (2006) “Election in War-Ravaged Societies: The Case of Sri-Lanka. In 
Power Sharing and Democratic Governance in Divided Societies, Oslo: Peace 
Research Center Oslo. 
Horowitz, D. (1983) Ethnic Groups in Conflicts, California; University Press. 
Horowitz, D.L (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 
Http://www.threeworlds.com/overview.htm retrieved on 27/10/2010 
Human Rights Watch, (1995) Slaughter Among Neighbours: The Political Origin of 
Communal Violence, New Haven : Yale University. 
Huntington, S.P. (2003) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World 
Order, New York:  Simon and Schuster 
Huntington, S. P. (1993) “The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs’ 72 (3): 22-49 
Huntington, S. (1997) “Clash of civilization” Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22-49 
Huntington, S. (1992) “Clash of Civilization” Foreign Affairs 72 (3):22-49 
Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D eds (1996), Ethnicity, Oxford: OXford University 
Press 
Huth, P. and Alle, T. (2002) The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the 
Twentieth Century, New York: Cambridge University Press 
Ibeanu, O. (2003) “Aguleri-Umuleri Conflict in Anambra State” In T.A Imobighe 
(ed), Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria. Ibadan: 
Spectrum. 
 
 
 
104 
 
Ibeanu, O. and Onu, G. (2001) Ethnic Groups and Conflict in Nigeria the South East 
Zone of Nigeria, Vol 2 The Lord‟s Creations: Ibadan. 
Ibrahim, Y. (2002) Ebira TAO: Lesson from History (i): Mumanrak Nig. Enterprises, 
Zaria, Nigeria. 
Igwe, O. (1997) “Inter-group Conflict, and the National Question in Africa: 
A Reconsideration of the Case for Continental Government” (Paper Presented 
at the PRIN National Conference on Inter-group Conflict, Inter-group Wars 
and Africa Development, Nsukka, 3-5 December. 
Ihonvbere, J. and Falola, T. (1985) The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic. 
London: Zed 
Ikelegbe, A. O. (2003) “Civil Society and Alternative Approaches to Conflict 
Management in Nigeria”, in Imobighe T,A (ed) Civil Society and Ethnic 
Conflict  Management in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. Pp: 36-77 
Imbusch, P. and Veit, .A. (2011) “The Nexus of Violence, Violence Research, and 
Development, International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJVC) 5(1):4-12 
Imobighe, T. A. (1998) “Conflict in Africa: Roles of OAU and Sub-Regional 
Organization” Lecture Delivered at the National War College of Nigeria, 
Abuja, Nigeria. February 
Imobighe, T. A. (2002) “Warri Crisis in Historical and Contemporary Perspective” In 
T.A Imobighe, C.O Bassey and J.B Asuni eds Conflict and Instability in The 
Niger –Delta:  The Warri Case. Ibadan: Spectrum. Pp: 36-54 
Imobighe, T.A. (2003) “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria: An Overview” In 
T.A Imobighe (ed), Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria. 
Ibadan: Spectrum. Pp: 13-35 
Imobighe, T.A. (2004) Sectarian Violence in Nigeria and Its Management, Centre for 
Strategic and Development Studies, Ekpoma: Ambrose Alli University,  
Imobighe, T.A. (2002) “Earlier Attempt at Managing the Warri Crisis in Imobighe, 
T.A., Bassey,  C.O and Asuni, J.B (Eds) Conflict and Instability in the Niger 
Delta: The Warri Case, Ibadan: Spectrum. Pp:53-64 
Institute for Economic and Peace, (2010) Peace, Wealth and Human Potential, 
Discussion Paper 2010 Global peace Index 
 
 
 
105 
 
Issa-Salwe, A. M. (2000) Cold War Fallout: Boundary Politics and Conflict in the  of 
Africa, London: HAAN. 
Isumonah, A. (1997) “Oil and Minority Ethnic Nationalism in Nigeria:  The Case of 
the Ogoni” Ph.D Thesis of The Department of Political Science, University of 
Ibadan. 
Jega, A.M. (2002) “Tackling Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria” the Nigerian 
Social Scientist 5 (2): 35-39 
Jeong, H.W. (2000) Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction, Aldershort : 
Ashgate 
Jonathan, F. (2004) The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict 
and Revolutionary Wars 1945-2001. Journal of Peace Research 41:715-733. 
Jeong, H.W. (2000) Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction, Aldershort : 
Ashgate 
Kalb, M.G. (1982) The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – from Eisenhoner to 
Kennedy, New York: Macmillan. 
Kadera, K.M, Crescenzi, M. J. C and Shannon, M.L. (2000) Democratic Survival, 
Peace and War in the International System. A Paper Presented At the 34th 
Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Oct. 27-29, 2000 at Yale 
University, New Haven 
Kaiser, P. J. (2001) “From Imagine Community” to Multicultural Mosaic: The 
Politics of Difference in Tanzania” African Journal of Political Science, 
6(1):89-104 
Kaldor, M. (1999) New Wars and Old Wars: Organized Violence in A Global Era, 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
Kastfelt, N. (2005) Religion and African Civil Wars, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Keen, D. (2001) “Sierra Leone: War and Its Functions” in Stewart F. and Fitzgerald, 
V. (eds) War and Underdevelopment Vol. Oxford:OUP 
Keir, G.K (2002) “Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution” in Kiek, G.K and 
Mukenge, I.R. (2002) (eds) Zones of Conflict in Africa Theories and Cases. 
Westport: Praeger 
 
 
 
106 
 
Kerslake, R.T. (1997) Time and the Hour: Nigeria, East Africa and the Second World 
War. London and New York: Raxliffe Press and St. Martin‟s Press. 
Kiecolt- Glaser, J.K, Glazer, R. C, J. T, Maccalum, R.C (1997) Marital Conflict in 
Older Adults:  Endocrinological and Immunological Correlates, 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 59:339-349 
Killingran, D. and Richard R.  (1986) Africa and the Second World War. New York: 
St. Martin‟s Press. 
Kirk-Greene, A.H.M (undated) Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary 
Sourcebook, 1966-1970 Vol. 1 115-124. 
Klass, M. (1980) Caste: The Emergence of South Asia Social System. Philadelphia: 
Institute for the Study of Human Issues. 
Kochalumchuvattil, T. (2010) “The Importance of Subjectivity in Overcoming 
Ethnical Conflicts in Africa: A Philosophical Reflections Cultural, 
International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology, 7(1):28-40 
Komey, G.K. (2009) Communal Land Rights, Identities and Conflicts in Sudan: The 
Nuba Question, Paper Presented at “the Human Rights Dimensions of Land in 
the Middle East and North Africa”, MENA Land Forum Founding 
Conference, Cairo, 10-12 May, Organized by Housing and Land Rights 
Network – Habitat International Coalition. 
Lake, D.A. and Rothchild, D. (1996) “Containing Fear: The Origin and management 
of Ethnic Conflict‟ International Security 21(2): 4-75. 
Large, J. and Sisk, T. (2006) Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing 
Peace in the 21st Century. Stockholm: International IDEA. 
Lasswell, H. (1930) Politics: Who Gets What, When and How? New York.  
LeBaron, M. and Pillay, V. (2006) Conflict Across Cultures: A Unique Experience of 
Bridging Differences, Boston and London: Intercultural Press  
Lederach, J. P. (1995) Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures 
New York: Syracuse University Press. 
Lenin, V.I. (1975) What is to be Done, Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 
 
 
 
107 
 
Lentz, C. (2007) “Land and the Politics of Belonging in Africa” in Patrick Chabal, Ulf 
Engel, and Leo de Haan (eds.) African Alternatives, Leiden: Brill: 37-58. 
Leremont, R.R. (2002) “The Causes of Warfare and the Implication, of Peacekeeping 
in Africa” in Ricado Rene‟ Leremont, ed., the Cause of Warfare and the 
Implications of Peacekeeping in Africa, Portsmouth, N/T: Heinemann, 1-18. 
Lijphart, A. (2004) “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of 
Democracy 15 (2): 96-109. 
Lindsay, K. (1970) “Political Factors in Biafra Relief”, Venture, 22 (2) February. 
Lipschutz, R. and Crawford, B. (1996) Economic Globalization and the “New” 
Ethnic Strife: What is to Be Done? Berkeley: University of California  
Lorenz, K. (1966) On Aggression. London: Methuen. 
Maclean, P. (1975) “On the Evolution of Three Mentalities” in S. Arieti and G. 
Chrzanowski, eds New Dimensions in Psychiatry: A World View, Vol. 2, New 
York: John Wiley 
Mamdani, M (2002) Making Sense of Political Violence in Post Colonial Africa, 
Identity, Cultures and Politics 3(2): 1-24 
Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialiam, Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Mansfield, E. and Snyder, J. (2005) Electing to Fight: Why Emerging 
Democratization Go to War, Cambridge: MIT Press 
Mansfield, E.D., and Snyder, J. (2001) Democratic Transitions and War: From 
Napoleon to the Millennium‟s End, In Cirocker, C.A, Hampson, F.O and Aall, 
P.A (eds) Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International 
Conflict, Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Maxwell, N. (1974a) “The Rationality of Scientific Discovery, Part one The 
Traditional Rationality Problem”, Philosophy of Science 41:123-153 
Maxwell, N. (1974b) “The Rationality of Scientific Discovery”, Philosophy of 
Science 41: 247-295 
 
 
 
108 
 
Merton, R.K (1981) “Forward: Remarks on Theoretical Pluralism” in Merton,, R.K. 
and Blau, P.M (eds) Continuities in Structural Inquiry. Berverly Hills: Sage 
Publications 
Merton, R. K. (1981) “Foreword: Remarks on Theoretical Pluralism” in : Merton, R. 
K. and Blau. M.P (eds) Continuities in Structural Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sge 
Publicationns 
Merton K. (1957) System and Process in International Politics (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, pp. xiii-xiv. 
Marx, K. and Friedrich, E. (1847) 1955 Selected Work in Two Volumes. Reprint, 
Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 
Mazrui, A, A. (2008) “Conflict in Africa: An Overview”s in Nehema, Alfred Zeleza 
Tyambe, P. (eds) The Roots of African Conflicts The Causes and Costs: 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, the Horn of Africa, Oxford: 
James Currey. 
McEnery, J. H. (1985)”Towards a New Concept of Conflict Evaluation “, Conflict All 
Welfare  Short of War vol.6, No.1. New York: Crane Russak. 
MCGinnis, M. D. (1999) Conflict Dynamics in a three-Level Game: Local, National, 
and International Conflict in the Horn of Africa. A paper presented at the 
thirty-third North American Meeting of Peace Science Society (international) 
University of Michigan, Oct. 
Miall, H. Rainsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999) Contemporary Conflict 
 Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly 
Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Miller, C. A. (2003) A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict 
Studies (Geneva: University for Peace). 
Minogue, K. (2000) Politics: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University 
press. 
Mitchel, C. and Banks, M. (1998) Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The 
Analytical Problem-Solving Approach, London: Printer. 
Mlambo, N. (2004) “Rethinking Economic Agenda in African Conflict” Paper 
presented at International Conference on African Conflicts: Management, 
Resolution and Post-conflict Recovery and Development, Organized By the 
 
 
 
109 
 
Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(OSSREA), Addis Ababa, 29 Nov. – 1 Dec. 
Moaz, Z. and Russet, B. (1993) Normative Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 
1946-1986. American Political Science Review 87 (3) 624-638 
Moe, A.T. (2009). The Causes and Dynamics of Conflict In Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Master of Strategic Studies Thesis Department of Defence, U.S Army War 
College, Car Lisle. 
Momah, S. (1993) Global Disorders and the World Order, Lagos: Vista Books. 
Montville, J.V. (1993) “The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution” in 
D.J.D Sandole, and H. Van der Merwe (eds), Conflict Resolution Theory and 
Practice: Integration and Application, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Morgan, T. C. (1993) Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature. 
International Interactions 18 (3): 197-204 
Mortimer, R. A. (1996) “Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian 
War”, the Middle East Journal 50 (Winter): 18-39 
Muhammadu, T. and Haruna, M. (1981) “The Civil War” in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed) 
Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd. 
Munene, G. Macharia, J.D. Olewe, N. and Korwe, G. A. (1995) The United States and 
Africa: from Independence to the End of the Cold War. Nairobi: East African 
Educational Publishers. 
Murshed, S.M. (2002) Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction”, 
Journal of Peace Research 39 (4): 387-393 
Murshed, S.M. and Gates, S. (2003) Spatial-Horizonta Inequality and the Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal. A paper Presented for the UNU/WIDER Project 
Conference on Spatial Inequality in Asia. UUnietd Nations University Centre, 
Tokyo, 28-29 March. 
Nafzigier. E.W. and Auvinen, Y. (2002) “Economic Development, Inequality, War, 
and State Violence” World Development 30 (2):153-163. 
 
 
 
110 
 
Namwanbah, T. (2004) “Politics of Ethnicity in Kenya: A Subjective Approach to 
Conflict Resolution Strategies” Paper Presented at International Conference on 
African Conflicts: Management, Resolution and Post-Conflict Recovery and 
Development, Organized by the Organisation of Social Science Research in 
Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), Addis Ababa, 29 Nov.-1 Dec.  
Nnoli, O. (1988) Ethnic Conflict in Africa: A Comparative Analysis in Nnoli O. (ed) 
Ethnic Conflicts in Africa CODESTRIA Book – Senegal. 
Nnoli, O. (1978) Ethic politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. 
Nnoli, O. (1986) Introduction to Politics, Lagos: Longman Nigeria Ltd. 
Noer, T.J. (1985) Cold War and Black Liberalism: The United States and White Rule 
in Africa, 1948-1968). Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 
Norris, P. (2004) Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behaviour. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
Northrup, T.A (1989) “Dynamics of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict” in 
Kriesberg  et al eds Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation. Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press 
Nwanegbo, C.J. (2005) “Them Against Us: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Bourgeois/State Sponsored Conflicts in Anambra” in Yakubu, A.M.; 
Adegboye, R.T.; Ubah, C.N. and  Dogo, B. (Eds) Crisis and Conflict 
Management in Nigeria since 1980. Vol.2. Kaduna: Nigeria Defence 
Academy. 
Nwolise, O.B.C. (1997) “ECOMOG Peace-Keeping Operation in Liberia: Effect on 
Political Stability in the West African Sub-Region” African Review, Journal 
of National Defence College, April 1(1): 36-60 
Nwolise, O.B.C. (2004) The Nigeria Police in International Peace-keeping under 
the United Nations, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 
Nwosu, B.U. (2008) “Understanding the Issues in the Citizenship-Indegeneship 
Controversy, A Paper Presented at a Two-Day National Diologue on 
Citizenship Organised for Spaekers of Houses of Asembly and Chief Judges in 
Southern Nigeria by the Nigerian Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution 
at Concord Hotel, Owerri, Imo State, 19th-21st 
Nyerer, J.N. (1973) Freedom and Development, Oxford University Press 
 
 
 
111 
 
Obeihieghon, O.P. (2005) “A Critical Assesment of the African Union‟s (AU) 
Involvement in the Revolution of Darfur Conflict: Seminar Paper Presented at 
the Centre For Strategic and Developemnt Studies, June. 
Oberst, T.S. (1991) Cost of Living and Strikes in British Africa. 1939-1948: 
Imperial Policy and the Impact of the Second World War. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Michigan University Press. 
Obi, C. (1997) “Economic Adjustment and the Deepening of Environmental Conflict 
in Africa‟ Lesotho Social Science Review 3(1): 13-29. 
Odey, M.O. (2006) “Land Disputes in the Benue Valley since 1999: A Study in an 
Aspect of Inter-Group Relations in Central Nigeria in Akinwumi Olayemi, 
Okpeh O.O. and Gwamna Jel Adayibe (eds) Inter-Group Relations in Nigeria 
the 19th and 20th Centuries, Markudi: Aboki Publishers. 
O‟Fashey, R.S. (2004) “Conflict in Darfur Historical and contemporary Perspective” 
Conference Proceedings, on Environmental Degradation as a Cause of 
Conflict in Darfur” Khartoum, December, University for Peace. 
Ofuatey-Kudjoe, W. (1994) “Regional Organisations and the Resolutions of Internal 
Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia; International Peace Keeping. 
1 (3): 261-302. 
Ojo, E.O. (2004) “The Malady of Public Enterprise in Nigeria” Ilorin Journal of 
Business and  Social Science. 9 (1&2): 154-166 
Omorogbe, S. K. and Omohan, M. F. (2005) in Yakubu, A.M et al (eds) Crisis and 
Conflict Management in Nigeria since 1980. Vol. 2, Kaduna: Nigeria Defence 
Academy. 
Omotayo, B. (2005) “Women and Conflict in the New Information Age: Virtual 
Lirariesto the Rescue” A Paper Presented at the World Library Information 
Congress: 7th IFLA General Conference and Council “Library – a Voyage of 
Discovery” August 15th-18th, Oslo, Norway. 
Omotosho, M. (2004) “Evaluating Conflict and Conflict Management: A Conceptual 
Understanding” African Journal of International Affairs and Development . 9 
(1&2): 1-9 
Omoweh, D. and Okanya, D. (2005) “Community unrest and threat to Nigeria‟s 
National Security” in Ogwu, U.J. (ed.) New Horizons for Nigeria in World 
Affairs, Lagos: NIIA, 293-311 
 
 
 
112 
 
Omoweh, D. (2010) Political Economy of Natural Resource Struggle in the Niger 
Delta, Nigeria, Public Lecture Series, Covenant University, 1 (33), April. 
Oneal, J. R. and Russet, B. (1997) The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-85. International Studies Quarterly 41 
(2): 267-39 
Onuoha, B. (2011) “Power conflict and consensus Building in Africa: Ideaology 
Revisited, African Journal on Conflict Research 2 (2) 8-31 
Onyekpe, N. J. G. (2003) Politics and Political Power In Nigeria: Nature, Dynamics 
and Determinanat in Dukor M. (ed) Philosophy and politic : Discourse on 
values, politics and power in Africa, Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited. 
Oromareghake, P. B. and Akpotor, J. D. (2005) Managing Inter-ethnic Conflict in the 
Niger-Delta: The Case of Warri in A.M. Yakubu et al eds Crisis and Conflict 
Management in Nigeria Since 1980 Vol 2 Kaduna: Nigerian Defence 
Academy 
Osaghae, E. E. (1996) “Human Rights and Ethnic Conflict Management: The Case of 
Nigeria” Journal of Peace Research 33 (2): 171-188 
Osaghae, E. (2001) Ethnic Groups and Conflict in Nigeria. Vol. 1. Ibadan: The 
Lord‟s Creations. 
Osaghae, E.E. (2005) “Introduction” in Parter, E; Robison, G.; Schnase, A.; Smyth, M 
and Osaghae E.E. (eds) Researching Conflict in Africa; Insights and 
Experience, Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Osaghae, E.E. and Suberu, R. (2005) CRISE Working Paper, No. 6. Centre for 
Research in Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, UK: University of 
Oxford. 
Oshita, O.O. (2007) Conflict Management in Nigeria Issues and Challenges. 
London:Adonis and Abbey Publishers Ltd. 
Osman, A. (2007) cultural diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality? 
African Journal on Conflict Resolution 7(2): 93-134 
Ostrawski, J. (Undated) Does Democracy Promote Peace? Retrieved on 23/10/11 
from http://docs.google.com/viewr? a=v89. 
 
 
 
113 
 
Osuntokun, A. (1979) Nigeria and the First World War Atlantic, Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press 
Otite, O. (1999) “On Conflicts, their Management, Resolution and Transformation In 
Albert O.I and Otite .O. (eds) Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management 
Resolution and Transformation, Ibadan Spectrum Books Ltd. 
Otite, O. (1990) Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria. Ibadan: Shanesson 
Oyebade, A. and Abiodun, A. (1998) Africa After the Cold War: The Changing 
Perspectives on Security.  Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. 
Oyeshola, D.O.P. (2005) Conflict and Context of Conflict Resolution, Ile-Ife, Nigeria: 
Obafemi Awolowo University Press Ltd. 
Page, M.E. (2000) The Chiwaya War: Malawians and the First World War, Boulder 
Co: West View Press 
Panitch, L. and Colin .L. (eds) (2002) Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno 
Nationalism, London: Merlin. 
Pape, R. (2005) Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism New York: 
Random House 20-24. 
Azar, E. and Moon, C.I. (1986) “Managing Protracted Social Conflicts in the Third 
World: Facilitation and Development Diplomacy: Millennium, Journal of 
International studies 15(3): 393-406. 
Payne , G. and Payne, J.  (2004) Key Concepts in Social Research. Sage Publication 
Percox, D. (2004): Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial 
Security   and Decolonization. New York: Tauris Academic Studies. 
Pius, R.M. (1986): American Government and Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill 
Books. 
Plato, (1968) The Republic, Trans A.B. Bloom New York: Busy Book Company 
Post, K.W.J. and Vicker, M. (1973) Structure and conflict in Nigeria: 1960-1966, 
London: Heinemann. 
Powel, B. G. (jr) (1992) Contemporary: Participation, Stability and Vioelence. 
Porthharcout: Sunray Publishers Ltd 
 
 
 
114 
 
Pruitt, D. G. and Kim, S. H. (2004) Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and 
Settlement, 3rd edition. Boston: McGraw Hill. 
Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda Crisis: History of A Genocide, New York: Columbia 
University Press 
Pugh, M. and Neil, C. (2004) War Economics in a Regional Context: Challenges and 
Transformation.  Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Co. 
Puke, T.A. (2007) Substance of Government, Lokoja: JHL Printing and Publications. 
Puniyan, R. (2005) “Introduction” in Puniyan Ram (ed) Religion, Power and 
Violence: Expression of Politics in Contemporary Time, New Delhi, India: 
Sage. 
Rana, M. A. (2004) A to Z of Jehadi Organizations In Pakistan, Trans. S. Ansari 
Lahore: Mashal 
Rasmussen, L. (1993) Christian–Muslim Relations in Africa: The Cases of Northern 
Nigeria and Tanzania Compared, London: British Academic Press 
Bassey, C. O. (2002) “Framework for The Conflict Transformation Project in Warri 
in Imobighe, T.A, Bassey Celestine and Asuni Burdi, J. (eds) Conflict and 
Instability in the Niger Delta: The Warri Case. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Pp.1-
35 
Reilly, B. (2001) Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict 
Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reilly, B. (2004) Elections in Post-Conflict Societies in Edward Newman and 
Rolan Rich (eds). The UN Role in Promoting Democracy between Ideals and 
Reality. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Reilly, B. and Andrew, R. (2000) “Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided 
Societies‟ in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (eds), International Conflict 
Resolution after the Cold War. Washington, D.C. National Research Council. 
 Reilly, B.R and Andrew, E. et al (2005) Electoral System Design: The New 
International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA. 
Remmer, K.L. (1998) Does Democracy Promote Inter-State Co-operation? Lessons 
From the Mercosure Region. International Studies Quarterly 42(1): 25-51 
 
 
 
115 
 
Reynal-Querol, M. (2005) Does Democracy Preempt Civil Wars? European Journal 
of Political Economy (2) 445-465 
Reynal-Querol, M. (2002b) Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars, Defence and 
Peace Economics (13) 465-483). 
Reynal-Querol, M. (2002a) “Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 46, 29-54 
Richmond, A. H. (1987) “Ethnic Nationalism: Social Science Paradigms cited in Kieh, G.K 
“Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution” in Kiek, G.K and Mukenge, 
I.R.(2002) (eds) Zones of Conflict in Africa Theories and Cases. Westport: Praeger 
Robertson, L.R. (1997) “The Constructed Nature of Ethnopolitics” International 
Politics, (34) 265-283 
Rodee, C. C., Christol, C. Q.; Anderson, J.T. and Green, T.H. (1983) Introduction to 
Political Science, 4 editions Auckland; McGraw-Hill. 
Ronen, D. (1998), “Can There Be A Just Resolution of Conflict? Peace and Conflict 
Studies, 5(1): 8-25. June 
Roseanu, J. (1961) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press. 
Rousseau, D., Gelpi, C., Reiter, D., and Huth, P. (1996) Assessing the Dyadic Nature 
of Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review 90 (3): 512-533 
Ross, M. (1983) The Culture of Conflict. New Heaven: Yale University Press. 
Ross, M.H. (1993) “Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural 
Resources in Civil War”‟ in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds. The 
Political Economy of Armed  Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder, 
Co: Lynne Rienner. 
Rotberg, R. (2007) Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators in Arts R. and Jervis, R. (eds) International Politics: Enduring 
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, London: Pearson Longman. 
Roy, A. (2009) Field Notes On Democracy, Listening to Grasshopper Chicago: 
Haymarket 
Rubin, B.R. (2006) Central Asia and Central Africa: Transnational Wars and Ethnic 
Conflicts, Journal of Human Development 7(1) 5-22. 
 
 
 
116 
 
Rupensinghe, K. (1994), “Forms of Violence and its Transformation”, in K. 
Rupensinghe and M. Rubio (eds) The Culture of Violence, Tokyo: The United 
Nations University Press.              
Rupesinghe K. and Rubio M. C. (1994) The Culture of Violence, Tokyo: United 
 University Press. 
Russet, B. (1995) “Process of Dyadic Choice for War and Peace” World Politics 47, 
268-282. 
Rutake, P and Gahama, J. (1998) Ethnic Conflict in Burundi in Nnoli O. (ed) Ethnic 
Conflict in Africa. Darkar, CODESRIA Book series 
Sainbury, K. (1979) The North African Landings 1942: A Strategic Decision. 
Newwark, DE: University of Dekaware Press. 
Salih, M. (1989) New Wine in Old Bottles: Tribal Militias and the Sudanese State, 
Review of African Political Economy (45-46) 168-174. 
Sambanis, N. (2001) “Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Cause? 
A Theoretical and Empirical Enquiry” (Part I), Journal of conflict Resolution 
45, 259-282 
Sanda, J. (2003) “Bassa-Egbura Conflict in Nassarawa State” in Imobighe, T.A. (ed) 
Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum 
Book. 
Sanderson, S.K (1987) “Ecleticism and its Alternatives” Current Perspectives in 
Social Theory, 8:313-345 
Schultz, K.A (2001) Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Cambridge: University of 
Camb.ridge Press 
Senghaas, D. (2002) The Clash Within Civilizations: Coming to Terms with Cultural 
Confli.ct, London: Routledge. 
Scarborough, G. I. (1998) “An Expert System for Assessing Vulnerability to 
Instability”. In Davies J. and T.R. Gurr eds.  Preventive Measures: Building 
Risk Assessment and Crisi Early Warning Systems. Lanham, M.D; Rowan and 
Littlefield. 
Schwartz, B. (1991) “ Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization 
of George Washington, American Sociological Review, 56, 221-236.  
 
 
 
117 
 
Seck, D. (2004) “An Economic Theory of Civil War in Africa”. Paper Presented at 
International Conference in African Conflict: Management, Resolution and 
Post Conflict Recovery and Development, Organized by the Organization of 
Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), Addis 
Ababa, 29 Nov.-1 Dec. 
Sheldon, S. W. (1969) “Political Theory as a Vocation” in the America Political 
Science Review, (63):1062-1082. 
Shils, E. (1957) “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties” British Journal of 
Sociology, (7):113-145 
Shills, E. (1981) Tradition : Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Shipton, P.M. (1994) “Land Tenure” in Gilliam, M (ed.) The Agriculture of the 
Sudan, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 101-116. 
Sills, D. (1968), “Modernization: Political Aspect”, The International Encyclopedia of 
Social Science, Vol. 5. New York: The Macmillan Company free press. 
Simmons, C. S. (2004) The Political Economy of Land Conflict in the Eastern 
Brazilian Amazon, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 94(1): 
183-206 
Sisk, T. D. (2008) Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence, A Paper 
Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting San 
Francisco, California. March 24-28,  
Skidmore, M. and Lawrence, P. (2007) Women and the Contested State: Religion, 
Violence and Agency in South and Southeast Asia, Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press. 
Smith, A. B. (2000) “Theories of Nationalism and Alienation, Models of Nation 
Formation” in Micheal, L. (ed) Asaian Nationalism, London: Routledge 
Smith, D. A. (1993) “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism” in M.E Brown (ed), Ethnic 
Conflict and International Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Smith, R. B. (1968) “The Politics of Violence: How Effective is Violence? 
Proceeding of the Academy of Political Science xxxi: 111-126. 
 
 
 
118 
 
Smyth, M. (2001) “Introduction” in Smyth M. and  Robinson, G. (eds) Researching 
Violently Divided Societies, Ethical and Methodological Issues, Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press 
Snyder, J. (2000) From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalism 
Conflict, New York : W.W Norton 
Sodaro, M.J. (2001) Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction, Boston: McGraw 
Hill. 
Soeter, J. L. (2005) Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of 
Civil War. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis 
Spears, R and Leach, C.W. (2008) “Why Neighbours Don‟t Stop the Killing: The 
Role of Group-Based Schadenfreude in Esses, V.M and Vernon, R. (eds) 
Explaining Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbours Kill, U.S.A.: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Stewart, F. (1999) Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities. A paper 
presented at World Bank Conference and Poverty Reduction June 14-15 
Stewart, F. (2000) “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities” Oxford 
Development Studies 28 (3): 245-262 
Stewart, F. and Sullivan, O. (1998) Democracy, Conflict and Development Three 
Cases, University of Oxford Queen Elizabeth House, Working Paper Series  
Steward, F. (1998) The Root Causes of Conflict: Some Conclusions, Queen Elizabeth 
House Working Paper Series 16 Oxford, University of Oxford   
Stremlau, J. (1977) The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Stinchcombe, A. (1968) Constructing Social Theories. New York: Harcourt Brace 
and World 
Suberu, R. (2001) Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace. 
Suleiman, M. and Omer, A. (1994) “The Environment: a New Dimension in Sudan, 
Political and Social Landscape”, Africa World Reviewed April, 23-5. 
Swilliam, D. (1993) “Introduction” in The Evolution of UN Peace Keeping. New 
York: St. Martin Press 
 
 
 
119 
 
Tambiah, S. (1996) Leveling Crowds, Ethno-nationalist Conflicts and Collective 
Violence in South Asia, Delhi: Vistaar 
Tambiah, S.J. (2005) “Urban Riots and Cricket in South Asia: A Postcript to Leveling 
Crowds” Modern Asian Studies 39, (4):897-927. 
Tan, L. (2006) A Blueprint For Change: Diversity As A Civil Asset, Washington: 
Partners For Livable Communities. 
Tangri, R. (1999) The Politics of Patronage in Africa: Parastatals Privatization and 
Private Enterprise. Oxford: James Currey. 
Tariola, O. J. (2001) The Ife-Modakeke Crisis: An Insider View. Ife Psychologia 
9(3):21-29. 
Tasfel, A, and Turner, J.C. (1979) An Integrative Theory Conflict in W.G. Austin and 
S.Worchel (Eds) The Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Monterey, CA: 
Books. 
Tenuche, M. (2002) “Youth Restiveness and Violence in Nigeria: A Case Study of 
Youth Unrest in Ebiraland” Journal of Studies, in General Education JGGE. 
Vol.14, No.1.  F.C.E. Okene.   
Tenuche, M. O. (2002) Intra-Ethnic Conflict and Violence in Ebiraland Afrigov 
Available  at http://works-bepress.con/marietu_tenuche7 Retrieved 16/06/10. 
Tenuche, M. O. (2009) The State, Identity Mobilization and Conflict: A Study of Intra 
Ethnic Conflict in Ebiraland, North Central-Nigeria African Journal of 
Political Science  and International Relations, 3 (5): 253-258, May. 
The Holy Book (1982) King James Version.  Nashvile: Holman Bible Publishers. 
Thayer, G. (1970) The War Business, London: Palladadin 
Tocqueville, .A. (1955) The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Garden city, 
New York: Donveday Anchor Books 
Toyo, E. (2000) “Defining the Crises in Oil Producing Communities: An Opening 
Remark” in W. Raji A. Ale and E. Akinsola (eds) Boiling Point. Lagos: 
CDHR  
Tshitereke, C. (2000) Securing Democracy: Party Finance and Party Donations- the 
South Africa Challenge, ISS Paper Number 63, Institute for Security Studies, 
Pretoria and Cape Town. 
Tshikereke, C. (2003) On the Origin of War in Africa. African Security Review 12(2)  
 
 
 
120 
 
Tyghe,  (1985) The Social Use of Intelligence Tests. Psychology in Society, 3, 2-21 
 
Uji W.T. (2005) Appraisal of the Use of Coercive Instrument in the Management of 
Conflict in the Benue Valley in Yakubu A.M, Gogo B., Adegboye, R.T. (eds) 
Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980, Vol. 2 Kaduna: 
Nigeria Defence Academy Book Series No. 1 
Ujo, A.A. (2003) Understanding Political Science in Nigeria, Kaduna : Anyaotu Ent. 
Publishers Ltd. 
UNDP, (2006) Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis? New 
York 
UNESCO, (1985) Africa and the Second World War (Report and Papers of the 
Symposium Organized by UNESCO at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
from 10 to 13 Nov. (1980)  Paris: UNESCO. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (2009) Democractic Governnance 
Group Bureau for Development Policy, New York : UNDP 
United Nations, Interagency Framework Team for Prevention Action (2012) Tool Kit 
and Hindrance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources 
Conflict. 
Van Den Broucker, S. Vandereycken, W., and Norre, J. (1997) Eating Disorders and 
Marital Relationships. London: Routledge 
Van de Vliert, et al (1999) “Temperature, Cultural Masculinity, and Domestic 
Political Violence, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (30), 291-314 
Weeks, D. (1992) The Eight Essential Steps to Conflict Resolution. New York: 
Pitman. 
Wilke, B., Hippher, J. and Zakar, M. Z. (2011) “Violence Research From North 
Africa to South Asia: A Historical and Structural Overview International 
Journal of Conflict and Violence IJCV 5 (1): 32-54 
Wilson, Edward, O (1978): On Human Nature; Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
 
 
121 
 
Wiseman, J. (1990) Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival. New York: 
Paragon House Publishers. 
World Health Organisation (2002) World Report on Violence and Health, Geneva 
Workshop on Disarmament and Confidence Building in Africa, (1991) New   York: 
UN Secretariat. 
Yates, A. (1962) Frustration and conflict, London: Methuen 
Yahaya, A. O. (2005) “Role of Asset Valuation Models in Conflict Management” in 
A.M. Yakubu et al (eds) Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 
1980 Vol 2 Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy 
Yamano, T. and Deininger, K. (2005) FASID Discussion Paper 2005-12-002 
Zamtato, G.B. (2003) “Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management: Lessons from 
 other African States” In Imobighe, T.A. (Ed) Civil Society and Ethnic 
Conflict Management in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 
Zartman, I.W. (1991) “Conflict Reduction, Prevention, Management and Resolution” 
In F. Deng and I. Zartman (Eds) Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington 
DC 
Zeleza, T.P. (2008) The Causes and Costs of War in Africa From Liberation Struggles 
to the “War of Terror” in Nhema, A. and Zeleza, P.T (eds) The Roots of 
African Conflicts, the Causes and Costs, Addis Ababa and Oxford: OSSREA 
in Association With James Currey Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
GEOGRAPHY OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA  
Since the dawn of the era of “flag independence,” Africa has experienced and 
continues to experience civil conflicts. Virtually every region of the contiment has 
been affected by the “civil conflict epidemic” (Kieh, 2002). In this section, some 
selected cases of conflict in various regions of Africa were examined. The discussions 
focus on the history, trend and implications of such conflicts. This is to enable the 
researcher provide a background for the character of conflicts in Nigeria and 
Ebiraland in particular.   
 
3.1 The Horn of Africa (Sudan) 
 Sudan has been described as a bridge between the Arab world and sub-Sahara Africa, 
denoting peaceful trade and cultural meddling. It has equally been described as the 
advance guard for Islamic conquest of Africa (Peterson, 2002). Sudan is enmeshed in 
a series of division manifesting in the form of Christian-Muslim; Africa-Arab and the 
North-South. The north is made up of Arabs who are Muslims, while the south is 
predominantly composed of Africa, with a mixture of Christian and Muslim 
population. The Sudanese conflict is indeed Africa longest civil war. The sources of 
the conflict are deeper and more complex than most political leaders and observers 
claim. Sudan has fluctuated between military regime and democratic rule (UN Report, 
2005). It is essential to note that from independence till date all heads of state civilian 
or military have always been from the Northern Sudan (UN Report, 2005). 
 
One thing that characterized the reign of various leaders from Northern Sudan is that 
they always gave robust support to the spread of Arabic language and Islam in the 
entire Sudan. Southern resistance to this has often been met with repression by 
successive governments. (UN Report, 2005). The intermittent civil war between the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (Army) (SPLM) 
was brought to an end by the Nimeri regime in 1972, by granting the South autonomy 
in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (Peterson, 2002). Deng called this Southern 
autonomy, Southern province, Regional Self Government Act of 1972 (Deng, 1995). 
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However, the conflict cropped up again in 1983 as a result of the abrogation of the 
1972 Addis Ababa agreement (Dagne, 2006). In addition, the discovery of oil in the 
South propelled Nimeri to implement some measures to ensure the incorporation of 
the oil-rich areas in the south to the north leading to the cancellation of southern 
autonomy. The matter was exacerbated with the introduction of sharia rule in the 
country by the government. Nimeri appointed a provincincial governor for Darfur 
who was not of the local population. This appointment sparked riots across Darfur in 
which three students were killed (Prunier, 2005). 
 
 In essence, the combination of these factors led to another war with the south in 
1983. The present president of Sudan (Omar Hassan al-Bashir) came into power via a 
military coup supported by the Muslims brotherhood. His government has also been 
influenced by the political Islamic ideology. In 1994, Darfur was balkanized into three 
federal states within Sudan: Norhern (Shamal), Southern (Janus), and Western 
(Gharb) Darfur. Ali al Haj, Minister of federal Affairs was the brain behind this 
division. The goal was to make sure that, the Fur by this division will not be able to 
form a majority in any state which will also orchestrate the stage for Islamic 
candidates to be elected (Flint and Waal, 2006). 
 
 A Clandestine group made up mostly of Darfuris published the Black Book in 2000. 
The manuscript is a detailed chronology of domination by the north and the 
impoverishment of the other regions. Many of the writers came together to form rebel 
groups christened Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) (Cobham, 2005).  
 
3.1.1 The Darfur Conflicts 
Political leaders in the Southern Sudan argued that, under successive civilian and 
military governments have made only spurious efforts to address the grievances of the 
south without compromising the northern domination in economic, political and 
social spheres (Dagne, 2006). Based on the aforementioned reasons, in February 
2003, two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) made up of 2,500 
troops, together with the Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (SJEM), a force 
numbering several hundred men organized rebellion against the government of Sudan 
in a bid to end political oppression and economic neglect in the Darfur region of 
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Western Sudan (Ofcansky, 2005). The government of Sudan in Khartoum responded 
by organizing a militia group known as Janjaweed to confront the rebel groups. This 
action culminated into “spiral of state sponsored violence and indiscriminate spread of 
weaponry” (Mandami, 2004:38). 
 
 Some observers are of the view that the National Islamic Front (NIF) government is 
pursuing systematically and deliberately a policy of marginalization and 
discrimination of the African communities in Darfur by giving support to Arab 
militias to suppress non Arabs whom it saw as a threat to its hold on power (Dagne, 
2006). According to the United Nation (UN) estimates, the war in Sudan had affected 
some 3.3 million people: 1.8 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); 200,000 refugees in 
Chad; and 300,000 persons had died in the war (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006). 
 Quite a number of agreements have been reached to bring about resolution without 
total success. 
 
3.1.2 Peace Initiatives 
Quite a number of peace initiatives have been employed to broker peace in Darfur, 
Sudan. The earliest among these were the Juba Conference of 1947, the round table 
conference in 1965, the Addis Ababa Talks of 1972, (Deng, 1995). Others include the 
Koka Dam Declaration of March 24, 1986; the Sadiq-Garang talks of July 31, 1986; 
the Harare (Zimbabwe) meeting of March 20-22, 1988, under the leadership of the 
Global Inter-Action Council of the former heads of state and government; the 
Mirghani-Garang Agreement of November 16, 1988. Two meetings were held 
between the SPLM-SPLA and Al-Bashir‟s Revolution for National Salvation, the first 
in Addis Ababa on August 19-20, 1989 and the second in Nairobi (Kenya) on 
December 1-5, 1989 under the auspices of the former U.S President Jimmy Carter, 
(Deng, 1995), and several meetings mediated by Chad and Nigeria (Dagne, 2006; 
Ofcansky, 2005). 
 
3.1.3 Peace Agreements 
The aforementioned peace initiatives and many others have orchestrated the stage for 
peace agreements reached in an effort to bring about lasting peace in Sudan. Some of 
the peace agreements namely are: the Machakos Protocol dated   July 20th, 2002; the 
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Agreement of security arrangement, dated September 25th, 2003; the agreement on 
wealth sharing, dated January 7th, 2004; the protocol on power sharing dated May 
26th, and the protocol on the resolution of conflict in the Abyei Area, dated May 26th, 
2004 (http://www.unip.org; www.unmis.org). 
  
The parties in dispute had met in Nairobi and Naivasha, Kenya, between November 
26th, 2004 and December 31st, 2004 under the auspices of the Intergovernmental 
Authority and Development (IGAD). There they agreed that the aforementioned 
peace agreement, together with the agreement on permanent cease fire and modalities 
for implementing the above mentioned protocols shall form part of the comprehensive 
peace agreement which shall be binding on the parties, (http://www.usip.org). In this 
resolution, Mr. Sayed Elkhatib represented the government of Sudan, while Dr. 
Samson Lukare Kwaje stood for the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and Lt. 
General Sumbeiywo (rtd) ambassador and Kenya special envoy for the Sudan peace 
process served as a witness (http://www.usip.org). 
 
3.1.4 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
It has been mentioned before that it was the U.S sustained pressure on the Sudanese 
government that helped to secure the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. While 
maintaining U.S bilateral sanctions on Sudan, the Bush administration also engaged 
the Sudanese government in critical dialogue and thereby gave the resolution of 
Darfur crisis and settlement of the North-South conflict as a condition for the 
normalization of the bilateral relations between the U.S and Sudan, (Dagne, 2006). 
Apart from disarming the Janjaweed other provisions were made to bring an end to 
Darfur and north-south crisis: 
 
Armed Forces: the North and South were to maintain separate armed forces. The 
Sudanese government is to withdraw 91,000 of it troops from the South within two 
and a half years, while the SPLM was given eight months to withdraw it forces from 
the North. The Naivasha Protocol which forms part of the CPA contains provision for 
integrated units of 21,000 soldiers (of which government will have half and the other 
half from SPLM) is to be formed during the six years interim period the troops are to 
be deployed to sensitive areas such as the disputed areas. These units are to be 
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commonly stationed albeit under separate command and control structures. However, 
if the south decides not to secede after the interim period, both sides will unify into a 
39,000 strong force. 
Autonomy: the South is to have autonomy for six years which will be followed by 
referendum in 2011 as regards secession from Sudan. 
Oil wealth: the oil wealth is to be shared on a 50:50 basis between the Sudanese 
government in Khatoum and the SPLM. 
Economic issues: two separate currencies are to be used in the context of dual 
banking system. The North is to retain the Sudanese pound, while opportunity is 
given to the south to opt for the Sudanese Dinar. The essence of the dual banking 
system is to give room for two different windows of service. 
Administration: the central and transitional government positions are to be shared on 
a 70:30 in favour of the Sudanese government, and 55:45 also in government favour 
in the contentious areas of the Blue Nile state, Abyei and the Numba Mountains. 
While Bashir‟s position as the Head of State is maintained, Garang is to serve as the 
Vice President. A government of national unity is to be formed. 
Islamic Law: the application of Sharia Law is to remain in force in the north, parts of 
the Sudanese constitution is to be rewritten so as to forestall application of Sharia Law 
on non-Muslims in the entire Sudan. In addition, an elected Assembly is to decide the 
status of Sharia in Khatoum. 
Other: each territory is to use it own flag: while the North will continue to use the 
current Sudanese flag, the south is to introduce it own flag. (http:// www.iss.co.za) 
 
3.1.5 Implementation and Constraints on Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
The Drafting Commission finished its work in June, 2005, and presented the draft 
constitution to the Sudanese government and the SPLM. It was ratified by the 
National Assembly in Khartoum and the council of SPLM leadership and was signed 
as the Interim National Constitution (INC) on July 9, 2005. The same day after 
signing INC, the presidency which consists of the president, first vice pres ident, and a 
vice president was inaugurated (Dagne, 2006). 
 
The Abyei Commission Boundary established with the responsibility of demarcating 
the area of the nine Dinka chiefdoms finished and submitted its report to Al-Bashir. 
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As regard power sharing Agreement, the parties accepted to a 28% SPLM and 52% 
National Congress Party (NCP) this arrangement cut across all sectors of government, 
with the legislature, executive and the judiciary inclusive. The SPLA deployed an 
estimated troop of 1500 to be part of the Joint Integrated Units. Further more, the 
SPLA equally deployed an estimated 1000 troops to Juba as requested for in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), (Deng, 2006). The first Vice President and 
Chairman of the Sudan Peoples‟ Liberation Movement (SPLA/M) John Garang died 
in a plane crash, and was subsequently replaced by the SPLA/M leadership council 
with Salva Kirr. 
 
The formation of cabinet in September, 2005 was contentious as dispute centered on 
distribution of key economic ministerial portfolios. The NCP was bent on keeping the 
energy and finance ministries, while the SPLM contended that it should be shared 
between them. In the long run the SPLM secured eight ministries, including Foreign 
Affairs, Cabinet Affairs, Labour, Transportation, Health, Education, Humanitarians 
Affairs and Trade, with two advisers. This development has been greeted with 
negative attitude by the southern Sudan. The argument is that in exception of the 
Foreign Affairs Minister, other key positions went to the NCP. 
 
Apart from the dotted successes that are noticeable, it is essential to state that the 
implementation process has been an uphill task, with the NCP exploiting the lapses 
within the CPA coupled with the weaknesses of the SPLM its junior partner to delay 
and frustrate the process, (International Crisis Group 2006). On October, 2007, the 
SPLM said it would suspend participation in the government of national unity because 
the NCP was not implementing the key aspects of the 2005 CPA, (International Crisis 
Group 2008). 
 
The inglorious role of the Sudanese government has made it to assume the status of a 
spoiler. In February 2008, the Sudanese government launched major aerial 
bombardments and ground attacks on West Darfur. In response to this assault, the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the rebel groups in mid- May 2008, 
retaliated by attacking Khartoum leaving at least 200 persons dead. The NCP led by 
Al-Bashir continued to pursue destructive policies in Darfur, while at the same time 
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resisting key provisions in the CPA (International Crisis Group 2008). The idea is that 
the NPC wants Darfur in chaos so as to gag the room for emergence of opposition; 
thus, defying security council resolution by integrating its Janjaweed militias into 
official security structures instead of disarming them, (Human Right Watch, 2006; 
International Crisis Group, 2008). 
 
The Sudanese government also made things difficult for the Africa Union (AU) and 
the United Nations Organization (UNO) in resolving the conflict. It was observed that 
the Sudanese government at a time painted its vehicles in the colour of Africa Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) vehicles, culminating in restrictions on AMIS patrols by the 
opposing rebel movements (International Crisis Group, 2006). The government of 
Sudan even after signing the CPA, 2005 still used helicopter gunship at the time of 
several janjaweed attacks in October 2005 with the dead toll well above thirty, 
(Tadesse, 2005). The AU equally attested to the fact that Sudanese government 
partook in an attack against AU compound in Tawika in October 2005. The 
government is also accused of assigning a regular army officer, christened a technical 
expert to monitor each AMIS sector headquarters; this was to provide insight for 
Sudanese government into AMIS sector operations and also to interfere with its 
operational activities, (Human Right Watch, 2006). President Al-Bashir was also 
resisting UN peace keeping force in Sudan. Thus, on June 19, 2006, he had said: “I 
swear that there will not be any international military intervention in Darfur as long as 
I am in power. Sudan, which was the first country south of Sahara to gain 
independence, cannot now be the first country to be recolonised” 
(http://www.thesar.co.za 2006). 
 
Concerning the implementation of CPA the Al-Bashir government feared that full 
implementation of the CPA, and comprehensive political solutions to Sudan, Darfur 
conflict could lead to change of power locale with the NCP being ousted via free and 
fair elections, or its control of the structures of government may whittle down to a 
minority stake (International Crisis Group, 2006). In a bid to ensure its political 
survival amidst these challenges apart from keeping the international community at 
bay, it has equally led to increase in chaos on ground and has also promoted divisions 
within the rebels. In addition, it has been implementing selectively elements of the 
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CPA without reducing its grip on power or fundamental change in the way the 
country is governed to be weakened. 
 
In an attempt to perpetuate chaos in Sudan, the NCP at a time appeared to have 
bought over SPLA/M faction of Minni Minawi. Thus, the leaders were given 
government jobs and land, and as an astute supporter of the status quo have been 
responsible for numerous attacks on civilian, the Humanitarians, the AMIS and some 
of the violence in internally displaced person (IDP) camps, (International Crisis 
Group 2008). 
 
Aside the fact that the NCP was not comfortable with the 2009 national elections and 
the 2011 southern independence referendum, there were numerous problems that 
dogged the CPA implementation in this regard.  The NCP in an effort to protect its 
control over the state and the economy delayed the national elections. It needed a 
partnership for democratic victory, yet in favour of the one that will neutralize the 
SPLM as a national challenger and still be defined as a purely southern based junior 
partner (International Crisis Group 2008). Furthermore, the SPLM were internally 
divided on priorities. While some favour the 2011 referendum, others were inclined 
with Garang‟s new Sudan vision, that is, a role in national politics, confronting the 
NPC so as to change the country‟s governance and thereby address the grievances of 
the regions that are marginalized. This infighting has weakened the CPA and SPLM 
positions vis-vis NCP. In addition, the dangerous disengagement of the international 
guarantors on the CPA partly as a result of lack of consensus on the way forward 
and/or due to preoccupation with Darfur does not help matters. The fact that the 
international community is satisfied with heavy monitoring, but weak on follow-
through, as the key countries involved in the negotiation of the CPA have not yet 
played their role as a guarantor of the CPA, made it lack coordinated approach in 
dealing with the parties majorly the NCP let alone enjoning them to keep to their 
commitment. Having come to conclusion that it may be unwise to rely on the 
guarantors, the SPLM started building up its military capacity as a leverage over the 
NPC as well as forming alliances with other rebel factions within Darfur that are 
marginalized, (International Crisis Group 2008). 
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Another factor that constituted impediment to the success of CPA is the fact that other 
rebel groups were neglected in the signatory of the CPA like the Justice and Equality 
Party (JEM), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Union Sudan African Parties 
(USAP), United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), Popular National Congress 
(PNC), and so on. They argued that the CPA was negotiated by two parties and 
therefore were not ready to participate in the national Assembly which is part of the 
CPA (Dagne, 2006). 
 
The fact that the Sudanese government has been tagged a spoiler does not mean that 
the rebel groups like SPLM, JEM among others are innocent. They were also 
involved in violence most especially the SPLM. For example, the SPLM has been 
found to be involved in a range of abuses like ambush, assault and abduction of health 
workers; extortion of commercial goods; recruitment and arming of child soldiers, and 
unlawful collection of taxes, (Human Right Watch, 2006; AU Report of the 
Chairperson of Commission on the situation in Darfur, 2004). But the abuse is a far 
cry to that of Sudanese government, whose spoiler posture has led to a warrant of 
arrest on President Omar Bashir for genocide, crime against humanity and war crime, 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (International Crisis Group, 2008). 
 
In spite of the aforesaid obstacles, the CPA achieved the objectives of ending civil 
war in Darfur, Sudan through the conduct of elections in April 2010 and a referendum 
in January 2011 (Soderlund, 2011). The referendum culminated in the emergence of 
the Southern Sudan as an independent state on 9th July, 2011, the 193rd country to be 
admitted to the United Nations (UN) with Salva Kiir as elected president 
(http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de).  
 
The Sudan and South Sudan are two of the poorest and most indebted countries in the 
world. In many parts of both countries, especially in Southern Sudan the problem of 
food scarcity is quite worrisome. Many people depend on humanitarian aid from the 
International community. Water shortages and desertification are widespread and 
hampered development of the two countries although both countries are rich in 
mineral resources like oil, Ore, precious metals like gold, water from the Nile and 
potentially fertile arable land. The distribution of oil resources between the Southern 
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and Northern Sudan remains unresolved following the independence of the South and 
the precise positioning of the borders most especially that of the region of Abyei to 
which both sides lay claim. 
 
It can be inferred from Sudan‟s crisis that central to the conflict is the politics of 
power sharing between the North and the South. Thus, marginalization and 
discriminatory policies of successive governments in Khartoun led by the NCP 
especially in power sharing against the South Sudan culminated in perennial arm 
struggle between the North and the South. Attempts to crush perceived Southern 
rebellion by the NCP who saw the rebellion as a threat to its hold on power, 
exercabated and externalized the conflicts. It is also interesting to note that although 
the independence of the Southern Sudan supposed to bring an end to hostilities as that 
would have permanently resolved the issue of power sharing, economic interests of 
both countries tie to the presence of oil in the South perpetuates the conflicts. The 
next country that will be examined is Liberia. 
 
3.2 Conflict in West Africa (Liberia) 
The Americo-Liberians established the Republic of Liberia purposefully for 
themselves and ostensibly to enjoy the benefits and privileges which have been used 
in time past by the colonization societies to lure many of them from the USA 
(Osaghae, 1998). 
 
Freed American Slaves founded Liberia in 1822 (Adeyemo, 2000). The Americo-
Liberians is made up of a small group described by Liebenow (1969, 1987) and 
Clower et al. (1966) as an interlocking family and coastal regional network made up 
of just 5 per cent of the population. It was due to this small size that made them 
unwilling to admit many African-Liberians into their ranks, nor give room to 
expansion of the political arena. 
 
Their overriding goal for about 200 years was to retain political control among a small 
group of families “…and to share in the material benefits of economic growth among 
its own members (Osaghae 1998:134). To this extent, until, 1980, they constituted a 
hegemonic ruling class, satisfying Gramci‟s (1971) two hegemonic indices, control 
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over coercive instruments of state (class domination) and moral and intellectual 
leadership, through which the class imposes its will on society without having to use 
force ( Ihonvbere and Falola 1984; Agbaje, 1992). 
 
The class treatment of the Americo- Liberian group posed the danger of glossing over 
the fact of history that it was never a homogenous group. Although quite a lot of the 
differences that separated them have melted away over the years; however, their 
historical significance lies in the fact that they help to show that the seeds of the 
overthrow of hegemonic rule did not lie only in the African- Liberians, they also lay 
within the Americo- Liberians themselves.The overthrow in the 1980 of the Americo- 
Liberian dynasty was feasible, partly, because of the coming together of elements 
from both groups while, in the nineteenth century, two segments of the America- 
Liberians alone teamed up to unseat the dominant mulatto segment. 
 
The mulattoes who were freeborn American citizens dominated power between 1847 
and 1970 when the first black America-Liberian, Edward James Roye, was elected. 
The mulatto dynasty did not last long because of the extremely small number of 
mulattoes whom generations of intermarriage completely wiped out in later years 
(Osaghae, 1998).  
 
The next set of America-Liberians comprised black freed slaves, many of whom were 
free only on the grounds of accepting to return to Africa. It is essentially to note that 
not all of them, however, came from the United States of America (U.S.A.), some 
though a few were from West Indies and Sierra-Leone. This segment of settlers 
capitalized on their numerical strength to take over America-Liberia leadership from 
mulattoes and rule the country from 1884-1980 through the de facto single party, the 
True Whig Party (TWP) (Osaghae 1998). Down the rung of the America-Liberian 
hierarchy were the recaptured slaves who were rescued by the U.S. navy on the West 
African Coasts and settled in Liberia. The recaptured slaves were called “Congoes” a 
name which has now assumed generalization as Americo-Liberians. Through 
intermarriage with the Americo-Liberian and by emulating them, the Congoes came 
to share the prerogatives, if not the status of the ruling group (Lowenkoft, 1976:13). 
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The Americo- Liberians emphasized the differences between them and the African 
Liberians. In their pursuit of collective security, they did not only monopolize power, 
but they also cling to their superior class markers: big luxurious cars, western 
dressing, education, Christianity, Masonic fraternities and Anglo-saxon names. Where 
they had the means then segregated themselves from the natives in churches, urban 
neighborhoods and meetings. Through intermarriage and inter-elite cooption, few of 
African-Liberians were admitted into the privileged ranks (Osaghae, 1998).  
 
 The African-Liberians are like other ethnic groups found in other parts of Africa, 
whose relationships with one another has been transformed in the process of colonial 
rule of American-Liberians. Osaghae (1998) notes that the African-Liberian 
relationships and conflicts have been understudied as only those involving America-
Liberians were considered worthy of attention by the colonialist. The number of 
African-Liberian ethnic groups have been put variously, some said 16 (Schulze, 
1973); 20 (Marrinelli, 1964) 28 (Lowenkonf, 1976); and 30 (Anderson, 1962). 
However, 16 is always taken as the number of ethnic groups of the African-Liberians 
(Osaghae, 1998). Many of the groups, especially the Vai, Gola, Mano, Kru, khrahn 
and Mandingo have kith and kin in neighboring Guinea, Cote d‟ivoire and Sierra 
Leone. 
 
Another issue worthy of note is that many of the groups migrated to the country from 
elsewhere. The Gola and Kissi who were often seen as the earliest migrants moved 
between 1,300 and 1,700, consequent with the collapse of the Sudanese empires. 
While others like Grebo, Kru, Gio and Mano came in between the 17th and 20th 
Century (Kup, 1960). However one unique case is that of the Madingoes itinerant 
Liberians who did not settle until Doe‟s years. One observable thing among these 
groups of African-Liberia is the cross-cutting linkages which evolved in the sense that 
many Africa-Liberians are multilingual, with Vai, Kpelle and Khran being the most 
widely spoken language (Osagha, 1998; D‟Azevedo, 1962).  
 
3.2.1 The African-Liberian Challenge to American-Liberian Hegemony 
African-Liberians challenged America-Liberian hegemony through democratic and 
violent means. Some African-Liberians tried to contest or even contested in 
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presidential elections and also tried to organize opposition parties to challenge the 
TWP. For instance, Momulu Massaguoi via assimilado was the first non-settler to 
nurse a presidential ambition in 1931. He was subsequently dismissed from the 
government service (Smyke, 1983). Didwho Twe floated a party with the name 
United Peoples Party in 1951 which was Kru-based to contest the presidency with the 
Tubman. The party was not registered. He later ran on the platform of another party- 
Reformation Party, an indigenous (coastal) party. He eventually lost out in the 
election. Twe and his collaborators were charged with sedition and he fled the country 
(Sundiata, 1981). 
 
The inability of African-Liberians to wrest power from Americo-Liberians through 
democratic means led to the adaptation of violent method via coup d‟état (Clapham , 
1976). Suffice to say that Americo-Liberian stronghold on power which prevented 
change of power through democratic means made violent overthrow inevitable 
(Osaghae, 1998). 
 
3.2.2 The 1980 Coup and the Doe Years 
Liberia‟s political instability dates back to the 1980 overthrow of late President 
William Tolbert who was a descendant of the dominant Americo-Liberians who ruled 
from 1947 to late 1980s. Liberia‟s Khran coup leader master Sergeant Samuel Doe 
killed Tolbert in spite of personal appeal of Houphouet Boigny for clemency. In a 
nutshell, peace eluded Liberia between December 1989 and early in 1997 due to 
power struggle and control of the government by various Liberian factions notably the 
Armed forces of Liberia dominated by President Samuel Doe‟s Khran ethnic group, 
the United Liberian Movement (ULIMO) led by Prince Yomie Johnson and the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor who chased late 
President Samuel Doe out of the Liberian Presidential Mansion in December 24, 1989 
(Adeyemo, 2000). 
 
Thus, Doe coup saw the overthrow of Americo-Liberian hegemonic rule as the 
establishment of an African-Liberian dominated ruling class which was initially built 
around a military junta of non-commissioned officers. Given (1986), pointed out that 
several points can be raised to prove that the coup was a matter of African-Liberian 
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independent struggle. First, all the revolutionaries who executed the coup and formed 
the People‟s Redemption Council (PRC) were African-Liberian. Allied to this is the 
fact that only one out of the people officially executed was an African –Liberian. 
Tubman (1986) argued that the African- Liberian saw the take-over as the birth of a 
new country owned by them rather than by the Americo- Liberian. In fact, they 
demanded change in the country‟s name, flag, emblem and other symbols. Hence the 
slogan which formed the hallmark of the “revolution” also bore this perception .  
Indeed, the people were no longer comfortable with the idea of monkey work for 
baboon to eat “our eyes are now opened” (Osaghae, 1998:148). 
 
The period between the coup and the civil war was marked by Doe entrenching 
himself in power by eliminating or repressing opponents. To start with, he eliminated 
all the sixteen other “revolutionaries” on the grounds of plotting to overthrow him. 
Having got to power, Doe increased the number of Krahns in important government 
positions. His personal body guards, executives‟ mansion guards, security service, 
immigration and police were headed and predominantly composed of the Krahns. Doe 
also systematically built a Krahn-based army: the elite first infantry battalions as the 
special anti-terrorist unit were almost completely Krahn. In fact, by the time Liberia 
was embroiled in civil war it was difficult to describe the Liberia Armed Forces as 
anything but a Krahn army (Osaghae, 1998). 
 
Doe‟s reign was characterized by repression of opposition as many journalists were 
arrested, jailed or killed. Many thought the reign of terror would end with the return 
of Doe as a civilian president to no avail. The outline of the elections was rejected. 
Yet, Doe clearly adopted repressive and co-operative strategies to suppress opposition 
(Osaghae, 1998). 
 
3.2.3 The Civil War 
Adeyemo (2000) observed that the political situation in Liberia was quite horrible 
during the reign of Doe as president. Majority of Liberians were alienated while 
Doe‟s regime set up very bad repressive machinery which enabled his administration 
to kill several people in Liberia. This made majority of Liberians and Doe‟s  main 
rival - Charles Taylor not wanting Doe to remain in power. 
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However, overthrowing Doe became impossible except through violent means. Taylor 
and his America-Liberian collaborator aligned with some African-Liberians like Gio 
and Mano of Nimba, who were victims of genocidal attack by Doe and his fellow 
Khrahn‟s rose up against Doe. It should be noted that the army that invaded Liberia to 
conquer Doe was not made up of Gio and Mano and even other Liberians; it was 90 
percent an army of mercenaries from Burkina-Faso, Sierra-Leone, Ghana, Gambia, 
and Nigeria. Doe‟s Krahn soldiers killed hundreds of Gios and Mano in Moronvia and 
ransacked their villages in Nimba County this forced them to join forces with Taylor. 
From that point, the combatants were divided along Gio / Mano / America- Liberians 
on the one hand, and Krahn and Madingo (on Doe‟s side) on the other hand (Osaghae, 
1998).  
 
The war raged and Doe was captured by forces led by Taylor. Since the U.S 
government refused to intervene in the Liberia crisis the ECOWAS took up the 
responsibility. An election was conducted and Taylor emerged the winner (Berman 
and Sons, 2000) and Charles Taylor emerged as President of Liberia following the 
election of July 1997. Deliberately he chose to govern in the same manner which 
created the schism between the America-Liberian “settlers class” and the 
“indigenous” Liberian population. By June 2003, Taylor found himself encircled by 
the two main rebel groups of Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy in 
Liberia (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).  The 
international community could no longer countenance the mounting level of casualties 
(civilian and military) and therefore demanded Taylor‟s resignation from office. The 
warrant of arrest put out by the international court in Freetown on June 4, 2003 further 
increased the pressure on Taylor, in that it demanded his arrest and extradition to 
Freetown to face trial on charges of complicity in human rights offences and crimes 
against humanity (Iroha, 2005). There was a transitional government put in place to 
oversee Liberia affairs through the collective effort of EU, U.S, A.U, and ECOWAS.  
 
Critical to the understanding of Liberia crises is the role of power struggle and control 
of government by various factions. At inception, it was Americo-Liberian that 
schemed out the Africa-Liberian from the political mainstream. The African-Liberian 
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reacted violently to this via a coup led by Samuel Doe which ipso facto resulted in the 
establishment of African- Liberians rule. Attempts by Charles Taylor, a descendant of 
Americo-Liberia to overthrow Doe and return power to Americo-Liberia culminated 
into a bloody civil war. Hence, politics can be seen as a precursor of conflicts in 
Liberia. The next country on the list is Rwanda. 
 
3.3 Central Africa (Rwanda) 
The gory state of conflict of genocidal proportion in Rwanda has been succinctly 
captured by Gourevitch (1998:3):  
Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a 
population, and in the spring and early summer of 1994; a program 
of massacres decimated the Republic of Rwanda. Although the 
killing was low-tech – performed largely by machete – it was 
carried out at dazzling speed: of an original population of about 
seven and a half million, at least eight hundred thousand people 
were killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a 
million deaths, and they may be right. The dead of Rwanda 
accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during 
the holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
 
Rwanda is a small country made up of two major ethnic groups namely: the Ba-Hutus 
and the Ba-Tutsis (Adeyemo 2000). The discussion of Rwanda‟s violent conflict of 
genocidal proportion has been scaled down into the following: The Hutsi-Tutsi origin, 
the pre-colonial relations, the colonial period and the introduction of strict ethnic 
divisions, the post-colonial relations and ethnic violence, post-cold war period, 
pressures from the international community as it regards introducing democracy in 
Rwanda via the Arusha Accord. Finally, the indifferent posture maintained by the 
international community on genocide in Rwanda. 
 
In order to unravel the mystery behind genocide in Rwanda, it is pertinent to see how 
the ethnic differences evolved with the arrival of the colonialists, and also the tagging 
of violent conflict in Rwanda as tribal violence. 
 
3.3.1 Pre-Colonial Rwandan Society 
Pre-colonial Rwandan society has been portrayed as a linguistically and culturally 
homogenous enclave divided into three groups – the Hutus, Tutsis and the Twa. They 
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lived together, shared the same language, and engaged in intermarriages. The Hutus 
formed majority of the population who were mainly peasants. The Tutsis constituted 
roughly 15percent of the population and were mainly aristocrats. The Twa were the 
smallest group, not more than 1percent of the entire population (Prunier, 1995). 
 
Heleta (2006) stated that opinions are divided even till today on the origin of the 
Rwandan people. While some argue that the Hutus and the Tutsi are people of 
different biological origin who settled in Rwanda from different parts of the world, 
others see socio-economic divisions as the only difference between them. The Hutus 
who constitute 84 percent are agriculturalists, while the Tutsis are pastoralists 
(Adeyemo, 2000). Des Forges (1999:247) a historian who has written much on 
Rwanda averred that the terms Tutsi and Hutu were based on people‟s wealth. The 
word “Tutsi” described the status of an individual – a person rich in cattle and 
referred to the elite group as a whole, and the word “Hutu” meaning originally meant 
a subordinate or follower of a mere powerful person came to be referred to the mass 
of the ordinary people. John Hanning Speke a European first explorer of the Nile 
claimed that the Tutsis were a Caucasoid tribe of the Ethiopian origin that descended 
from King David in the Bible. While later explorers postulated that the Tutsi came 
from the Ancient Egypt or Asia Minor (Prunner, 1995). 
 
Hintjens (1999) concluded that the difference between the Hutus and the Tutsis are 
not easily differentiated as the most historical and anthropological accounts suggest. 
As a result of mixed marriages prevalent in the centuries gone by which culminates in 
tracing the ethnic identity only through the male line. Gourevitch (1999) due to 
centuries of marriages and clientage mixing, many ethnographers and historians agree 
that the Hutus and the Tutsis cannot be called distinct ethnic groups. Thus, it is 
difficult to differentiate a Tutsi from a Hutu (Hintjens, 1999). 
 
From the above, one can glean the fact that there exists conflicting opinions about the 
origins of the groups that live in Rwanda. Uvin (1997) claimed that with the passage 
of time, the issue that borders on the origins of the Tutsis and the Hutus had acquired 
political stakes. Nevertheless, the official Hutu position after the 1950s was that 
foreigners (Tutsis) invaded Rwanda and consequently installed systems of oppression 
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in Rwanda. At the same time, the position of the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus was 
that the differences only manifested in the socio-economic status. 
 
Before Rwanda became a colony of Belgium, it was part of German East Africa from 
1890 to 1916. During the same period, the German presence led to the introduction of 
a colonial policy of indirect rule in which Rwandan Kings and officials were used to 
rule their people indirectly. However, during the First World War, the Belgians fought 
Germans over Rwanda and succeeded in acquiring the territory thereby declaring 
Rwanda as a Belgian colony in 1916 (Prunier, 1995). One of the legacies of the 
Belgian colonial policies that eventually shaped the future of Rwanda was a rigid 
interpretation of ethnic groups. They saw the Hutus as distinct from the Tutsis and 
skewed policies separating them, thereby creating two different ethnicities. Identity 
cards that listed the ethnic group of individuals were introduced by Belgians in 1933. 
In addition, the Hutus and the Tutsis were seen by Belgians as distinct races. They 
saw the Tutsis as “almost white”, while the Hutus were classified as “another African 
tribe” Prunier (1995) argued that the race division was a fall out of the Europeans 
insistence on the “superior race of aristocratic invaders (Prunner 1995:46). 
 
Treading the path of their predecessors, the white explorers and missionaries who 
“discovered” Rwanda, the Belgians were fascinated by the Tutsis “nobleness”. Thus, 
the Tutsis were given limited authority by the Belgians to rule Rwanda in spite of the 
fact that they were in the minority. They were indeed charged with the responsibilities 
of the “divide and rule” policies of the Belgians. By giving the Tutsis certain powers, 
the Belgians stayed at the background thereby exposed the Tutsis to the 
criminalization of the Hutus majority who saw them as the first-hand oppressors. The 
colonial Administration under the auspices of Belgium used the local Tutsis chiefs for 
requisition of forced labour from the Hutu masses. Coporal punishment and routine 
beatings were meted out to the Hutus on behalf of the colonial masters by the Tutsis 
(Melvern, 2000). The matter was made worst with the Catholic Church, education, 
administration and the army organizing around the presumed racial superiority of the 
Tutsis (Hintjens, 1999; Heleta, 2006). Catholic schools openly discriminated against 
the Hutus, favouring only the Tutsis (Gourevitch, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Most of the Hutus chiefs in the 1920s were replaced by the Tutsis. This culminated in 
the total dominance of the Tutsis minority in all important positions. Towards the tail 
end of Belgian formal presence in Rwanda in 1962, 43 chiefs out of 45 were Tutsis as 
well as 549 sub-chiefs out of 559 (Prunier, 1995). Indeed, “ Belgians played a 
decisive role by imposing European racial stereotypes, supporting the Tutsis to the 
detriment of the Hutus, and then shifting the blame for colonial oppression to the 
Tutsis and leaving them to their fate” (Berry and Berry, 1996:6). 
 
The wave of nationalist movement that swept through the continent of Africa in the 
1950s and 60s did not go unnoticed in Rwanda. This precipitated African rebellion 
against colonial rule which resulted in the independence of many African countries. In 
the case of Rwanda, it was the Belgians that mooted the idea of Rwandan 
independence. Starting in 1960, the Belgians came to the realization of the fact that, if 
elections should be conducted in the country, looking at the numerical strengths of the 
Hutus, they would emerge as winners. Armed with this knowledge, the Belgian 
colonial masters started replacing the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with the Hutus 
(Heleta, 2006). 
 
In attempt to cover up, the Belgians hereafter accused the Tutsis of exploiting the 
Hutus, whereas it was the Belgian colonial policies that orchestrated the stage for the 
emergence of oppressive Tutsi aristocracy in the first place. The first municipal 
elections were conducted in the 1960 in which Parmehutu; an ethnic party for the 
Hutu emancipation won an overwhelming victory (Heleta, 2006). Since conflicts, 
wars, and violence are endemic, pre-colonial Rwanda had its fair share of it; however, 
not as portrayed by the Western media as tribal violence between the Hutus and the 
Tutsis. Prunier (1995:39) argues that: 
Although Rwanda was not a land of peace and harmony before the 
arrival of the Europeans, there is no trace in its pre-colonial history 
of systematic violence between the Tutsis and Hutus. There were 
plenty of wars, but they were either fought against foreign 
kingdoms or between local groups trying to gain power. 
   
Mandani (2001:34) establishes the fact that: “The origin of violence is connected to 
how the Hutus and Tutsis were constructed as political identities by the colonial state, 
the Hutus as indigenous and the Tutsis as alien”. 
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No sooner had the Hutu politicians took over power than they organized the vengeful 
persecution of the Tutsis. The Hutus viewed the Tutsis as their main oppressors and 
not the colonialiasts. The violence that ensued left thousands of Tutsis dead, which 
resulted in many of them taking refuge in neighbouring countries. By late 1963, no 
fewer than 130,000 Rwandan Tutsis took refuge in Burundi and Uganda (Prunier, 
1995). The first two years after independence witnessed constant attacks by the Hutu 
government on the Tutsi minority. As a way of bringing about parity between power 
and population, the Hutu government introduced ethnic quotas in every sphere of life. 
This permeates the public service employment in which the Tutsis were allocated 9 
per cent of jobs (Berkerley, 2002). This was equally applied to education sector. 
When the Belgian colonial masters were in charge of Rwandan government, the 
population of the Tutsi was put at about 15 per cent after hundreds of thousands of 
Tutsis had fled, taking refuge in the neighbouring countries, the Hutu government cut 
down the number to 9 per cent (Heleta, 2006). The economic decline in the 1980s put 
additional pressure on the Hutu government to put in place more stringent ethnic 
quotas and intensify oppression of the Tutsi minority (Heleta, 2006). 
. 
3.3.2 The Build-Up to the Genocide 
After Rwanda‟s independence in 1962, the idea peddled by the Hutu extremists that 
the Tutsi did not belong to Rwanda became nurtured. The Western world became 
involved in a negotiation process to solve the conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsi 
after the Cold war. These efforts later boomeranged. Rwanda was one of the countries 
that received large amount of financial aid from the Western world during the Cold 
War. The goal was to keep Rwanda, together with many other African countries, 
away from the communists. Even when the Hutu government killed thousands of 
Tutsis and Hutu moderated and forced hundreds of thousands into exile, the western 
powers kept sending funds without questioning how such money was spent (Berry 
and Berry, 1999). 
 
The end of the Cold War, led to a resurface of democratic crusade. This led to 
pressure being mounted on the regime in Rwanda to democratize, negotiate power 
sharing with the Tutsi in exile and organize free elections (Unvin, 1997). The majority 
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of the Rwandan Tutsis, who fled to neighboring countries like Uganda and Burundi, 
were not given equal treatment like the nationals of such countries. Indeed, they were 
subjected to various forms of discrimination on a daily basis. The frustration 
generated from this experience especially among the Tutsi (youths) refugees made 
many of them to join the guerilla army. Not less than 3,000 Tutsis got military 
training with some becoming top army officers (Malvern 2000). Majority of the 
Tutsis left Museveni‟s army when he emerged victorious to form the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) with the aim of launching attacks on the Rwandan government 
(Heleta, 2006). 
 
After three years of sporadic fighting in Northern Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front was finally perceived by the international community and Rwandan 
Government as a legitimate participant in the political process (Malvern, 2000). At the 
same time, the Rwanda government expanded the army to ward off Rwandan Patriotic 
Front incessant attacks. Thus, the Rwandan army grew from 5000 to 30,000. The 
Hutu extremists complemented the efforts of the Rwandan government by 
establishing their own militias. Between 1990 and 1994, no fewer than 50,000 
unemployed Hutu youth were recruited and given military training and weapons by 
the militia (Mamdani, 2001; Heleta, 2006). 
 
As fighting escalated with thousands of dead civilians and many more fleeing the 
conflict areas, the international community pressure led to negotiations between the 
government Rwandan Patriotic Front and the newly formed opposition parties about 
the future of the country. The talks began in August 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania 
(Heleta, 2006). Observers opined that the signing of the Arusha Accord was the last 
hay that broke camel‟s back as it prepared the ground for genocide on April 7th 1994. 
Kuperman (1996) noted that even though the mediation at the Arusha Accord was 
virtual textbook case of modern conflict management it could not prevent the 
genocide. Rather it is possible that the pressures applied by the international 
community on the Rwandan president to sign the Accord led to the 1994 genocide.  
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Kuperman (1996: 230) argues that the Western mediators contributed to the Rwandan 
tragedy: 
There is little doubt that the proximate cause of the genocide in 
Rwanda was that President Habyarimana signed and began to 
implement an agreement that threatened the privileged position of 
powerful extremists in his county. It was not until the Arusha 
Accord of August 1993 that extremists took the final steps 
necessary to implement the genocide…it was continuing 
international pressure that ultimately drove Habyarimana to agree 
to implement the Accord. 
 
In fact, Herman Cohen (former American under-secretary of state for African Affairs) 
claimed that the Arusha Accord was too favourable to the Rwandan Patriotic Front. 
The international community‟s obsession with getting a peace agreement led to a lack 
of analysis and a failure to consider whether or not the Accord could be implemented 
(Heleta, 2006:7). In the same vein Des Forges (1999) observed that the full 
implementation of the Arusha Accord would lead to many Rwandans losing 
privileges and positions. In the army, many Hutus would lose their power and 
relatively decent salaries after the planned demobilization and integration with the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front. 
 
3.3.3 The Role of the UN in Rwanda 
Indeed, the world body did little or nothing to prevent the 1994 Rwanda genocide 
(Adeyemo, 2000). Between 1990 and 1994 there were ominous signs that the 
extermination of the Tutsis in Rwanda would take place. Dalwaire who was the UN 
officer in charge of peace-keeping in Rwanda requested for 4,500 troops but got only 
2,548. The major obstacle was American Diplomats at the UN, requesting a low-cost 
operation. Dalwaire requested 8 helicopters and 22 armed personnel carriers (APCs), 
but received no helicopters and only 8 APCs (Heleta 2006). On January 11, 1994, a 
top-level Hutu militia man approached General Dalwaire and briefed him about the 
plans for extermination of the Tutsis. He specifically stated that he trained 1,700 men 
who, in groups of 40, could kill 1,000 persons in 20 minutes. He revealed the list of 
the moderate Hutus, and Belgian peacekeepers to be killed as well as the 
extermination of the Tutsis. General Dalwaire sent an urgent letter to the UN in New 
York, informing them about the plan to be hatched to no avail (Des forges, 1999). 
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Furthermore, the CIA predicted that in the worst case scenario, more than a half-
million Rwandans could die in a war between the government and the RPF 
(Kuperman, 1996). It also sent a report to the state department that the Arusha Accord 
would fail, resulting in massive violence (Malvern, 2000). The world body turned a 
deaf ear to all the many signs but busy at this time in the former Yugoslavia, instead 
of applying additional pressure that would have prevented the conflict from 
snowballing to uncontrollable conflagration. 
 
On April 6, 1994, Juvenal Habyarimana, the president of Rwanda flew back from a 
meeting in Tanzania to implement the Arusha Accord as he had been told not to delay 
in order to forestall Rwanda crisis from engulfing the entire region. As his plane 
approached Kigali Airport someone fired missiles and shot down the plane, killing the 
president and other people on board. In less than an hour after killing the president, 
the Hutu army and the militia put road blocks on every major road and began mass 
killings of the Hutu opposition and the Tutsi minority. Their first targets were the 
Hutu opposition politicians, who were likely to oppose the genocide if they were left 
alone (Heleta, 2006). 
 
On the Kigali streets and around the country, the Rwandan army, Hutu militia, and the 
ordinary Hutu citizens began brutal killing of the Tutsis and all those who resembled 
Tutsis. Ethnic identity cards introduced by the Belgian colonial government and the 
physical features that supposedly distinguished between the Tutsis and Hutus were 
used as sufficient basis for a death sentence. At roadblocks, persons whose identity 
cards read Tutsi got killed on the spot. Many Hutus who were unfortunate to look like 
Tutsi were killed on the basis of the appearance alone and many Tutsis who 
resembled Hutus had forged identity cards and managed to escape death. Mistaking 
the Hutus for Tutsis and vice versa prove the falsehood of colonial impression and 
policies that created divisions and hatred in Rwanda (Heleta, 2006). 
 
During the Rwanda genocide in 1994, the UN and humanitarian agencies estimated 
that the Hutu extremists slaughtered over 500,000 Rwandans mostly the Tutsis while 
the Rwanda or Kigali government estimated that 800,000 people were killed within 
100 days or between April and June 1994 (Adeyemo, 2000). The various panels of 
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investigations set up at the level of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now 
African Union (AU)) People‟s Panel, Belgium and French governments did little or 
nothing to bring the perpetrators to book. 
 
In March 1999, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned an 
independent investigation with a view to finding out the role which the UN played in 
Rwanda genocide. The Commission indicted the world body of being timid, 
disorganized and misguided before and during the Rwanda genocide. It was said the 
world body ignored all signs and warnings that the Hutu government wanted to 
exterminate people of Tutsi origin. The UN later accepted responsibility for its failure 
in Rwanda and also accepted the responsibility of Rwanda reconstruction as requested 
by the Rwanda government (Adeyemo, 2000). Schrawl (2010) noted that in order to 
overcome ethnic division and promote national unity Rwanda implemented majority, 
liberal democracy.  
 
A quick look at the Rwanda crises may deceive any analyst into thinking that it was a 
colonial inspired conflicts perpetuated by colonial style of governance. However, a 
critical analysis of the conflicts brought to the fore the underlining factor which is 
politics orchestrated by inequality in power relations between the Hutus and the 
Tutsis. Although the seed of conflicts was sown by the Belgian colonialists; however, 
the kernel of war was the power relations which was skewed in favour of the the 
Tutsis during colonial rule and the Hutus after independence. The civil war left in its 
wake a decimation of over 800,000 people with heavy casualties on the side of the 
Tutsis who constituted minority group in clan ratio.  
 
3.4 East Africa (Burundi) 
It is necessary to state from the on set that the trend of conflicts in Rwanda and 
Burundi is quite similar. However, some differences can still be noticed. The analysis 
of Burundi conflicts will be situated within a historical context before highlighting the 
differences between Rwanda and Burundi conflicts. Burundi came to the limelight 
essentially because of the conflict that rocked the country.  Some commentators have 
erroneously described the conflict in Burundi as “tribal war” between the Hutus and 
Tutsis. The bloody conflict of the 1970s occurred at a time when the regime in power 
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was noted for clientelism, nepotism, and divisive policies. Rutake and Gahama (1998) 
argued that the Hutus/Tutsi problem was neither a social nor an economic but 
essentially a political problem of how this or that ethnic group comes to and stays in 
power. Burundi conflict is traceable to “ethnic” manipulation during the period of 
Belgian colonization ditto the management of post-colonial Burundi by the local 
authorities. 
 
Specifically, there was a surge of conflict in Burundi between 1965-1993. However, 
the formation of several organizations of the Hutus in diasporas, especially the 
Palipehutu or Party for the Liberation of the Hutu people, formed in 1980 gave further 
impetus to the conflicts. The scenario is as follows: some Hutus, aware of their 
numerical superiority attack and kill Tutsis; the army composed of a majority of 
Tutsis since 1972 intervened and repressed them the assassination of a democratically 
elected Hutu president on 21 October 1993, by a small group of Tutsis soldiers 
worsen the conflicts in Burundi as it triggered new killings which further complicated 
Hutu-Tutsi coexistence and relations (Rutake and Gahama, 1998). In Burundi as in 
Rwanda, the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas, have been living together in the same territory 
for centuries (Adekanye, 1996, Nestor, 2005). In pre-colonial Burundi, mixed 
marriages between the Hutus and Tutsis were commonplace and specific cultural 
characteristics were trivialized by a strong national identity (Nestor, 2005). 
 
Before colonization, the wars in Burundi were caused by rivalries between princes 
who were poised to enlarge their regions and through the initiatives of kings who 
wanted to defend or expand national borders. During those conflicts the code of 
honour for the fighters generally helped spare civilians who were not the specific 
target of the conflicts. Moral uprightness and soundness of judgment were 
prerequisites for appointment to the position of leadership. Such people appointed to 
the position of leadership were trained in law, ethics of justice and truth. Leaders 
could only be enthroned with the consent of the local assembly where even the 
youngest people had to give their opinion. In other words, there was relative 
democracy at the grassroots (Nestor, 2005). 
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Clan organization was very prominent in pre-colonial Burundi. In fact, the entire 
Burundi population is structured around about 220 clans dispersed throughout the 
country and even outside. The names of certain clans are reminiscent of their well-
known places of origin such as the Banuyarwunda (Rwanda), the Banyabugfi 
(Bugufi), the Banyagisaka (Gisaka), the Buyugoma (Buyugoma), the (Buha), others 
are directly attached to a famous, historical personality. The Bakundo, Bavuna and 
Bavubikiro identify with Ntare Rushatsi, founder of the Burundi monarchy. It is not 
easy to come to terms with Burundi clan structures, as a result of complex 
combinations between ethnic groups (Amoko) and lineages/clans (imiriyango) 
(Rutake and Gahama, 1998). 
 
In view of the Above, Mworoha observes that the Bahanza and the Bashbusi are 
exclusively Hutu, the Bategwa are particular to the Tutsis; the Bonyoni particularly to 
the Twa; the Barango and Banyagisaka are common to the Hutus and Tutsis, whereas 
the Barimas are to be found in the three aforementioned categories (Mworoha, 1977 
cited in Rutake and Gahama, 1998). 
 
Pre-colonial political organization was distinct by the existence of a territorial space 
over which the king exercised power and the extension of royal power was through 
authorities delegated to chiefs that head of administrative sub-division. The king was 
at the echelon of hierarchy and he reigned over the entire country. The chiefs under 
him were appointed and dismissed at his will. The administrative sub-division over 
which the chief exercise power was in turn sub-divided into sub-chieftaincies. The 
latter were administered by sub-chiefs appointed and dismissed by the chief. There 
were both Hutu and Tutsi ethnicity just as it was in Rwanda.There was variation in the 
size of the chieftaincies administered by chiefs of royal lineage who may also very 
well come from more humble Hutu or Tutsis families that have demonstrated absolute 
loyalty to the monarch and the national cause (Rutake and Gahama, 1998). 
 
The classification of Burundi population into “races” and castes” were the handiwork 
of the Belgian colonialists. The distinction between the Tutsis and Hutus in Burundi 
was made on the basis of some criteria that include: measurement of the forehead, the 
length of the nose and the number of cows a citizen had. Physical attributes were used 
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to determine whether a Burundian was of “nilotic” (considered to be closed to the 
hamates”) or “Bantu” race. Being a “Hamites” means being close to the allegedly 
superior race of the colonizers. Being of “Bantu” race raised some doubts as to a 
man‟s mental or even biological ability to be a full-fledged human being in history 
(Nestor, 2005). 
Thus, Father Menard wrote:  
The Batutsi race is undoubtedly one of the most handsome and 
interesting race of equatorial Africa. Physically, the Mututsi are 
perfectly built.  Their physique is more like that of white, than that 
of Negroes, to the extent that one could say without exaggeration 
that they are Europeans in black skin cited in (Ruttake and 
Gahama, 1998:84). 
 
Rychmans described the Tutsis as reminiscent of the physique of the mummy of 
Ramses ii (Mayer, 1985). Conversely, the Hutus were considered as stocky people 
with wooly hair and flat noses. The Twa were described as dwarfs and grotesque little 
creatures (Louis cited in (Rutake and Gahama, 1998). 
 
It appears the physical built up of the Tutsis endeared them to the colonial over lords. 
In fact, the way Belgians introduced indirect system of rule in which the Tutsis were 
selected to occupy position of authorities so it was in Burundi. The local system of 
governance was truncated and was subsequently replaced with colonial method of 
administration. Obviously, the source of what has become the differentiation between 
the Hutus and the Tutsis was precipitated and sustained by the colonialists. 
Colonialism did this by not just creating the categories, “Hutu” and “Tutsi”, and 
endowing them with new ethnic identities, including the introduction of identity cards 
bearing the mention of ethnic membership, but also (an) perhaps this is the most 
critical conside ration here) by planting the seeds about two radically different and 
exclusive” myths of origin (Adekanye,1996). 
 
The effects of colonial role in the restratification of society were more pronounced in 
Burundi than in Rwanda. The restratification of Burundian society under colonial rule 
did away with many of the existing cross-ethnic linkages and networks and ended up 
introducing in Burundi, as in Rwanda, a big cleavage between the Tutsis as a class of 
rulers and the Hutus as a class that was ruled (Adekanye, 1996). It is interesting to 
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note that just as was the case in Rwanda in terms of population distribution so it is in 
Burundi. The country is made up of an 85 per cent Hutu majority, the Tutsi minority 
of around 15 per cent enjoyed disproportionate levels of power following the 
country‟s independence in 1962 (Rodt, 2011). 
 
The Burundi Armed Forces (FAB), for example, were Tutsi dominated, as was the 
government. The uneven power distribution, often exploited by the Tutsis leadership 
caused a series of Hutu uprisings. The Hutu insurgents in 1972 crossed into Southern 
Burundi from neighboring Tanzania and systematically persecuted the Tutsis. The 
insurrection resulted in the death of between 2,000 and 3,000 Tutsi people. The 
incursion was met by a brutal retalation from the Burundi army, which did not 
discriminate between Hutu rebels and civilians between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus 
were killed. An estimated 150,000 fled the country and many to neighbouring 
Rwanda and Tanzania. The violence and oppression has since been described as 
reaching genocide levels (Swenson, 2008). 
 
Another wave of violence was triggered this time in the North of the country as a 
result of President Buyoya‟s seizure of power in 1987 and the continued repression of 
the Hutus population. This led to retaliation on the side of the Hutu in which a number 
of Tutsis were killed. The military response (dominated by the Tutsis) cost 
approximately 20,000 Hutus their lives. Once again many people fled the country. 
The refugees‟ camps provided a convenient platform for the Hutu radicalism and 
future uprisings (Swenson 2008; Boshoff, Very and Rantenbach, 2010; Rodt, 2011). 
 
The most recent violent conflict occurred shortly after the introduction of a multi-
party system in Burundi in 1992. The new system orchestrated the ground for the 
election of the first democratic Hutu president Ndadaye Melchior and a parliament 
dominated by the Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU).  In October 
1993, President Melchior was assassinated. This culminated in the reprisal attacks on 
the Tutsis across the country, which in turn sparked retaliation against the Hutus by 
the Tutsi-dominated armed forces. Soon after Melchior‟s successor Hutu President 
Cyprian Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana were killed when 
their plane was shut down in Kigali, the circumstances that led to their death are still 
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being disputed. Another Hutu, Sylvester Ntibantunganya, became president of 
Burundi in October 1994. However, in a matter of months, the mainly Tutsi Union for 
National Progress (UPRONA) withdrew from parliament, leading to a spark of new 
wave of violence. An estimated 300,000 people most of them civilians were killed 
(Boshoff, Very and Rantenbach, 2010; Rodt, 2011). 
 
 Various attempts to restore peace to the region have been unsuccessful. The current 
political situation in Burundi cannot be said to be stable. The country‟s democratic 
transition is under threat as a result of the opposition‟s   withdrawal from political 
dialogue after its defeat in the 2010 elections. There have been recent clashes between 
the security forces and unidentified around groups in the west of the country 
(International Crisis Group (ICG), 2011). 
 
From the analysis of Burundi conflicts, it is necessary to stress the fact that while it is 
similar to that of Rwanda, there are noticeable differences. In the case of Rwanda, the 
Hutus that constituted majority in the country used their numerical strength to wrestle 
power from the Tutsis minority through democratic means before embarking on mass 
killing of the Tutsis. In the case of Burundi, the Tutsis minority dominated the 
military and they used their military advantage to repress and take over government. 
The reaction of the Hutus that constituted majority to Tutsis repression led to the 
masscare of some Tutsis. The Tutsis with their military might in tow retaliated and 
this resulted in large scale killings of the Hutus by the military dominated Tutsis. 
 
From the discussion of Burundi conflictst as well as in Sudan, Liberia and Rwanda it 
can be posited that central to the various conflicts is the question of control of state 
power and the role played by competing elites in power game. 
 
3.5 Angola Crisis 
Angola armed conflict is traceable to the legacies of colonialism which started with 
the arrival of Portuguese in 1550. Deep-rooted and institutionalized animosities based 
on class, race and politicized ethnicity remain at the heart of this conflict. The 
Ovimbundu making up more than 45 per cent of the Angola population together with 
other peoples in the central highlands are pitted against the assimilated Kimbundu (i.e 
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assimilados) and the mixed race (i.e mestico) peoples, who reside in the coastal areas 
of the county around Luanda, the Angola capital (Nasher, 2000). 
 
In 1956 Mestico and Assimilado intellectuals from the coastal cities founded the 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MFLA) in order to secure the release of their 
colleagues at that time imprisoned by Portuguese colonialists. Originally the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was formally known as the Union of the 
People of Angola (UPA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 
was founded in 1961. At the time it launched a violent armed uprising in order to 
expel the Portuguese, Mestico and Assimilado people from the northern areas of 
Angola. The Ovimbundu and other central highland peoples, on other hand, formed 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in 1966. UNITA 
was, among other things, also formed as an alternative to the dominance of MPLA by 
Mestico and Assimilado intellectuals and the FNLA by Kikongo-speaking 
Northerners (Nasher, 2000). 
  
Angola‟s civil war began three months after independence from Portuguese rule in 
1975, and lasted until the death of the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi  in 2002 (Aleisha 
and David, 2005). Angola got its independence from Portuguse colonialists on 
November 11, 1975 when the ex-colonial power terminated her colonial rule abruptly 
in the country. The military coup d‟etat against the Mercello Caetano government in 
Portugal on April 26, 1974 aided the demise of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola. 
Regrettably, Portugal failed to hand over power smoothly to any of the three Angola 
Liberation Movements – MPLA, UNITA / FLNA. Portuguese objective was probably 
to cause confusion among the Angola Liberation Movement after its departure. 
Portuguese sudden exit and proclamation of independence in Angola was followed by 
power struggle, tense rivalry and competition among Angola‟s Liberation Movements 
(Adeyemo, 2000). 
 
The later agreed upon transitional government that was to incorporate the three parties 
quickly crumbled due to widely different political ideologies, leaving the MPLA in 
central of the capital and regulating the FNLA and UNITA to the status of rebel 
insurgents in the hinterlands. This practical structure was maintained throughout the 
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period of the civil war, with the MPLA and UNITA acting as key opposition groups 
(Aleisha and David, 2005). 
 
It is necessary to state that each of the liberalization movements aligned itself with 
one or two major powers. For instance, the MPLA led by Augustino Neto was aided 
principally by Cuba and the former Soviet Union, while the FLNA led by Holden 
Roberto received assistance from Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and 
the USA through the CIA; and theUNITA led by Jones Savimbi received America 
and South Africa support because of their aversion to communism or Marxism. The 
MPLA government in Angola was not recognised by the America government until 
Clinton administration, on 19 May 1993 by the Clinton administration when it 
announced Angola led by Jonas Savimbi (Adeyemo, 2000). 
UNITA had earlier rejected the results of the September 1991 elections which the 
Clinton administration strongly believed reflected the views of the majority of Angola 
people (Adeyemo, 2000). 
 
Malaquias (undated) had linked the Angola war to “Resource War”. The elite of the 
two warring parties MPLA and UNITA – have used the country‟s vast oil and 
diamond resources to advance their political and economic interests while majority of 
the people live in miserable conditions. This view however accurate failed to take into 
consideration the important underlying causes of the conflict. Angola‟s conflict was 
also the result of the reluctance of the dominant political-military force to share power 
and wealth within an inclusive multi-ethnic and multi-racial political system. One 
cannot also ignore the colonial factor in the conflict. This is because by forcibly 
binding different ethnic groups into one centrally administered territory, colonial rule 
inevitably led to the politicization of ethnicity as different ethnic groups recoursed to 
primordial construct for cultural, if not political and self preservation. 
 
The stance above authenticates the facts that, Angola conflicts is smacked of political 
inter play among the various movements in the country in their struggle for power. 
Thus, inability to share power and wealth within an inclusive multi-ethnic racial 
political system culminated in the recourse to ethnic politics as a tool for self 
preservation. 
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From the analyses of the various conflicts above, it can be deduced that although 
conflicts in Africa can be said to be a combustible interplay of political, colonial and 
at times socio-economic factors, politics seems to be the prime factor in almost all the 
conflicts. Analyses of the the various conflicts reveal the primacy of political power 
as the neuclus of the various conflicts as almost all of them centered on power-
sharing. At the background of the various violent conflicts are the elite manipulating 
and mobilizing various groups to attain their selfish political ends. It is necessary to 
add that democratization which was part of the decolonization process has been a 
great burden to Africa. This is because the zero-sum character of politics no doubt 
sharpened the nature of group conflicts. Group in government is perceived as a gain to 
its members. This is because having access to power guarantees access to public 
resources; whereas for the out-group this is tantamount to a loss and almost complete 
denial of this share. The frustration that often occasioned being edged out in power 
game generates aggressive and violent behaviour.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA 
One of the major problems threatening the peace of the Nigerian state is the recurring 
communal/sub-ethnic conflicts. It appears as if there is no geopolitical zone without 
one or more communal flashpoints. The implications of this condition may be far 
reaching than can be imagined.This lends credence to the assertion credited to 
Stavenhagen (cited in Akanji, 2005:1) “whatever it cause, an intra-state conflicts, if it 
continues, lead eventually to the disintegration of the state”. This section examined 
some of the communal conflicts in Nigeria. One of these communal conflicts is the 
Aguleri and Umuleri conflicts in Anambra State. 
 
4.1 Aguleri-Umuleri Conflict 
Ibeanu (2003) contends that Aguleri-Umuleri conflict is unique in the sense that the 
two communities belong to the same ethnic group (Igbo) and to the same clan (Eri). 
They equally belong to the same state Anambra, and the same Local Government 
Area- Anambra East. In addition: 
Aguleri-Umuleri conflict focuses attention on intra-ethnic 
conflicts, which have not received adequate attention among 
research scholars of communal conflicts in Nigeria. Consequently, 
sub-ethnic identity has not featured very much in the study of 
ethnicity in Nigeria. Yet, such identity could become a strong basis 
for political mobilization and ferocious communal conflicts 
(Ibeanu, 2003:172). 
  
In summary, a historical excursion into Aguleri-Umuleri conflict reveals that the 
struggle for the ownership of Otucha, a beach along River Anambra was the major 
cause of the conflict. The coming and activities of Europeans in the area transformed 
the economic value of land and social relations among communities that had used 
land in common till then. Thus, competition either to sell or lease land for profit to 
Levantine organizations, instead for farming and other communal purposes, became 
the primary objective behind land property. 
 
4.2 Ife-Modakeke Conflicts 
Local conflicts can also take inter-community dimension like the Ife Modakeke in 
Osun State, Tiv- Jukun in Taraba State, and Bassa- Egbura conflict in Nasarawa State. 
Some scholars argue that the oldest intra-ethnic conflict in Nigeria is the Ife-
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Modakeke conflict. It has been going on for more than a century (Aguda, 1994; 
Albert, 1999; Agbe, 2001; Toriola, 2001 and Asiyanbola, 2007).  In the empirical 
study conducted by Asiyanbola, (2007), the researcher contends that the causes of the 
crisis are many and varied; these are cultural identity, economic and politics.  
 
However, from the view of Babajimi (2003) both communities have their own reasons 
for the conflict. The Modakekes, on the one hand, have identified five major ones. 
These are: non-recognition of Modakeke as a separate town; relocation of the 
Headquarters of the Ife East Local Government to Oke-Ogbo in Ile-Ife; the use of 
derogatory language against Modakeke such as “Oyo pe”; forceful ejection of 
Modakeke from their village and the confiscation of their farmlands by the Ifes; 
nonpayment of salaries to Ogunsua and his chiefs since 1997. The Ife, on the other 
hand, has identified seven major causes of the conflict. These are: non-recognition of 
Oluaye, the Ooni of Ife by the Modakekes as the supreme and paramount ruler of Ife 
land; the killing of Ife landlords by Modakekes and forceful acquisition of their land 
coupled with annexation of land that does not belong to them; arrogating undue 
authority to Baale of Modakeke by proclaiming him as an Oba and his appointment of 
Baales in Ife villages; refusal to pay tribute (isakole) by the Modakekes; daily radio 
propaganda, jingles, and advertisement most especially on Osun Radio suggesting that 
all Ife areas belong to Modakeke; removal of “Ife” inscriptions from the various sign 
posts or boards in Modakeke; some highly placed individuals such as Chief Arisekola 
Alao and Alafin of Oyo as backers of Modakeke (Babajimi, 2003). 
 
There is a catalogue of wars between the Ifes and Modakekes: seven major wars- 
1835-1849, 1882-1909, 1946-1949, 1981, 1983, 1997-1998 and 2000. The conflict is 
depicted as a conflict between the Ife “landlords” and the Modakeke 
“strangers/tenants”. The one of year 2000 caused over 2000 deaths and left several 
injured. Several hundreds of people were shot, slaughtered or lynched; several houses 
and property were destroyed (Asiyanbola, 2007). 
 
Analyzing the political dimension of Ife-Modakeke conflicts, Akanji (2005) noted 
that the creation of local governments areas in 1981 by the Oyo state House of 
Assembly in which the only one requested by the Modakeke in Oyo state was the only 
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one not honoured by the state government generated hostility between the two groups. 
The Modakeke saw the trifling of their aspiration as nothing but a day light robbery. 
They saw the territorial restructuring process as a politicization policy hence, it served 
as the purveyor of communal conflicts and acrimony. One of the major implications 
of the interference of the political class in the communal conflict was that it portrayed 
it as another extension of the already polarized politics in Yorubaland. It is necessary 
to state that politics in Yorubaland was essentially constructed along two schools of 
thoughts: the Awoist and the anti-Awoist schools of thought. While the Awoist 
believed in and championed welfariest politics of chief Awolowo their mentor, the 
anti-Awoist, saw Awolowo politics as nothing but politics of vengeance orchestrated 
to exclude Oyo-Yoruba from the main stream of Yoruba Politics. To some Yoruba 
politicians, many staunch and core members of the Awoist camp in Yorubaand were 
non Oyo-Yoruba from communities such as Ekiti, Ondo, Ijesha, Ife, Egba, and Ijebu 
along side some Oyo-Yoruba who were oblivious of the “real” Awoist agenda but 
only aligned with the school of thought simply for its ideological appeal.  
 
 On the other hand the anti-Awoist camp was made up majorly of Oyo-Yoruba 
people, that is, people from Ibadan, Ogbomoso, Modakeke and other communities 
that aligned with Ibadan during the Kiriji war. It was believed that, it was this position 
that informed Chief Obafemi Awolowo opposition to the splitting of Ile-Ife in an 
attempt to create a local government for Modakeke in 1958 and again in 1981. 
 
However, there was a dramatic twist of event in 1983 when chief Omololu Olunloyo 
NPN-led government of Oyo State created a local government area with Modakeke as 
the headquarters. It was believed that this was done as a way of rewarding the 
Modakeke for their massive support for the NPN in wrestling power from the UPN 
government in the state (Akanji, 2005). The Ife-Modakeke led to wanton destruction 
of lives and property. We now look at the Tiv-Junkun conflict. 
 
4.3 Tiv-Jukun Conflicts 
Best, Idyorough and Shehu, (2001) have given a detailed analysis of conflict between 
the Tiv and Jukun. The analysis in this section is based on the study conducted by the 
aforementioned scholars. Land, traditional rulership, political authority, fear of 
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domination and marginalization are factors responsible for the conflict. The conflict 
burst out in 1990 and lasted for two years. The dead toll was quite worrisome and 
destruction of property was quite alarming. The conflict dealt a heavy blow on 
Wukari Local Government and the memory may remain for a long time. 
 
The Tiv-Jukun conflict appears to be the most violent and well organized ever 
witnessed in Nigerian history apart from the civil war. It was characterized by 
barbarity and atrocities that beat human imaginations. Both side employed heartless 
methods in killing their victims. Road blocks were mounted by each side and after 
identifying “enemies” they were slaughtered or shot in nearby bush or beheaded. At 
times victims were set ablaze. Pregnant women had their wombs cut open with knives 
and foetus removed and put on their dead mothers‟ breasts. No data existed about the 
exact figure of casualties in this imbroglio. Looting of property and foodstuffs by 
opportunists also characterized the conflict. The conflict had political, economic and 
psychological dimension.  
 
The Jukun claimed that the Tiv met the Jukun at their present locations which they 
dominated for centuries in the ancient Kwararafa Empire. The Tiv were said to have 
sought their permission before establishing their earliest settlements. They claimed to 
have taught the Tiv who came in hunger for land how to wear cloth and the concept of 
rulership and that they were initially used as messengers. The Tiv seemed not to agree 
with this. They believed they were co-landlords and not squatters for some obvious 
reasons. They said they were there before the Jukun. 
 
The political dimension of the conflicts manifested in the form of political 
participation in and control of Wukari Local Government Council ditto political 
appointments as well as other resources. Closely related to this is the Tiv desire for 
membership of the Wukari Traditional Council (WTC) given their numerical strength 
coupled with the fact that they do not regard theselves as strangers in the land. It is 
important to stress at this juncture that both groups sought to use control of the Local 
Government Council as an instrument to achieve other broader goals like employment 
of group members in the council. 
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Another factor hinges on the siting of government projects. The Tiv accused the 
Jukun of using the Wukari Local Government and other levels of government as 
machinery to deny them access to modern government facilities in areas dominated by 
the Tiv. Opinions are divided as regards land factor in the conflict. While most Jukun 
believed that land was the primary cause of the conflict, most Tiv were of the view 
that land only served as a vent for political and other forms of conflict.  
The next on the list is the Egbura-Bassa communal conflict in Nassarawa State. 
 
4.4 Egbura-Bassa Conflicts 
The Egbura and Bassa communities are found in Toto and Doma Local Government 
Areas of Nassarawa state. The Bassa and Egbura have been living together for long. 
The Egbura claim that the Bassa are settlers. The Egbura are found in north and east 
of the confluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers. They are, therefore, found in Kogi, 
Edo, Nassarawa, Niger and the FCT. The Bassa who claim ownership of the area are 
domiciled also in the FCT, Niger and Kogi. But principally, they are found in Toto 
Local Government Area (LGA) of Nassarawa State and Koton-Karfe and Bassa Local 
Government Areas in Kogi State. In Kogi, they are usually called Egbura-Koto and 
Bassa-Kwomu. Any time conflict erupts between the two groups in Nassarawa State it 
usually spills into  their kith and kin communities in Kogi State, and vice versa 
(Sanda, 2003). 
 
Conflict between the two groups first broke out in 1986 and there have been several 
conflicts till 1998. In 1986 as a result of the death of the Ohinoyi of Toto there was 
serious agitation for the change of title of the traditional head of Toto by other ethnic 
groups who felt marginalized in the traditional arrangement. They also wanted the 
title to be rotated among the ethnic groups. The bone of contention was land 
ownership; other factors can be said to be accompanying. The Bassa claim ownership 
of the land. They felt shortchanged by the Egbura aided by government in the creation 
of kingdom. When the area was under former Plateau state government before it was 
carved out to be part of the present Nassarawa State, the fomer had created two 
chiefdoms for Egbira without creating any one for Bassa and Gbagyi. The conflict 
between the two groups has resulted in killings. For example in 1987 disagreement 
over the appointment of an Ebgura man to the post of Sarkin Kasuwa ( Head of 
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Market) to succeed  another Egbira man who died (because Bassa people felt that the 
Egbura man should be succeeded by his deputy who was a Bassa man) led to a bloody 
battle in which seventy-two (72) people lost their lives.  1997/98 marked the bloodiest 
clash between the two groups. Sophisticated weapons and mercenaries were used. 
Over three thousand people were killed, more than hundred thousand (100,000) 
Basssas were displaced and forced to be refugees in at least six states (Oyo, Kwara, 
Niger, Kogi, Ondo and Federal Capital territory) (Sanda, 2003).  
It is neccasr to state that one can also see the hand of politics in the communal 
conflict. 
 
4.5 Itsekiri-Urhobo Conflicts 
Other examples of such local conflicts include; the Itsekiri and Urhobo in Warri in 
Nigeria, Niger Delta region. The conflict in Warri involved three major ethnic groups-
Urhobos, Ijaws and Itshekiris. Oromareghake and Akpotor (2005) in analyzing the 
Warri crisis disprove the integrative model usually associated with urbanization. This 
has to do with the conception that  increasing urbanization can bring about the 
transformation of the relationship between different ethnic groups from a mere 
association to an integrated society based on organic solidarity, cemented by 
increased inter-dependence and harmonization of shared values and goals. This theory 
has been punctured as it fails to explain the Warri case. Rather than the expected 
evolutionary change that should bring about ethnic integration and peaceful co-
existence, what is in vogue in Warri is a heightened awareness of ethnic identity. Put 
differently despite many years of association that have resulted in inter-ethnic 
marriages and functional exchanges, entrenchment of ancient identities and cultural 
boundaries remains as far as inter-ethnic relations in Warri are concerned. 
 
The eccentricity of the Warri situation is traceable to the pattern of settlement at the 
time of migration of different ethnic groups into the town. As at the time of settlement 
rather than mix together, each of the ethnic group settled in a separate area which may 
be by their own choice or dictated by those that gave them right to settle there. With 
the passage of time, this settlement became exclusive domains of the ethnic groups in 
question. This pattern of settlement made their original cultural root to take deeper 
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root. In a nutshell, the incessant violent conflict in Warri is the result of a complex 
mix of historical development and contemporary political and sociological factors. 
 
In clear terms, the causes of conflict in the three ethnic groups according to 
Oromareghake and Akpotor (2005) hinge on goals and means incompatibilities, 
varying from material resources to positional goods involving: dispute over ownership 
of Warri land and corresponding “settler” designation for “migrants”; suzerainty of 
the Olu of Warri. The Urhobos claim that they are the original owners and settlers in 
Warri, and that they only lease land to Itshekiri people to farm since they had no dry 
land to farm as they were occupying swampy areas of Delta. The Urhobos perceived 
Itshekiris as migrants whom they assisted to overcome their occupational challenge at 
a particular point in time in the history of their existence by leasing land to them but 
when their leasing period was over they refused to hand over . Rather they cashed in 
on the privilege position granted them by the colonial masters to engage in dispute 
with Urhobo over the ownership of Warri. The Urhobo also argued that Ode-Itshekiri 
is the ancestral home of the Itshekiris which they often refer to as “big Warri” while 
Warri town the area in contest they call small Warri. The Urhobos contend that how 
the Itshekiris could leave big Warri and make small Warri the seat of their traditional 
ruler if not because of social and economic advantage associated with small Warri. 
They argued that ancestral home of the people should be the seat of their traditional 
ruler (Equavoen, 2003). 
 
Amongst the Urhobos there seems to be another version of the origin of the conflict. 
To some Urhobos according to Equavoen (2003), the conflict in Warri essentially is 
concerned with just a particular family lineage and Itshekiris. Those that subscribed to 
this school of thought believe that the family in question sold the disputed area long 
time ago to the Itshekiris unknowingly of the implications of their action. There after, 
the oil boom and the subsequent benefits associated with the position of Warri being 
central in an area blessed with many oil wells, inevitably resulted in the development 
of infrastructure and the likes, hence the quest and tussle of owner of area became a 
major crisis. 
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The Itshekiris, on the other hand claimed the ownership of Warri town. Their 
argument is that they are the original occupants of both the small and big Warri and 
that the area in contest was given by them to their slaves (the Urhobos) to farm since 
they were mainly fishermen and middlemen traders and that the distinction between 
big and small Warri was made because the river that separate the community into two. 
As the place developed with the activities of oil companies, a new dimension was 
introduced into the conflict. The ijaws, who also occupy the place side-by-side with 
the Urhobos and Itshekiris complained of their marginalization and as such demanded 
for their own local government council so as to give them recognition.  Thus, this 
twist of event introduced a new dimension in the conflict as it now pitched the Ijaws 
against Itshekiris in that zone. The resultant effect is that it exacerbated the already 
complex situation. 
 
 The conflict between these two groups started when the headquarters of Warri South 
Local Government area was sited in Ogbe-Ijo, an enclave of the Ijaws. The Itshekiri 
protested that they were the one that made a request for creation of new local 
government area and that the the headquarters of the new local government should be 
in Ogidigben, an area predominantly occupied by the Itshekiris. They argued further 
that the gazette announcing the local government creation named Ogidigben as the 
local government headquarters not Ogbe-Ijaw. The mix-up was attributed to the then 
military administrator of Delta state, Col. David Dung. An attempt to correct the mix-
up culminated in mayhem leading to killing of people and burning of houses. The 
Urhobos capitalized on their standing grievances against Itshekiri thereby, given the 
Ijaws tacit support that further widened the conflict. While the mayhem lasted the 
elites in the three communities were accused of supplying arms and ammunitions to 
the youths in their respective communities which led to escalation of violent conflict 
in the region (Equavoen, 2003). 
 
4.6 Ugep-Idomi Conflicts 
Local conflict can also be in form of cultural conflict like the conflict between Ugep 
and Idomi in Cross River State. In analyzing the Ugep-Idomi conflict. Obono (2001) 
argues that the conflict could be explained within the context of the warring character 
of the people and their strong ties to land existing in juxtaposition with population 
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increase. In a sense, the aurthor posits that the conflict has cultural and demography 
dimensions. The author also sees double-unilateral descent principles (linguistic and 
cultural homogeneity) as a factor responsible for mobilization for war. The dispersed 
nature of settlemet and the potency of matriclan in the realm of ritual provide an 
important key to war mobilization. Because of the rule of exogamy in vogue, together 
with the co-residential status of the patriclan, the anguish concomitant with the killing 
of its member is localized. Conversely, with respect to the matriclan a similar muder 
is capable of affecting numerous families concurrently and this makes mobilization of 
sentiments a lot easier unlike a thorough-going society of patrilineal. Matrilineal 
descent necessary results in double unilineal society. The natural sentiment or passion 
matrilineal descent engenders makes mobilization for war very swift. In fact, many 
factors, remote and immediate, are responsible for frequent crisis at the border 
between Udomi and Ugep.   
 
Quite often, the crisis takes the form of “hidden fight” i.e clandestine murders 
between the warring parties long after formal hostilities have ended. In a nutshell, the 
remote causes of the Ugep-Idomi war according to Obono (2001) included the long 
standing issue of undefined borders between the communities. For one, the rapid 
population expansion in the region brought about land scarcity. In order to respond to 
pressure on residential space a segment of patriclan detached itself by migrating to 
“free lands” belonging to the patriclan. The tendency for expansion through farming 
and building of hamlets in the context of ill defined boundaries between the Ugep and 
Idomi whom they share boundary with in the South east was the major cause of the 
conflict. In addition, simmering thoughts of vengeance over the previous murder of 
the patrikin or matrikin that went unavenged also contributed to tendency to wage 
war. This is because historically, deaths of innocent farmers usually triggered so much 
animosity in the families of the victims towards the offenders that the question of 
retaliation was hardly subjected to debate it was merely a question of time. Such 
families always appear ready to cash in on any crisis in a bid to seek “justifiable” 
revenge. This is often done through managing or mismanaging information and 
propaganda to maximum effect. 
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 Other issue that exacerbated the conflicts includes a largely belligerent attitude by a 
section of the people whose faith in the power of black magic to make them invincible 
in war. While the conflict lasted, the Ugep is believed to invoke the aid of the war 
deity Ojilikpotor. Ojilikpotor is a society that has all its functions connected with 
incantations and the use of herbs and roots. The priest of this cult produced 
concoctions that the worriors swallowed which provided immunity for gunshots and 
matchets cuts.The immediate factors for the conflict included claims and counter-
claims of kidnappings and the killings of innocent indigenes (mostly farmers) in the 
area like Obol (Chief) Ebri Obla, Ete Onun Obeten and Madam Ojekn Ejeng. It 
appeared the killing of Obol who was seen as a helpless old man and at the same time 
the head of a military constituency was the most painful to the Ugep. Aside the 
aforementioned factors discussed above, other factors included violation of the terms 
of peace moves earlier initiated by the communities over the disputed area, 
molestation of persons and uprooting of farm products were other factors that gave 
fillip to the conflict. Obono concluded that the ethnographic setting is very crucial to 
understanding the interplay of political, geographical, psychological, demographic 
and economic factors combine to make war inevitable between Yakurs and Idomi. 
 
At other time, conflict could take the form of religious differences or between 
different religious groups. The most glaring examples of such conflicts are between 
Christians and Moslems in northern Nigeria. This manifested in the religious crisis in 
Kano, Kaduna and Plateau States in Nigeria, conflict between Hindus and Moslems in 
India, Jews and Moslems in Israel. Local conflicts are often organized along ethnic or 
lineage lines, and leaders organized around themes of group vulnerability and 
demonization of other group(s). According to Brinks (1995) local conflicts are often 
caused by competition over access to scarce resources like water, land, and cattle. One 
can also add that even at local level contest for social and political positions can result 
in conflict. 
Having analysed cases of communal conflict in Nigeria it is pertinent at this juncture 
to take a look at the history of Ebiraland our case study. 
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4.7 The Ebira Tao 
As earlier mentioned the Ebira who constitute the focus of this study are people of 
Okene, Okehi, Adavi and Ajaokuta Local Government Areas of Kogi state with a 
total population of 844,774 people (The National Population Commission, 2006). 
They are collectively called Ebira Tao. The word “Ebira” refers to the people 
themselves, their language and geographical location. The Ebira Tao occupy the hilly 
stretch of land Southwest of the Niger-Benue confluence area and share boundaries as 
stated before to the South with the Bassange, Bassa Kwomo and Igala; to the North 
and East is the Nassarawa Emirate, to the West are various Nupe speaking groups of 
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Kakanda, Eggan, Kupa and Nupe of Bida Emirate and to the South-West are the Bini, 
yoruba-speaking people of Akoko, Owe and Ijumu. 
 
Sani (1993) observed that attempts to trace the actual origin of Ebiras have not been 
easy. The early works in this direction are full of conflicting claims and 
contradictions. Scholars however agree that the various groups, who collectively 
constitute the Ebira race, are said to have migrated at different times before the First 
World War. According to Sani (1999) Ebiras along with their Jukuns brothers 
originally migrated from Egypt and Sudan Regions. While other accounts according 
to local legend trace their origin to Yemen in the Middle East from where they settled 
in the Kwararafa kingdom with other groups such as Jukun, Idoma, Tiv, Angas, Igala 
and Ebira ethnic groups (Salami 2002; Sani 1997; Enesi, 1996) and finally settled at 
Opete before they spread around the surrounding hills of Opete; that was after 
sojourning in Wukari, Apoto and Idah (Tenuche 2002). It is believe that, the leader of 
Ebira group settled at Opete while his five sons settled in groups around Opete. These 
areas of settlement include Eika, Okehi, Adavi, Okengwe and Ihima (Tenuche, 2002). 
 
The account of Husaini (2009) is slightly different from the above. Husaini contends 
that the Egbira, now variously referred to as Egbira, Ebira or Igbira trace their origin 
from Bira, a city or territory in the upper Gongola valley down the middle and the 
lower Benue river region in the old kwararafa kingdom. In their migratory movements 
they emerged as a distinct people in the middle Benue region in the area now 
occupied by the Tiv and the Idoma and it is in these areas they identified themselves, 
and were recognized as people from Bira, hence they are now called Ebira, Egbira or 
Igbirra. In the course of their movements they intermingled with other peoples 
particularly the Akpoto, acquiring their cultures and traditions. Like many other 
peoples the (Igbirra) made their migration downward movements to Igaland and the 
consequent upwards movements to their present abodes in Koton-Karfi, Toto and 
Umaisha areas while the Ebira and Igarra crossed the Niger to their present abodes in 
Ebiraland and Igarra areas. Another account documented by Audu (2009) about the 
origin of Ebira establishes that Ebira historical development started with their 
migrations across the Niger at Itobe to the right bank of the Niger around the present 
site of Ajaokuta often known as Ebira-Opete (Old Ebira) around 18th Century. The 
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migration was premised on succession dispute. It was their desire to rid off Attah‟s 
political influence. In Ebira Opete they found small settlements in or around Upake, 
Ochobane, Ohuruku, Ohuenene, Ogodo, Obangede and so on. From Opete they 
moved gradually in families, lineages and in clans to the hills of Okehi, Upai and 
Eikoku with neigbours as Anowe, (owe Yoruba) Amuna, Anoso (Akoko-Edo group) 
Anivasa (Bassa Nge) and so on. The first settlements in Ebira present location include 
Eikaoku, Okengwen, Okehi, Ukpai, Ukpake, Okekere, and Obangede. They further 
spread inland to locations like Ihima, Okene, Kuroko, Ipaku, and Nagazi.  
 
Looking at the various claims of the origin and migration of Ebira people, there is 
clear indication that most of these stories are shrouded in myths which tend to obscure 
the historical process.  Audu (2009) argues that the idea that Ebira was part of the 
groups that founded the Kwararafa confederacy lacks concrete evidence to actually 
prove this fact. This may not be unconnected with the fact that memories of 
developments affecting the people in this period are very scanty as a result of its 
remoteness. 
 
Be it as it may, it is apparent from the studies above that the people (Ebira Tao) at one 
time or the other has been associated with the Jukun, Idoma and Igala, to mention just 
a few. From the above it can be seen from the submission of scholars that the history 
of Ebira cannot be told without making reference to the settlements around the Niger-
Benue trough. This position is in line with the argument of Ohiare (1988) who 
submits that recent in depth research indicates that the Ebira have been part and parcel 
of what is now generally known as central Nigeria since 4000 BC.  In summary, there 
exists the Ebira Tao or Ebira Ehi (which is our focus of study) located in Kogi State; 
the Ebira Koto also in Kogi State; the Ebira Agatu in Benue State; Ebira Umaisha and 
the Ebira Oje or Ebira Toto in Benue State (Sani, 1997; Jibo et al, 2001; Tenuche 
2002). The pre-colonial economy of Ebiraland was based on agriculture, land tenure, 
iron technology, trade and commerce, animal husbandry among others. Production 
was basically geared towards meeting the subsistence need of the family as well as for 
exchange. Some of the food crops cultivated in Ebiraland included yam (Enu), 
cassava (Echuka), maize (Apapa), water yam (Evina), Guinea corn (Aku), cocoyam 
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(Ikoko), beans (Eza) to mention just a few. Apart from the above they equally 
engaged in fishing (Audu, 2009). 
 
4.7.1 Pre-colonial Political Structure in Ebiraland 
Pre-colonial political structure in Ebiraland was characterized by the existence of 
units of settlements called Ohueje (homestead). Each of the homesteads is made up of 
a man, his wife or wives, brothers, children and those entrusted to such a man by his 
relatives collectively living in the same compound with the eldest surviving male 
occupying the headship of the family (Audu, 2009). Next was the Ovovu which was 
the patrilineal or extended family stead. This is consisted of more than one Ohueje. 
Literally, Ovovu simply denotes gate leading to Ohueje. People that belong to this 
extended family stead might include relations of patrilineal and matrilineal. It is 
essential to note that the stead was exclusively reserved for those related by blood 
through paternal side. However, there are ocassions one may find people from 
maternal side residing in this stead although by right of inheritance they did not 
belong to that stead as they derived their inheritance from their fathers (Audu, 2009). 
This submission is contrary to that of Okene (2000) who postulated that Ovovu (outer 
compound) was the exclusive use of other people under the custody of the family. 
These include the family slaves, war or famine refugees on asylum and family 
labourers. The oldest surviving male was the head of this extended family. Indeed, he 
personified the cultural and economic heritages as he serves as the representative of 
the ancestors in the family. 
 
The third stage was the Abara (kindred). Audu (2009) establishes that Abara was 
brought about as a result of fear of invasion and expansion in population as well as 
observance of the same religious taboos among others. Abara is a collection of two or 
more Ovovu. Decisions are reached after due consultation with the various family 
heads of the lineage or kindreds. The head of Abara was the oldest surviving male 
child who was vested with prerogatives of economic and political lives of the lineage. 
The lineage land and relics were vested on him and the sylvan produce of the lineage 
were gathered in his palace annually for distribution to the various member families 
based on the ancestral law of the age grade. Examples of Abara that still survive till 
date include Etumi, Adovosi, Egiri and Ogagu (Okene, 2000).   
 
 
 
173 
 
 
Following closely the Abara was the clan, Iresu. It was the largest group of family 
settlement in Ebiraland. A combination of more than two Abara made up Iresu. It was 
in short the main political institution in the area. In Ebira language clan means Ezi 
symbolizing children which was an indication of the descent from a common ancestor 
through the male child (Audu, 2009). Husaini (2009) observed that some clans are 
classified as pioneer clans, while others were old or new. As a result of which 
lineages emerged one after the other. The pioneer clans existed before migration 
especially clans which settled on the hills of Upai, Okehi and Eikoku, founding 
villages on the land acquired. Examples of these clans were the Okovi, the Agada, the 
Akuta and the Ogu of Okengwen clan group. Others were Anemani, Ogu and 
Anohueta of Ihima, to name just a few.  
 
The combination of all these units or settlements is called Ekura which was the basic 
unit and the clan group representing the land area (Ete) as the highest unit. Pre-
colonial political system in Ebiraland was a class society. It was indeed government 
of the elders (gerontocracy). This is because within the village (Ekura) were 
households in which elders were household heads, the lineage heads and the chiefs 
including the powerful and wealthy individuals in the village. The head of each 
household (Ada-rehi) administered their respective households, performed duties 
connected with resolution of disputes in the family, ritual matter and other 
commitments assigned to them. Ekura (clan group) was administered by village 
council the head of which must come from the most senior or oldest clan in the 
village. However, in a situation where the eldest clan had a weak position which 
rarely happen the clan that has the highest numerical strength might produce the head 
of village council (Husaini, 2009).  
 
Examples of the clan heads of the councils based on seniority of clan are the Ogbu-
Obanyi of Emani clan, the Ozumi of Ogu clan, and the Asema Upopuveta of Ihima, 
Okene, and Adavi respectively. There were times clan headship generated controversy 
which at times led to rotation among the pioneer clans. In Ihima, Eika, Adavi and 
Eganyi, the seniority of the clans hardly resulted in dispute because the headship had 
already been vested on the most senior clan but rotated among its components 
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lineages. This is quite different from that of Okengwen in which headship is rotated 
among the four clans, namely, the Ezi-Avi, the Ezi-Evine, the Ezi-Omavi and the Ezi-
Omoye, the first two representing the Agada group, while the last two represented the 
Okovi group of clans.  
 
Aside the aforementioned, the village council had some people in its membership, 
they include; the lineage head (Ozoku-Iresu), the village powerful and wealthy 
individuals (Ohu-ekura), and the lineage-priest (Ohinoyi-Iresu). At the land area (Ete) 
level, there was the council of Iregba consisted of the heads of clans, which made up 
the entire Ete. At the head of this council were important offices of the Ohi-ekura and 
the Ohinoyi-ete. The Ohinoyi-ete was the chief priest of etc (Husaini, 2009). The 
chief priest was the highest spiritual and socio-political head of clan-group (Okene, 
2000). The nomenclature of this position differs from one Ekura to another. For 
example in Adavi it was called Asema, in Ihima (Obobanyi), Okengwen (Ohindase), 
Eika (Adeika), Okehi (Ohiemeli) and Eganyi (Adogu) (Audu, 2009). The chief priest 
coordinated the activities of other functionaries in the settlement. Sensitive areas 
relating to capital punishment, war, abduction, sorcery, robbery and theft, arson, 
disputes over land and hunting rights were brought to the chief priest for adjudication 
(Audu, 2009). When there were inter-clan clashes the Ete council would intervene, 
although with limited political power and the intervention would be recognized and 
respected (Husini, 2009). 
 
4.7.2 Masquerade Festivals in Ebiraland 
There are different versions of the origin of masked performance culture in Ebiraland. 
According to Adinoyi-Ojo (1996), masquerade performance started shortly after Ebira 
settlements were founded. Ebira mythology traced the origin of masquerade 
performances to Ododo and Obaji, two fiercely competitive farmer-hunters who lived 
in Okehi and Eika towns. Their post-burial celebrations were marked with the raising 
of masked figures as an embodiment of their returned spirits and as a symbolic defeat 
of death. A year after that, Eika and Okehi commemoration of the event was marked 
with more masked figures. With the passage of time, it became a spectacle and 
acquired a definite pattern and structure, which graduated into a communal 
celebration of all Ebira ancestors. Thus, the masked figures multiplied. Ododo (2001) 
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version of the origin of Masquerade in Ebiraland is in Contrast with the above. The 
author argued that, generally, Ireba Eku (masquerade cult) formation was believed to 
have divine origin. That its formation was a divine instruction from God to check 
women excesses, aside serving as ancestor worship. Myth has it that there was a day 
God sent for man after creating man and woman as husband and wife. The man was 
too busy to honour the call. The man decided to send his wife as his representative. 
“God gave her Irakwo (an egg-like object that contains the secrets of life and has the 
capacity to manifest supernatural powers) for her husband”. Having discovered its 
potency, she decided to keep it for her use. It made her powerful, performing 
supernatural feats like turning into any animal and changing back to a human being. 
She could develop wings that could make her fly around in astral travels. She was 
enabled for all forms of mysterious transformations. This made her to be the envy of 
her husband. God had sympathy on the man by empowering him to create the Eku 
masquerade cult to counter the powers possessed by women. 
 
Another version Sani (1993) contends that Obaji and Ododo were the progenitors of 
Eku. These were two brothers who were in constant opposition to each other on 
account of contest for seniority. However, Obaji was always generally considered as 
the senior, which was very displeasing to Ododo. Legend has it that Obaji took ill one 
day and was about to die. His brother, Ododo, concluded a plan that he would not like 
Obaji to be his senior here on earth and again be his senior in the great beyond. When 
Obaji died, Ododo put on the costumes of an Eku and the women were persuaded to 
believe that Ododo had died and had risen. Thus, while Obaji became the senior of the 
living, Ododo became the senior in the great beyond.  
 
Some of the masquerades in Ebiraland include: “the eku ana ki ise” which fore-tells 
and heals; “eku-echichi”-cane wielding masked entertainers; the highly revered sac-
like “eku-oba” which opens the masking season; the eku-ananyi-eze which dances 
and thrills; the eku ahere, the farm-based rehearsal mask; the akatapa, the jester which 
pokes fun at people; and the eku-ahete, which clears and cleanses the way for all other 
performers (Adinoyi-Ojo, 1996). In fact, masked performances have become the most 
important calendrical event in the social life of Ebira people. There are three major 
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festivals specifically dedicated to masked performances every year. They are Ebe in 
March; Echeane in May or June; Ekuechi in late November or early December. 
 
Ebira people believe that eku has the power to cleanse the community of evil forces 
and impurities; Ebira culture either at school or state-sponsored cultural extravaganza 
is showcased through eku performance. At other time eku outing may be to 
commemorate historic events in Ebiraland like the end of a war, electoral success of 
favourite‟s sons and daughter of Ebiraland. It is also performed as part of the ritual to 
bring an end to national disasters like drought, locust invasion, floods, and fire 
(Adinoyi, 1996). However, as time went by, eku performance has become associated 
with violence. 
 
4.7.3 The British Conquest of Ebiraland 
The situation which finally culminated in the forceful occupation of Ebiraland in 1903 
by the British imperial power has long history which is beyond the scope of this work. 
However, before the forceful occupation of Ebiraland by the British, Ebira had 
successfully resisted between 1865 and 1880 the Sokoto Jihadists who sought to make 
them vassals of the Caliphate conglomerate (Okene 2008). Despite the stiff resistance 
put up by the Ebiras against the colonialist, the land eventually fell to British power as 
a result of superior fire power of the colonialist. Thus, the people could not match the 
alien maxim-guns. They realized the feebleness and inefficiency of weak weapons 
made of bows and arrows, matchets and cutlasses, even if poisoned, in the face of the 
colonialist superior arsenals and effective organization (Okene 2000). After the 
British took over Ebiraland, serious uprising against alien rule continued especially 
against the introduction of taxation until the transfer of divisional police headquarters 
from Kabba to Okene in 1916.  
 
When the British took over Ebiraland, they found a loose confederation of 5 clan-
groups, the Eika, the Okehi, the Adavi, the Okengwe, the Ihima, each running a divine 
form of traditional government (Husani, 2009). In an attempt to consolidate their 
victory in Ebiraland vis-à-vis the heterogeneity that was prevalent in the area, the 
British resident, Morgan acting on the advice of Malcom in 1904 recognized and 
appointed Attah Omadivi as the district head of Okene, Owuda Adidi of Eika, Opoh 
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of Obehira and Apata of Ihima (Audu, 2009).  However the appointment of Attah 
Omodivi as the Warrant Chief was not accepted because each District Head of Okene, 
Eike, Obehira and Ihima considered himself suitable for the British local agent. In 
spite of the resistance put up by the other district heads, the British preferred Attach 
Omadiil (Audu, 2009) because of what they described as “always being the most loyal 
to the government” (Okene, 2000: 32). But Ebira people in general saw Omadivi as a 
collaborator whom they remember today as the man who invited the British in 1913 to 
take over their land (Okene, 2000). Between 1913 and 1917, Attah Omadivi was 
virtually the white man, chief of Ebira (Audu 2009). 
 
Atta Omadivi death in 1917 gave room for the British to reorganize and restructure 
the Native Administration in Ebiraland. Having found out that the Ebira nation 
practiced a republican system epitomized by chieftaincy system, the British was 
poised to create an acceptable central leadership so as to be able to attain her indirect 
rule policy.  Ohindase Adano was appointed by the British colonial administration to 
the office of the late Omadivi. However, this choice was not accepted by chiefs of the 
remaining clan groups,  Obobanyin, Adeika and Asena of Ihima, Eika and Adavi 
respectively who felt that one of the clan group chief‟s was being imposed on them. It 
was therefore easy for the colonial government to find excuse, to dismiss him in 
November of the same year for what they termed administrative and judicial 
corruption (Okene, 2000). 
 
In November 1917, the British imposed Ibrahim Onoruoiza, later known as Attah 
Ibrahim, as the District Head of Ebira native Authority. Ibrahim after assuming the 
position, set out to implement the entire British ordinances, He put in place an 
organized native authority police which enable him to maintain peace, law and order. 
He merged existing courts in other districts of Ebiraland such as Ihima, Eganyi, 
Adani, Eika, Ogori and so on with that of Okene and presided over it. He re-organized 
the administrative structure of Ebira in line with the current dispensation. He 
constituted the council of chiefs in which preference were given to clan heads that 
were loyal to him. His dynamism, intelligence and effectiveness, led to his subsequent 
appointment by the British as the paramount ruler of Ebiraland (Audu, 2009). This 
was contrary to existing situation. Sani (1999) observed that the resentment of a single 
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central authority manifested and still manifest, itself in the republican life style and 
nature of the Ebiras as a people, wherever they are. Thus, no single clan chief is 
accepted to be superior to the other rank. They respect the calendar age differentia l 
wherever they meet for common purpose.  
 
The influence of Attah grew and there was much socio-economic development during 
his time. He ruled from 1917-1954. From the above account, the fact can be gleaned 
that colonial rule brought about central administration in Ebiraland. Attah Ibrahim 
was later promoted from a Third Class Chief to a Second Class Chief (Sani, 1999; 
Tenuche, 2002). However, Tenuche (2002) noted that the change in the colonial 
native administrative system in 1952 gave the opponets of Attah the opportunity to 
challenge his authority. This was because the Chief-in-Council system in operation 
which gave Atta tremendous power was replaced by the Chief and Council system. 
Thus, Atta no longer enjoyed veto power over Native Authority members who were 
now elected. 
 
The struggle over chieftaincy and local power structure according to Tenuche (2002, 
2009) has been one important basis for intra-ethnic conflicts in Ebiraland. After Attah 
abdicated the throne as the paramount ruler of Ebiraland, for two years, the Native 
Authority ruled the land as there was no laid down rules for appointing a paramount 
ruler. According to Abdul cited in Tenuche (2002), 368 representatives made up of 
elected councilors, ward heads and two representatives (which include clan heads), 
from the eight districts in Ebiraland were constituted into a committee to select a new 
paramount ruler for Ebiraland. Sani Omonori a leading opposition figure of Attah 
won 342 and was appointed Ohinoyi on June 1st 1956 (Audu, 2009). Ohida (2012) 
noted that the rules and processes for the appointment of a traditional ruler for 
Ebiraland is still contentious as a High Court in Nigeria in February 2009 set aside the 
appointment of Ado Ibrahim the current paramount ruler who took over the rulership 
of Ebiraland after the death of Sani Omonori in 1994. The court ruled that the 
procedure for his appointment was not valid 
(http://www.sunnewsonline/webpages/politics/2011/sept/14politi...).   
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4.7.4 Democratization Process and Violent Conflicts in Ebiraland  
Today Ebiraland is ridden with phenomenon of violent conflict. The people have 
taken to nerve explosion and self immolation borrowing a leaf from (Audu 2009) if it 
is not a violent contest between political parties; it is one Ebira community versus 
another. At other time, it could be one masquerade group versus another or one clan 
against another. At a time it was Idozumi versus I Idoji in Okene, at other time it was 
two clan groups in Adavi that engaged in war of attrition. Again in the Adavi area, it 
was Adavi versus Ihima and two clan groups in Ogaminana tore each other apart. 
Today, it is Ogu and Omoye clan groups mauling each other to bits. The violent 
conflicts are often occasioned with the use of guns and other dangerous weapon, 
leading to razing down of magnificence building of opponents, cremation of lives and 
fleeing of people who also   become refugees in neighboring towns and villages 
(Audu, 2009). 
 
There was a general consensus among persons interviewed (Sani 2011, Raji 2011, 
Okaraga  2011 Jeremiah, 2011) as well as in some  literature Sani (1993, 1999) that 
violence in Ebiraland has its origin in the 1950s. Then, the wind of democracy 
blowing across Nigeria provided ample opportunity for those who vehemently 
opposed the ascendancy of Attah Ibrahim in 1917 to resist his authority openly. This 
culminated to his overthrow in 1954 and his replacement with sani Omonori as 
Ohinoyi of Ebiraland. This ugly scenario had serious political implication on the 
peace and stability of the area. The jostling for authority and control of state power by 
political leaders in Ebiraland resulted in the development of clan and sub-clan group 
identity as the base to ascend to political office (Audu, 2009). Clan now became the 
basis of selection to contest for position of authority either at federal state or local 
level. When Attah was a paramount ruler of Ebira land, there was a strong opposition 
group which was bent at wrestling power from him. This was the Igbira Tribal Union  
(ITU). While Attah belong to Igbira Progressive Union (IPU) led by the late Attah 
proxy Alhaji Umoru Adabara who was the president of the party. Its major ideology 
was to defend the ruling class interest of the IPU as a means of sustaining the 
paramount ruler in power.  
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The Igbira Tribal Union (ITU) was on the other hand a mass oriented party whose 
ideology was the freedom of the suffering masses from the perceived tyranny of the 
ruling class (Sanni, 1993). Attah was eventually dethroned in 1954. His abdication of 
the throne led to the enthronement of Sanni Omonori who became the new paramount 
ruler (Audu, 2009). The ITU was instrumental to the change of traditional title of 
paramount ruler of Ebira land from Attah to Ohinoyi (Sanni, 1993). What actually led 
to violence in Ebira land in the 1950‟s was the struggle for control of the Native 
Authority (NA) between ITU and the (NPC/IPU). Both parties engaged the youth to 
perpetrate violence. The ITU had the „Boma boys‟, while the NPU/IPU youth were 
known as the Cow Boys (Sanni, 2011, Raji 2011, Obobayn of Emami 2011).  
 
The old divide between the ITU and the NPC again manifested in the politics of the 
Second Republic (1979-1983). A good number of those who were strong opponents 
of Attah and the NPC joined the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), while the 
NPC supporters aligned forces with the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Indeed the 
second republic led to the introduction of new dimension into party politics in Ebira 
land with increased political mobilization of sub-ethnic identities. For example there 
was a fierce contest for power between Adamu Attah (a son of Ibrahim Attah) and 
Obatemi Usman for a seat into the Constituent Assembly in 1977. Adamu Attah won 
and Obatemi Usman resorted to appeal to the sentiments of his Oziogu clan, accusing 
Aniku sub-clan of Adavi to which Attah belonged, of occupying most of the public 
offices in Ebira land (Tenuche, 2002). 
 
While Adamu Attah led the majority faction of the NPN in the old Kwara State, 
Obatemi Usman leader of the minority faction of the NPN in the same State defected 
to the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). During the second republic election, while 
Obatemi was deputy gubernatorial candidate of UPN, Adamu Attah became the 
gubernatorial flag bearer of NPN. The fierce campaigns that occasioned the contest 
between the two candidates culminated in thuggery and wanton destruction of 
properties. Important centers of convergence in Ebira land were torched. Okene 
central market was burnt down, shops and stalls of important party notables were 
burnt, and it also led to dislocation and dismemberment of families (Audu, 2009).  
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It is essential to note that beginning from the Second Republic politics in 1979, 
zoning of public office along ethnic divide became increasingly entrenched in the 
body politic of Ebira land (Nelson, 2011). This is because groups in each district or 
clan groups hardly agreed on choice of candidate for elective post (Raji Report, 
2006). Tenuche (2009) gave quite a number of examples of entrenchment of zoning 
system in Ebira land. In 1990 for instance, the chairman of Adavi Local Government 
was produced by the Aniku sub-clan, while in 1999 it was zoned to Ezuka clan. In 
2003 it was the turn of Adeieka sub-clan. In Okene Local Government, occupation of 
public office is often rotated between Okene and Okengwen district (between the sub-
clans: Agada and Okovi), in Ihima between Eika and Ihima district. 
 
It is important to stress that the clan heads play a very prominent role in who is 
nominated to contest for an office zoned to the group. This has implication for 
violence as the struggle for such position is fiercely fought. In addition, political 
alignment along clan lines has provided a convenient platform for politicians to whip 
clan sentiment to further their parochial and selfish objective or ambition. The 
resultant effect is that, inter-clan conflicts have been brought to the front burner of 
politics in Ebira land which is evident in the incessant violence conflict between 
Okengwen and Ihima districts and Adavi Eba and Okenwe district (Tenuche, 2002). 
The violent nature of politics in Ebiraland entered the third and fourth republics. 
Contest for political office among politicians exacerbated the spate of violent conflict 
among clans and politicians in Ebira land. To seek for political office, there was need 
to recourse to sub- ethnic identity.  Politicians who felt marginalized instigated their 
sub-ethnic groups against the other clan members. In 1991, Kogi state was created. It 
was a product of the continuous process of adjustment to the structure of Nigeria 
federalism. The creation of Kogi State resulted in new configuration of power politics 
especially in Ebiraland (Omotola, 2006). 
 
Since the creation of Kogi State the eastern senatorial district (Igala), has continued to 
monopolize the state governorship position. Alhaji Abubakar Audu was the first 
executive governor of the state and was in power till 1993. During the return to 
democracy in 1999, he won the gubernatorial election under the auspices of the All 
People‟s Party (APP), which later transmuted to All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP). 
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He governed till 2003 when the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governorship flag 
bearer Ibrahim Idris wrestled power from him (Omotola, 2006). 
 
From the Third Republic till date, violent conflicts have assumed a different 
dimension. Marginalization seems to be the nucleus of unhealthy relationship among 
the groups in the state. The Igalas are seen as oppressors, but Ebiras hardly turn their 
violence against the Igalas they rather prefer making Ebiras who are in support of 
“Igala‟s” government their target. One thing that characterized the reigns of both 
Audu and Idris is the marginalization of other ethnic groups in the state (Saliu, 2011, 
Nelson 2011, Obeitor 2011, Raji 2011). It was observed by Omotola (2006) that there 
was no time when Kogi East (Igala) had less than 70 per cent of the commissioners 
and chairmen, as well as board and parastatals members. The situation is disturbing in 
terms of distribution facilities such as higher institutions of learning, roads, water, 
projects and also recruitment into the state public service. Audu (2009) equally 
observed as at year 2000, the staff strength of the state civil service was 30,000. Out 
of this figure, 18,000 were Igalas, 3000 Ebiras and 9000 Okuns. In the state executive 
council, the Ebira had 20 per cent of the appointments, 14 percent of permanent 
secretaries; as against Igala‟s 50 per cent and 61 per cent respectively. By 2011, in the 
state civil service, while the Eastern senatorial zone of the state had about 21,000, the 
West had 6,000 and the Central 3,150 (Field Survey 2011). 
    
Also, in March 2002 an attempt to create new local government areas further revealed 
the marginalization instinct in Audu. Out of the 25 new councils, he gave 14 to his 
ethnic group (Igala), Okun 6 and Ebira 5. This generated spontaneous violent riots 
across the state especially in Ebiraland resulting in large scale killing and arson. In the 
same vein, at the official celebration of Democracy Day on 29 May 2005, an armed 
group believed to be loyal to Senator A. T Ahmed, the head of the „power shift‟ from 
Ebiraland, Kogi Central, launched a violent attack on Kogi State Stadium leaving 
several people seriously injured. It took the reinforcement of security operatives to 
rescue the state governor from the venue (Omotola, 2006). 
 
 On another occasion, the governor‟s entourage to Okene was way laid by militant 
Ebira youths causing serious damage of their cars. In fact it got to the point that the 
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Governor was not allowed to enter Okene, the heart of Ebiraland. The same episode 
was played out when the Governor and his entourage went for the funeral rites of 
Senator A. T Ahmed (Confluence Mirror). Shortly before the 2007 general election, 
the idea of Ebira Agenda was hatched. That is an Ebira man should be the governor of 
the state. Ohiare (an Ebira man), a Senator between 2003 and 2007 contested under 
the platform of Action Congress for the Governorship of Kogi State in 2007 but lost 
to Ibrahim Idris (a PDP candidate of Igala extraction). The Ebiras found this too hard 
to swallow they felt they have been robbed of opportunity to occupy the highest 
position in the state. This made them to vent their anger on Ebiras who were 
supporters of PDP in Ebiraland because they saw them as betrayers of Ebira collective 
interest (Nelson, 2011, Saliu, 2011). 
 
4.7.5 Traditional Cheiftaincy Crisis 
Another source of conflict in Ebiraland under the Idris dispensation was the creation 
of additional traditional stool in Ebiraland. The crisis emanated from complaint on 
imbalance in key appointments within the state. The Ebiras had observed that only the 
Ohinoyi of Ebiraland is a first class chief in the whole of Ebiraland (Kogi Central 
Senatorial District). Whereas Kogi East and West have 5 and 4 respectively. A recent 
reorganization in the State Traditional Council was supposed to partly address the 
perceived imbalance which subsequently led to the creation of a new traditional stool-
the Adanihima of Ihima, as the first class chief to be rated amongst the 6 clans of 
Ihima ended up pitching two of the dominant clans against each other in a violent 
confrontation. The Obobanyi of Ihima from Emani clan felt slighted by the elevation, 
while the Obabayin of Ihuowan and his clan who were historically and implacable foe 
of Emani enthusiastically embraced the new Adanihima stool (Raji Repor,t 2006).  
  
 Government reports concerning the cases of violence indicted politicians for 
fomenting violence in Ebira land. The accused are usually left unpunished, thus, it 
appeared the government was interested in the conflicts. Although relative peace has 
been restored in Ebiraland as the 2011 elections were peaceful. Yet the problem is far 
from being totally resolved. This is because people are not ready to say the truth as 
result of fear of been killed. The police too have not been helpful as they collect 
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money from politicians to facilitate the release of thugs whenever arrested. They teach 
them what to say in order to escape been held culpable (Raji, 2011).  
 
4.7.6 Masquerade Festival and Violent Conflict in Ebiraland 
Before 1979, the institution of masquerade was under the control of farmers and the 
rural folks, who arranged festivals when there were no much farming activities. Since 
masquerades were considered as the representatives of the ancestors‟ spirits on earth, 
the emergence of a masquerade was only possible following the death of a powerful 
clan elder or clan chief. Initially, masquerade institution could only be identified with 
specific households or individual, who could be held responsible for any violence 
during festivals. It is interesting to note that during colonial era, singers and 
masquerades could only perform after request for permit, with a guarantor who could 
be held liable for breach of peace (Tenuche, 2002). 
 
This may not be far-fetched because some of the masquerades appeared violent. For 
example, Adinoyi (1996) noted that some of them wield cane to flog, while some 
drink water others prefer palm wine, beer or local or imported liquor. Eku ahere is 
noted for strapping cutlass around its body to mow down anybody who stood in its 
way. The eku-echichi at times succeeds in getting past the restrainers in order to beat 
spectator-participants. Some eku-echichi mostly made up of boys move around a town 
or village on their own looking for people to beat (Adinoyi, 1996). 
 
 Tenuche, (2002) however, noted that things changed as time went by due to a 
combination of many factors which included the politicization of clan identities, and 
the democratization process associated with the first Republic that followed. Cultural 
festivities like masquerade tow party lines (Igbira Tribal Union (ITU)/Northern 
People Congress (NPC) in the fifties. From 1979 there was an increase in sense of 
attachment to clan which invariably led to dividing prominent masquerades along clan 
lines. A good example is Achewuru masquerades which had the support of the Omoye 
clan and Okeverse supported by Oziogus clan. 
 
Another example was the experience of the Second Republic that led to rivalry 
between politicians from Oziogu and other clans which reflected in the pattern of 
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support for the two prominent masquerades. Suffice to say that the partisan divide in 
Ebiraland as reflected in the second Republic between the Unity Party of Nigeria 
(UPN) and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) equally provided the platform for 
division among the masquerades as each political party financed the activities of rival 
masquerades and also provided political protection for those that perpetrated violence. 
The idea of protecting masquerades against arrests for violent crimes, led to the 
creation of masquerades that were not backed by guarantors who could be held 
responsible for offences of masquerades (Tenuche, 2002). Although there are no 
statistical records of the number of casualties, however, Adinoyi (1996) averred that: 
The masked rituals have become very promiscuous, rough, and violent. Partisan 
politics, religious fanaticism, and clannish chauvinism continued to threaten the peace 
and stability of a once relatively cohesive society.  
  
It was observed that, the control of masquerade institution by young gangs has led to 
its use as instrument of unleashing terror and fomenting troubles thereby, forcing 
successive governments in both Kwara and Kogi states to enact laws banning the 
ehane festival celebration. In fact, the threat and imposition of ban at one time or the 
other have not yielded positive result as the festival continued to be characterized by 
violence. Tenuche, (2009) notes that since 1979, none of the celebrations of the 
annual Ekuechi festival has been devoid of violence. Unemployment among youths 
and manipulation by some powerful community leaders have been attributed to youth 
violence under the façade of masquerade festival. 
 
However, Sani (2009); Abdulkarim (2009) and Olorunmolu (2008) argued that 
politicians are responsible for perpetuation of violence in Ebiraland till date.  The 
prominent role played by the youth in the circles of violence in Ebiraland is attributed 
in part to unemployment. 
 
Tenuche, (2009) observed that youth perpetrators of violence are unemployed and 
hungry, and out of desperation, constitute themselves into groups referred to as 
“Aduvusu” ( I‟m ready to die) or “Ozomateyisu” (one cannot hide from death). They 
tend to be more violent under the cover of masquerades. This is in line of argument of 
Omobowale (2011) that, the Nigerian polity is replete with a mass of poor majority, 
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with restricted access to basic needs and survival, the political class therefore, has 
access to a pool of underprivileged human resources, out of which willing individuals 
may be recruited as “foot soldiers” to cause violence in order to acquire and sustain 
power.  
 
Politicians‟ started using masquerade cultural festivals right from fifties for 
campaigns, unleashing terror and witch-hunting political opponents. As noted by 
Tenuche (2009), the strained relationship between the ITU and NPC were exacerbated 
as each party was determined to get a man of its own appointed chief of Ebiraland, 
leading to the introduction of thuggery, arson and other forms of violence into the 
body politic of the land. The masquerade institution became instrument of violence as 
masquerades were divided along party lines. The traditional belief among the people 
in the powers of the masquerades as representatives of the ancestors on earth was 
demystified. Masquerades and singers who hitherto entertained during cultural 
festivals were now aligned with the different political parties thus turning such 
festivals into an arena of conflict and violence (Ododo, 2001:3 & Sani, 1997). 
 
From 1979, the sense of attachment to clan increased which invariably led to dividing 
prominent masquerades along clan lines. The Achewuru masquerades for instance 
have the support of the Omoye clan while Okeverse masquerades have the support of 
the Oziogus clan.  Similarly, the rivalry between politicians from Oziogu and other 
clans reflected in the pattern of support for the two prominent masquerades in the 
second Republic. Suffice to say that the partisan divide in Ebiraland as reflected in the 
second Republic between the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN) equally provided the platform for division among the masquerades as 
each political party financed the activities of rival masquerades and also provided 
political protection for those that perpetrated violence (Tenuche, 2002).  
 
The idea of protecting masquerades against arrests for violent crimes, led to the 
creation of masquerades that were not backed by guarantors who could be held 
responsible for offences of masquerades as stated before (Tenuche, 2002). Although 
there are no statistical records of the number of casualties, the chains of violent 
conflicts have impacted negatively on the socioeconomic organization of Ebiraland. 
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The victims of violence are mainly the women and the children; several women 
turned widows with added responsibilities of children upbringing in addition to 
industrious women having their wares destroyed when properties and markets are 
torched by irate youth‟s groups (Kogi State of Nigeria, 1997). 
 
 Furthermore, the gory that attend the Ebiraland masquerade festivals have the 
implication of socializing youths into a culture of violence and other forms of 
delinquent behaviours. As Adinoyi-Ojo (1996) further noticed, the control of 
masquerade institution by young gangs has led to its use as instrument of unleashing 
terror and fomenting troubles. The acrimony, thereby, forcing successive governments 
in both Kwara and Kogi states to enact laws banning the ehane festival celebration 
(Adaba, 2010:1). As Tenuche (2009) noted however, since 1979, none of the 
celebrations of the annual Ekuechi festival has been devoid of violence.  This shows 
that imposition of ban on the masquerade traditional festivals such as ekuechi, echane, 
ebe, etc is not the panacea to violence that has now found a hiding place in the 
masquerade cultural festivals in Ebiraland. This is because youth violence under the 
façade of masquerade festival in Ebira land is perpetuated by unemployed youths and 
manipulation by some powerful community leaders who use such avenue to 
perpetuate selfish political aggrandizement. This is because politicians in Ebiraland 
hadly believe in winnining election without using the youths as thugs and it is 
unemployed youths that mostly fall prey of their antics. 
 
 Youths in Ebiraland are fast becoming the focus of attention not just by all Anebira at 
home and in diaspora but for Kogi state government. This is predicated on the fact 
that the youth‟s beviour is not in tandem with acceptable manner of behavior in a 
civilized society. They have refused to imbibe and cherish good virtues. They have 
refused to be a link between the present generation and oncoming generation. They 
are not interested in education thereby, constituting themselves into a bunch of 
deviant, vagabond and social misfits in the society. No wonder they are now a willing 
tool in the hands of discredited politicians who hire them to maim, kill and destroy 
(Audu, 2009). No politicians in Ebiraland can freely play politics without employing 
Ebira youth to protect them. As a result, many Ebira youth have been deprived by the 
same politicians the possibility to envision anything better (Ebira Vonya, 2006). Their 
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poor financial status made them to easily succumb to to politicians who use them as 
thugs and other associated ills in politics (Ogido, 2008). The reason for this is not far 
fetched. Omeiza (2010) is of the view that politics in Ebiraland is not like other 
responsible places where the zeal is about development, that of Ebira is politics of 
revenge, bitterness, do or die affairs, thuggery, to mention just a few. He said 
politicians in Ebiraland are very desperate, they can use their immediate relations for 
sacrifice to attain a position that will last them for just four years or less. And if 
crocodile can eat their own eggs what will they not do to the flesh of frogs? 
 
 Comenting on the crisis ravaging Ebiraland, Ado (2010) argues that most of the 
violent conflicts are politically motivated by some who wanted to wrestle political 
power without going through a democratic system which made gun-running the chief 
merchandise of Ebiraland. He said in Ebiraland, there are three major causes of crisis: 
masquerade, politics and clannish differences. But political crises have succeded in 
dominating others because the politicians have cleverly used politics to cause division 
among the people. Politicians have used cultural system to their advantage in causing 
problems and when the problems come, they blame culture. Masquerading and other 
related violent activities have provided ample opportunity for the youth to exhibit 
their callous behavior. They possess sophisticated weapons used in unleashing terror 
in the land (Audu, 2009).  
 
Adoke (2008) argues that some of the arms used by Ebira boys are more lethal or 
sophisticated than the ones used by the security agents, thus making it dangeriously 
impossible for the police to effectively check their activities. In other to make 
themelves relevant they engaged in farming and stealing to get money to consult 
soothsayers, spiritualists and haberlists in order to acquire spiritual strength. They 
sought for charms to disappear in case of trouble and arrest, to protect them from 
bullet penetrating into their bodies and numerous other charms to protect them in 
situations of gun battle or any form of attacks (Audu, 2009). This has resulted in 
perpetration of other social vices such as burglary, armed robbery, strange and 
mysterious killing among others (Ohida, 2002). 
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4.7.7 Modernity  
The change of value system also has its finger prints of youth restiveness in 
Ebiraland. The Ebira society was mainly agrarian. Having a large family in those days 
was an asset which could be employed for farm work. Hence people were encouraged 
to marry as many wives as possible because it was not difficult to cater for the family. 
Laziness and joblessness were never condoned. With modern civililization children 
have to go to school. Children no longer labour with their parents in the farm; hence, 
the need for marrying many wives was no longer necessary. The inability or refusal of 
many parents to change in line with the current value system created some social 
problems which include having many children beyond what one could cater for, 
leading to denial of education because of lack of funds to pay school fees, poverty, 
lack of control among others. The resultant effect is becoming unruling and rebellious 
to parents, alienation to express their feeling leading to antagonism and resistance, 
encouraging the use of drug and other stimulants to strike back at parents and society 
(Audu, 2009). 
 
A corollary of the above is what Ogido (2008) described as parent “eating the food 
they cannot swallow” that parents should have children they will be able to cater for. 
The implication of this is that if husband could not provide for his wife and children, 
abdicating his responsibilities will serve as a negative role model for the children. 
 
Another observable phenomenon responsible for youth violence in Ebiraland is the 
growing discontentment amongst the youths on the activities of the elders in 
Ebiraland. Their performance in public offices left much to bedesired. The youth saw 
their failure in the inability to creat enabling environment for the youth to prove their 
mettle. They failed to use their public offices to alleviate poverty in form of job 
creation and provision of social facilities. In the light of the above, the youths have 
determined to shift the balance of power. They insisted on fielding in their candidates 
to contest elections. This has led to procreation of several youth organizations that 
straddle civil servants, academics, market women, retired military personnel and even 
students (Tenuche, 2002b). Examples of these youth organizations are The People 
Initiative Foundation (PIF), Ebira Youth Congress (EYC), Pal Collectives (PC) to 
mention just a few (Audu 2009). It is also interesting to notes that these orgaisations 
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are conglomerate of different youth associations of Ebira descent across the country 
with main objectives of promoting unity, peace and development of Ebiraland. For 
example, the EYC is made up of 152 Ebira clubs and association across the length and 
breath of Nigeria (Tenuche, 2002b). 
 
It is necessary to state that the aforementioned clubs and association are also 
implicated in conflicts situation in Ebiraland. Once a member was attacked, the club 
members jointly retaliated to put their enemies at bay and equally showed the strength 
of their club through display of weapons. These clubs financed their activities through 
collection of levies and dues from their members in accordance with the charter of 
their clubs. These clubs compete among themselves by demonstrating the immense 
proportion and sophistication of their weapons at any slightest provocation. A good 
case in point is the organization of a beauty pageant to select the most beautiful girl in 
Ebiraland. This contest resulted in violent conflagration in which Ebira central market 
was burnt and many lives were lost all on an alledged “trespass” of another club 
members‟ girl friend (Audu, 2009). 
  
In summary, this section has taken a look at conflict in Africa, Nigeria and Ebiraland. 
The study finds struggle for political power at the centre of the various conflicts 
although the impact of socio-economic variables cannot be overlooked. The 
consequences of the various conflicts include psychological trauma, loss of human 
and material resources. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND 
DISCUSSIONS 
This section focuses on the presentation, interpretation and analysis of the data 
obtained in the course of this study. Data collected were analysed using the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 15.0) software. Statistical analyses include 
frequency distribution tables and simple percentages. In view of the geographical 
spread of Ebira people into 4 local governments in Kogi State, a sufficiently large 
sample size of 1,200 is utilized in the study. This is consistent with common wisdom 
and statistician opinion that favour a fairly large sample in studies of this nature. As 
stated earlier, a total number of 1200 questionnaires were administrered to 
respondents out of which 850 were returned. The remaining 350 questionnaires were 
either unreturned or badly filled that made them unsuable. 
 
Table 1 RESPONSE RATE 
Number of Questionnaire Returned 850 70.83% 
Number of Questionnaire not Returned 350 29.16% 
Total 1, 200 100% 
 
The table above details the response rate of our respondents. Out of the 1200 
questionnaires administered, 850 were returned as stated before. The return rate of 
70.83% is satisfactory and deemed large enough to make valid conclusion. This is in 
line with the submission of Dane (1990:120), as stated before that “a survey research 
project may include as few as 100 participants or as many as 250 million”. 
In addition, it was observed that some of our respondents omitted few items of the 
questionnaire but this is not sufficient to discard the entire questionnaires affected. 
 
The Tables below present the socio-demographic characteristics of our respondents. 
5.1 Demographic profile of Respondents  
Table 2 Gender Distribution of Respondents 
The following subsections detail the demographic characteristics of the respondents 
and provide an overview of the make up of the study sample. 
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  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Male 528 62.1 63.5 63.5 
  Female 304 35.8 36.5 100.0 
  Total 832 97.9 100.0   
        
  100.0     
       Source: Author (2011) 
528 (63.5percent) are males while 304 (36.5percent) are females. From Table 2 
above, it is evident that both gender are represented, however, the percentage of 
male respondents is higher. The explanation for this could be found in the cultural 
roles of males and the structure of the society which is male dominated. In addition, 
males are much more involved in issues of violence and conflict because they are 
more predisposed to seeking power and political offices, therefore, have more 
interest on issues raised than their female counterparts.  
Table 3 Age Distribution of Respondents 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 18-30 577 67.9 71.1 71.1 
  31-40 152 17.9 18.7 89.8 
  41-50 50 5.9 6.2 95.9 
  51-60 21 2.5 2.6 98.5 
  60+ 12 1.4 1.5 100.0 
  Total 812 95.5 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
 
 The frequency of the age distribution inTable 3 reflects larger percentage of the 
respondents between 18 and 30 years of age followed by respondents between 31 and 
40, 41 and 50, 51, and 60 and above 60 respectively. This is helpful in this study 
because those that are often involved in violent conflicts are mostly within ages 18-
40. These ones, given the frequency of conflicts in Ebiraland, perhaps might have 
participated in at least one of the violent conflicts in Ebiraland. Admittedly, they may 
not have historical knowledge of past conflicts; the representation of the older age 
 
 
 
196 
 
grades is expected to compensate for this shortcoming. In addition, other instruments 
adopted in the study are expected to capture the views of all age grouping. 
Table 4 Marital Status 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Single 584 68.7 70.4 70.4 
  Married 230 27.1 27.7 98.2 
  Divorced 9 1.1 1.1 99.3 
  Separated 5 .6 .6 99.9 
  Widowed 1 .1 .1 100.0 
  Total 829 97.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
We reasonably expect marital status to affect the reaction of respondents to issues of 
conflict. For example, the burden of marriage may play a significant role in 
willingness to participate in conflicts or reduction of situation that breeds conflict. 
Therefore, a classification of respondents along marital status is presented in Table 4 
above. From the Table above, 70.4 percent of the total respondents are single 
compared to 27.7 percent married, 1.1 percent divorced, 0.6 percent separated and 
1percent widowed. 
Table 5 Occupation Distribution 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Civil 
servants 
99 11.6 11.9 11.9 
  Farmers 27 3.2 3.3 15.2 
  Traders 193 22.7 23.3 38.4 
  Students 490 57.6 59.0 97.5 
  Others 21 2.5 2.5 100.0 
  Total 830 97.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
As shown above in table 5, 11.9 percent are civil servants, 3.3 percent are farmers, 
and 23.3 percent are traders, students 59.0 percent and others 2.5percent. A significant 
proportion of our sample are students who understand the demand of the research 
instruments and are mostly likely to have opinions on the issues causing conflict in 
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Ebiraland. However, it is necessary to add that having more student respondents was 
not deliberate. 
 
Table 6 Academic Qualifications of Respondents 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Illiterate 16 1.9 1.9 1.9 
  Primary 18 2.1 2.2 4.1 
  JSS 14 1.6 1.7 5.8 
  SSS 243 28.6 29.5 35.3 
  Tertiary 534 62.8 64.7 100.0 
  Total 825 97.1 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
 Table 6 above shows that the vast majority of the respondents are educated to answer 
the questionnaire. 534 (64.7 percent) are either in higher institutions or have 
graduated from higher institutions, Senior Secondary School certificate holders are 
243 (29.5 percent), Junior Secondary School certificate 14 (1.7 percent), Primary 
School Leaving certificate 18 (2.2 percent) and 16 (1.9 percent) are not literate. 
    
 Table 7 Local Government Area 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Adavi 246 28.9 29.7 29.7 
  Ajaokuta 72 8.5 8.7 38.4 
  Okehi 248 29.2 29.9 68.3 
  Okene 226 26.6 27.3 95.5 
  Others 37 4.4 4.5 100.0 
  Total 829 97.5 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
The questionnaire was prepared to capture the four local government areas especially 
conflict prone areas in Ebiraland. However, as a way of verifying the reliability of the 
information given by the respondents, some non-indigenes were equally captured in 
the questionnaire administration. 
Having looked at the socio-demographic profile of the respondents, the tables below 
present the data on some of the causal variables of conflict in Ebiraland. Conflicts 
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generally have been identified to have multivariate and interrelated causes. This as 
shown in chapter two (2) of the study is the general consensus among conflict 
researchers and scholars. We however sought to test the validity of the proposition 
that politics constitutes the major cause of conflict in Ebiraland. In line with this, 
economic and socio-cultural variables were also tested. This was done to examine the 
relationship between youth unemployment and economic motive on the one hand, and 
violence associated with masquerade festival, and the struggle for chieftaincy title on 
the other hand. 
 
5.2 POLITICS AND COMMUNAL CONFLICTS 
In line with the focus of this study, this section explores the impact of politics on clan 
and communal conflicts in Ebiraland. Taking into cognizance the role of political 
elite, it examines responses to series of questions exploring the political dimension of 
communal conflicts in Ebiraland. 
 
 Table 8 Contest for political power as factor for conflict 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 23 2.7 2.7 2.7 
  Disagree 53 6.2 6.3 9.1 
  Undecided 16 1.9 1.9 11.0 
  Agree 243 28.6 29.0 40.0 
  strongly agree 503 59.2 60.0 100.0 
  Total 838 98.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
In an attempt to shed light on the understanding of conflict as a result of political 
competition, respondents were asked if “contest for political power is one of the 
factors responsible for conflicts in Ebiraland?” Table 8 above details responses of the 
respondents  to the statement relating contest for political power to conflict. Analysis 
of respondents‟ responses seems to overwhelmingly indicate that competition for 
political power among political elites in Ebiraland is responsible for conflicts in the 
region. Thus, 503 (59.2 percent) strongly agree to the above question, 243 (28.6 
percent) merely agree while those that strongly disagree were just 23 (2.7 percent); 
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disagree 53 (6.2 percent) and undecided 16 (1.9 percent). In all, 87.8 percent  agreed 
to the above question. In fact, our findings from above did not differ significantly 
from the views expressed by the community leaders interviewed and the responses 
from FGD that political competition is the driver of conflicts in Ebiraland. In the 
words of some of the key traditional rulers interviewed; “the politicians in most cases 
when they strive to win election often resulted into violence” (Obobayin of Ihonwa, 
2011). This has equally been supported by Obobayin of Ihima that violent conflict in 
Ebiraland is traceable to the political era of the 1950s. He stated categorically that it 
was politics that brought violent conflict to Ebiraland. In an interview with M.S Audu, 
he saw politics and political competition as the only source of conflict in Ebiraland, to 
corroborate earlier opinions. He put it as follows: 
It is not clannish crises, it is politics. They just give it clannish 
colouration. Intra-party conflict, they wear it the garment of clan 
just as violence is coloured with religion in Nigeria, it is purely 
politics. The houses that are burnt during crises are houses of 
political opponents. There cannot be clannish or religious crises in 
Ebiraland. They only colour it as clan conflict. The crises in 
Ebiraland are clearly political (Audu, 2011). 
 
The researcher sought to investigate whether there is a relationship between 
personality of politicians, followership and conflict in Ebiraland, so as to ascertain 
whether political followership are often deeply identified with individuals such that 
their cause become the rally point for followership who may sometime become 
fanatical in their identification with such personalities and their cause. The 
respondents were asked if “individual personality is the main political issue in 
Ebiraland” i.e the selfish pursuit of political interest by politicians is the factor 
generating conflicts in Ebiraland. Table 9 below depicts the positions of the 
respondents.   
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Table 9 Personality and Politics  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 105 12.4 12.7 12.7 
  Disagree 69 8.1 8.4 21.1 
  Undecided 58 6.8 7.0 28.1 
  Agree 272 32.0 32.9 61.0 
  strongly agree 321 37.8 38.9 99.9 
      100.0 
  Total 826 97.2 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
321 (37.8 percent) of the respondents strongly agree to the assertion that selfish 
pursuit of political interest of key personalities is one of the factors generating 
conflict in Ebiraland, while 272 (32.0 percent) merely agree to the assertion. Only 
105 (12.4 percent) strongly disagree, 69 (8.1 percent) disagree and 58 (6.8 percent) 
were undecided on the assertion. The implication of 69.8 percent of our respondents 
agreeing to the statement above shows that selfish pursuit of political interests by key 
personality is one of the causes of conflicts in Ebiraland. 
 
It is a commonplace occurrence that sentiments trigger conflicts among clans. That is, 
a particular clan or tribe may perceive itself as superior to other clans. Consequently, 
we explore clan sentiments as a factor generating conflicts in the region by eliciting 
respondents‟ responses to the statement “clannish sentiment is the main issue in 
Ebiraland”. Table 10 below is the summation of the reactions of respondents to the 
question. 
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Table 10 Clannish Sentiment 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 25 2.9 3.0 3.0 
  Disagree 39 4.6 4.6 7.6 
  Undecided 28 3.3 3.3 11.0 
  Agree 303 35.6 36.1 47.0 
  strongly agree 445 52.4 53.0 100.0 
  Total 840 98.8 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
Contrary to Audu (2011) position, the reaction of some other respondents to the 
question “clannish sentiment is the main issue in Ebiraland” revealed that there is 
dimension of clannish sentiment to violent conflict in Ebiraland. This is predicated on 
the fact that 445 (52.4percent) strongly agree, 303 (35.6percent) agree, 25 
(2.9percent) strongly disagree, 39 (4.6percent) disagree and 28 (3.3percent) are 
undecided. Thus, 88 percent of the respondents are of the opinion that there is 
clannish dimension to the conflict. The percentage of response to the above question 
is quite high, meaning clan has become the instrument for the pursuit of political 
power. The paramount ruler- Ohinoyi of Ebiraland Ado (2011), similarly enumerated 
politics, clan sentiments and masquerade festival as the causal factors of violent 
conflicts in his domain. 
The clan dimension is further explored with the statement “conflicts between clans 
provide opportunity for politicians to stress their relevance”. Table 11below details 
the reactions of respondents. 
Table 11 Inter-Clan Conflict and Political Relevance 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 36 4.2 4.4 4.4 
  Disagree 87 10.2 10.5 14.9 
  Undecided 67 7.9 8.1 23.0 
  Agree 276 32.5 33.4 56.3 
  strongly agree 361 42.5 43.7 100.0 
  Total 827 97.3 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
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Our findings from the above clearly show that conflict between clans provides 
opportunity for politicians to stress their relevance. 361 (42.5 percent) strongly agree 
to the assertion that politicians often capitalize on conflicts between or among clans 
to draw support for their political cause, thereby, stressing their relevance, while 276 
(32.5 percent) merely agree to the assertion, 36 (4.2 percent) strongly disagree to the 
assertion , 87 (10.2 percent) disagree, and 67 (7.9 percent) were undecided on the 
assertion. Responses from Focus Group Discussion (FGD 2011) point to the fact that, 
some politicians sponsor conflicts by instigating the youths and their clans against 
their political opponents. 
 
Next to the above question is an attempt to probe into differences in political party 
alliances of clans and conflicts in the region. This is because the clearest expression 
of differences in political views and ideas is often expressed in political party to 
which one aligns. It is reasonable to assume that individuals will align to parties that 
closely support their views and ambition. Therefore, we sought responses on 
differences in political party alliances and its effect on conflicts in Ebiraland. The 
question posed is “differences in political party alliances between clans often 
degenerate into conflicts in Ebiraland”. Table 12 below presents the responses.    
Table 12 Party Alliances and Conflict. 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 49 5.8 5.9 5.9 
  Disagree 82 9.6 9.9 15.7 
  Undecided 112 13.2 13.5 29.2 
  Agree 293 34.5 35.2 64.4 
  strongly agree 296 34.8 35.6 100.0 
  Total 832 97.9 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)   
In Table 12 above, 296 (34.8percent) strongly agreed and 293 (34.5percent) agreed to 
the view that differences in political party alliances between clans often degenerate 
into conflicts in Ebiraland. Others as shown in the Table strongly disagreed, disagreed 
or were undecided. However, responses from interviews and Focus Group Discussion 
FGD (2011) were at variance with the above position as they did not believe that 
clans‟ political party alliances have any role in conflicts in the region. The difference 
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in opinion may be attributed to the fact that while it is difficult to ascertain the 
veracity of the above proposition as other clans are concerned, it is not the case with 
the Omoye clan that constitutes majority and it has always been aligned with the 
ruling party right from the time of political independence of the country in 1960. 
 
The researcher also sought to establish whether there is a relationship between 
political party affiliation of community leaders and conflicts in the region. This is 
because traditional role of community leaders entrusts them the privilege position of 
being the opinion leaders, rallying point and motivators of the led. Consequently, 
their political affiliations and interests may count in terms of conflict among 
followers. The study raised a question to explore the implication of differences in the 
political party affiliation of community leaders. Table 13 contains respondents‟ 
reactions on the issue. 
Table 13 Political Affiliation of Community Leaders and Conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 strongly disagree 129 15.2 15.4 15.4 
  Disagree 118 13.9 14.1 29.6 
  Undecided 112 13.2 13.4 43.0 
  Agree 268 31.5 32.1 75.1 
  strongly agree 206 24.2 24.7 99.8 
  Total 833 98 99  
       
Source: Author (2011)  
Table 13 above shows that 56.8 percent of the respondents believe that differences in 
political party affiliation of community leaders and the community have implications 
for conflict. While 206 respondents (24.7 percent) strongly agreed, 268 (32.1 percent) 
agreed to the assertion that differences in political party affiliation of community 
leaders have implications for conflict, 112 (13.4) were undecided, 118 (14.1 percent) 
disagreed and 129 (15.2 percent) strongly disagreed to the assertion.  
Corollary to the question above is the succeeding statements “exercise of political 
supremacy between clan leaders often lead to violent conflict”. The responses‟ are 
summed in Table 14 below: 
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Table 14 Political Supremacy between Clan Leaders as Source of Conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 137 16.1 16.5 16.5 
  Disagree 109 12.8 13.1 29.6 
  Undecided 44 5.2 5.3 34.9 
  Agree 305 35.9 36.7 71.7 
  strongly agree 235 27.6 28.3 100.0 
  Total 830 97.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
In Table 14 above, the perceptions of the respondents indicate that overwhelming 
majority see exercise of political supremacy between clan leaders as one of the 
factors responsible for violent conflicts in Ebiraland. In fact, 235 (28.3percent) 
strongly agreed to the assertion that political supremacy among clan leaders is the 
source of conflicts in Ebiraland, 305 representing (36.7 percent) agreed to the 
assertion as well, while only 44 (5.3percent) were undecided, 109 (13.1percent) 
disagreed and 137 (16.5 percent) strongly disagree. The results of the interviews show 
that there were several cases of violent conflicts among clans in Ebiraland except in 
Ogori, for example between Ogu and Omoye clan groups, Agada and Okovi in 
Okene, Ire and Ohegbe, Adavi Vosu, Ihima among others. However, respondents 
interviewed believed that all the aforementioned crises and many others were inspired 
by political contests with clannish colouration. The import of this is that the exercise 
of political supremacy between or among clan leaders often leads to violent conflicts 
in Ebiraland. This probably often occurs in democratic dispensation.   
 
Derived from responses to earlier question is the statement that hinges on political 
affiliation on clan lines. The statement is “each clan is often affiliated to a particular 
political party” responses are presented in Table 15 below: 
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Table 15 Political Affiliation of Clan 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 153 18.0 18.4 18.4 
  Disagree 157 18.5 18.9 37.3 
  Undecided 79 9.3 9.5 46.9 
  Agree 229 26.9 27.6 74.5 
  strongly agree 212 24.9 25.5 100.0 
  Total 830 97.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)   
As shown in Table 15 above, 25 percent of the respondents or 212 respondents are of 
the opinion that each clan is affiliated to a particular political party. Slightly higher 
respondents agreed to the statement 229 (27.6 percent). Overall 37 percent of the 
respondents showed various degrees of disagreements with the fact that each clan is 
affiliated to a party. Only 9.5 percent of the respondents seemed not to have enough 
evidence to make decision on the mono-political affiliation of clans in Ebiraland. 
However, if the evidence in Table 15 is weighed, there is a cause for concern given 
the place of political difference in conflict (Table 12) in the area. 
 
A follow up item probed the use of clan affiliation to foster individual‟s political 
ambition and the consequence of inter-clan conflict. Respondents‟ reactions are as 
captured in Table 16 below. 
 
Table 16 Inter-Clan Conflicts and Political Ambition 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 strongly disagree 165 19.4 19.9 19.9 
  Disagree 106 12.5 12.8 32.7 
  Undecided 85 10.0 10.2 42.9 
  Agree 257 30.2 31.0 73.9 
  strongly agree 217 25.5 26.1 100.0 
  Total 830 97.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
Before going into the analysis of the table above, it is necessary to state that in 
politically developed setting where issues and welfare drive political competition, 
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tribal and clan sentiments exert less influence as basis for political followership. 
However, history of political competition in Nigeria does not wholesomely support 
this view point which is also reflected in our case study. From Table 16 above 26.1 
percent of the respondents strongly agreed to the fact that clan affiliation is often 
employed to foster individual political ambition. In other words, these respondents 
believed that the clan of political office seeker is more an issue rather than his 
political programmes and agenda for the welfare of the society. Above half of the 
respondents agreed in various degrees that clan affiliation as used to foster political 
support engenders inter-clan conflict.  85 respondents or 10 percent of the respondents 
were undicided on the issue while less than 30 percent of the respondents disagreed 
with the satement that clan affiliation used to foster political ambition is a source of 
inter-clan conflict.  
 
The analysis above confirms that political office seekers by their activities often fan 
the embers of inter-clan conflicts. Observations from FGD (2011) also supported the 
above position that, contests for political power by political elites in different clans 
often lead to polarization or support based on clan affiliations.  
 
 
Close to the question above is an attempt to assess competition for clan headship and 
violence in the region. This is not unconnected with the fact that, clan heads wield 
much influence over the clan and serve as rally point for the clan‟s cultural and 
political viewpoints. Consequently, succession to clan headship has attracted much 
interest from the government, competitors to clan headship and individuals charged 
with responsibilities of appointing clan heads. The interest is more exacerbated where 
several qualified candidates are to be screened to the most qualified. Consequently, to 
test the validity of competition for clan headship the statement was raised “succession 
to clan headship involve contest among the ruling houses” which explored the nature 
of contest between contestants in the ruling houses. The responses are as shown below 
in Table 17. 
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Table 17 Clan Headship Succession 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 89 10.5 10.7 10.7 
  Disagree 233 27.4 27.9 38.6 
  Undecided 107 12.6 12.8 51.4 
  Agree 244 28.7 29.3 80.7 
  strongly agree 161 18.9 19.3 100.0 
  Total 834 98.1 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
Assessing the reactions of respondents in Table 17 above, 161 respondents or (19.3 
percent) strongly agreed that sucession to clan headship involved contests among the 
ruling houses, 244 (29.3 percent) merely agreed, 107 (12.8 percent) undecided, 233 
(27.9 percent) disagreed and 89 (10.7 percent) strongly disagreed. The total number of 
respondents indicating varying degrees of agreement with the opinion amount to 405 
(48.6 percent). The views expressed by Ohinoyi of Ebiraland indicated that 
succession to clan headship involves contest among ruling houses. That is, the 
selection procedures involved competition rather than ascendancy on the basis of 
seniority or some other criteria based on tradition. 
 
The follow up item to the above examines the relationship between contest for 
supremacy among clans and conflict in Ebiraland. Traditionally, clans may be ranked 
according to seniority based on history or origin of a community. Key positions in 
such a community may be reserved for specific clans which may have justification in 
the tradition of the community or based on time of settlement or some criteria in 
tandem with traditions of the people. Succeeding generations put in a disadvantaged 
position may not be comfortable with such arrangement. Hence, while those that are 
not benefiting much with such arrangement may want to challenge the status quo, 
those gaining from it may fight for the perpetuation of it which may lead to conflicts. 
In addition, decisions and actions of groups and political party in power determine 
much of social and economic well being of others. Clans therefore, may strive for 
political relevance in the main stream of political group and party at the state and 
federal levels. Conflicts are promoted when clans are of different political divides 
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within a state and the clan affiliated to the main stream of political group may want to 
assert its supremacy over other clans who may resist such disposition. 
 
Therefore, the issue of contest for political supremacy among clans and its 
implications for conflict in Ebiraland were explored. Table 18 below portrays 
respondents‟ responses to the assertion “contest for political supremacy among clans 
has implications for conflicts in Ebiraland”.   
Table 18 Political Supremacy and Clan Conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 124 14.6 15.0 15.0 
  Disagree 113 13.3 13.6 28.6 
  Undecided 60 7.1 7.2 35.8 
  Agree 254 29.9 30.6 66.5 
  strongly agree 278 32.7 33.5 100.0 
  Total 829 97.5 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
 
The question elicited overwhelming responses that contest for political supremacy 
among clans has implications for conflict in Ebiraland. 278 (33.5percent) strongly 
agreed to the statement above, 254 (30.6percent) agreed, only 60 (7.2percent) were 
undecided, 113 (13.6percent) disagreed and 124 (15.0 percent) strongly disagreed. 
This finding appears constant wth the position of discussants during FGD (2011) that 
contest for political power between two clans has implication for conflict. For 
instance, an individual from another clan may usurp the position exclusively reserved 
for a particular clan through the use of money or political connections which may 
result in violence. 
 
5.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER AND CONFLICT 
Political power affords individuals in politics to influence others and determine the 
course of events in most cases. The following subsection explores series of questions 
on the relationship between political power and conflicts in Ebiraland. The first in the 
series of statements under this subsection was designed in this manner “privileges 
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attached to political offices encourage violent contest for elective post” the results are 
as contained in Table 19 below: 
Table 19 Privileges of Political Offices 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 strongly disagree 51 6.0 6.2 6.2 
  Disagree 63 7.4 7.6 13.8 
  Undecided 51 6.0 6.2 20.0 
  Agree 214 25.2 25.9 45.9 
  strongly agree 446 52.5 54.1 100.0 
  Total 825 97.1 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
 446 (54.1percent) strongly agreed that such privileges encourage violent contest for 
such political posts, 214 (25.9 percent) merely agreed 51 (6.27 percent) were 
undecided, only 114 representing (13.8) percent were in opposition to the assertion. 
The total percentage of those that agreed (strongly and merely) is 80 percent which  
shows that an overwhelming respondents are of the view that privileges attached to 
political offices encourage violent contest for elective posts.  
 
Political office seekers often contest for political power before a winner can emerge. 
Since it is a zero-sum game in which one of the contestants must win and others 
invariably become loosers, we sought to know whether competition for political 
offices is the major cause of violent conflicts in Ebiraland. Hence the statement: 
“competition for political offices is the main cause of violent conflict in Ebiraland” 
the analysis is presented in Table 20: 
Table 20 Political Competition and conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 59 6.9 7.2 7.2 
  Disagree 63 7.4 7.7 14.8 
  Undecided 39 4.6 4.7 19.6 
  Agree 312 36.7 37.9 57.5 
  strongly agree 350 41.2 42.5 100.0 
  Total 823 96.8 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
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350 respondents or 42.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed to the statement 
above with 312 respondents merely agreeing representing 37.9 percent, 39 
respondents or 4.7 percent were undecided, 63 respondents (7.7 percent) disagreed on 
the issue raised in the question and 7.2 percent of the respondents expressed strong 
disagreement with the question. On the whole, the total percentage of those 
expressing varying degrees of agreement equals 80.4 percent of the respondents. This 
view supports the findings in the previous section that politics is the major driver of 
conflicts in Ebiraland. 
The level of political tolerance and maturity of politicians in any political enclave is 
often tested during elections. In addition, the relationship between politics and violent 
conflict can better be understood during elections. In order to assess whether violence 
is more intense during election time, a similar assertion to the above was designed- 
“violence is more intense and frequent in Ebiraland during election times”. The 
respondents‟ reactions are as encapsulated in Table 21 below: 
Table 21 Violence and election  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 22 2.6 2.7 2.7 
  Disagree 41 4.8 5.0 7.6 
  Undecided 41 4.8 5.0 12.6 
  Agree 311 36.6 37.6 50.2 
  strongly agree 412 48.5 49.8 100.0 
  Total 827 97.3 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)   
It was observed that almost a majority of the respondents are strongly in agreement to 
the assertion that violence is more intense during elections. Thus, 412 (49.8 percent), 
311(37.6percent) strongly and merely agreed 41(5.0percent) undecided 63 
representing just (7.7percent) were in total disagreement to the statement.The 
summation of those that agreed (strongly and merely) is 87.4 percent.The above 
findings are in line with arguments of some of our respondents during interview: 
“Whatever happens that has traces of violence (sic) in Ebiraland has connection with 
politics” (Jeremiah, 2011).  Another respondent from Ihima also said “violence came 
to Ebiraland as a result of politics” (Okagara, 2011). In the same vein, Obeitor (2011) 
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contends that crises in Ebiraland were escalated by politics. A clan spokesman Raji 
(2011) interviewed in Lokoja said “violence is only during politics, without politics 
there is no violence”. In fact, Ohinoyi of Ebiraland Ado (2011) during interview 
conducted through proxy explicated that there are three causes of violent conflicts in 
Ebiraland: clan divide, masquerade festivital and politics. But the influence of politics 
on violence in Ebiraland dominates other factors. 
 
Political conflicts most often are the handiwork of political entrepreneurs popularly 
known as political elites who drive wedge of division within a group or among groups 
by dividing them along thin or major lines of differences for their political advantage 
with implication for violence. An attempt was made to interrogate the employment of 
violence by political elites through mobilization of people along group lines. Table 22 
detailed responses of our respondents to the statement “political elite employ violence 
to mobilize people along group lines for their political advantage”.   
 
Table 22 Elite Mobilization of People along Group Lines and Conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 68 8.0 8.2 8.2 
  Disagree 40 4.7 4.8 13.1 
  Undecided 42 4.9 5.1 18.1 
  Agree 323 38.0 39.1 57.2 
  strongly agree 354 41.6 42.8 100.0 
  Total 827 97.3 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
 The above findings revealed that 354 (42.8 percent) strongly agreed, that elites use 
violence to mobilize people along ethnic lines for their political advantage 323 (39.1 
percent) merely agreed, 42 (5.1percent) undecided 40 (4.8percent) disagreed 68 (8.2 
percent) strongly disagreed to the statement. The percentage sum of those that agreed 
(strongly and merely) is 81.9 that is, 81.9 percent believed that political elites 
employed violence to mobilize people along group lines for their political advantage.  
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In some societies, conflict sometimes is predicated on the ways societies are 
structured and organized. If the structure of a society puts a particular group in a 
position to monopolise political and socio-economic advantages to the detriment of 
other groups, conflict may ensue. Thus, we try to find out whether political structure 
in the state has a major role in violent conflict in Ebiraland. A statement was raised- 
“The political structure of the state has implication on unrest in Ebiraland”.  the 
responses of respondents are as presented in Table 23 below:  
 
 Table23 State Political Structure and Conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Strongly Disagree 49 5.8 5.9 5.9 
  Disagree 50 5.9 6.1 12.0 
  Undecided 66 7.8 8.0 20.0 
  Agree 324 38.1 39.3 59.3 
  strongly Agree 335 39.4 40.7 100.0 
  Total 824 96.9 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
Perceptions of our respondents indicate that political structure of the state has 
implication for unrest in Ebiraland. Analysis of the respondents shows that 335(40.7 
percent) strongly agreed that it did, 324(39.3 percent) agree 66 (8.0percent) undecided 
50 (6.1 percent) disagree 49 (5.9 percent) strongly disagree. 80 percent of the 
respondents agreed strongly and merely. 
 
 Analysis of our respondents during interview and Focus Group Discussion revealed 
the fact that opinions are divided on whether the political structure of the state has 
implication on violent conflict in Ebiraland. While some believed it did some did not 
agree. Those in agreement argued that politicians who formed alliance with 
government in power are seen as traitors and betrayers of the common course of the 
Ebiras. The Kogi State Government is dominated by the Igalas, thus they see the 
Ebiras that joined the Igalas as oppressors and enemies and during crisis they make 
them object of attacks. Others opined that this cannot be said to be true because the 
Ebiras do not attack Igalas during crisis rather they attack fellow Ebiras, thereby 
debunking the claim that the structure of the state has implication for violent conflicts 
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in Ebiraland. Also, the Ebiras are spread in the major political parties in the state even 
though a particular clan- “omoye”that also constitutes the majority, are predominantly 
members of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). 
 
A follow up question to the above Table 23 was asked for a thorough examination of 
the relationship between the structure of the state and violence in Ebiraland. Thus, the 
question on whether “perceived domination of the state by a section of the state 
promotes conflicts in Ebiraland”. The responses are as indicated below: 
 
Table 24 Perceived domination of the state apparatuses by a section  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Strongly Disagree 84 9.9 10.2 10.2 
  Disagree 107 12.6 13.0 23.2 
  Undecided 96 11.3 11.6 34.8 
  Agree 217 25.5 26.3 61.1 
  Strongly Agree 321 37.8 38.9 100.0 
  Total 825 97.1 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
 321 (38.9percent) strongly agreed that perceived domination of the state apparatuses 
by a section has implication for violent conflicts in Ebiraland 217(26.3 percent) 
merely agreed to the assertion 96 (11.6 percent) undecided, 107(13.0 percent) 
disagreed 84 (10.2 percent) strongly disagreed with the statement above. Total 
percentage of those that agreed (strongly and merely) is 65percent. This suggests that 
perceived domination of the state by a section has a role in conflicts in Ebiraland. 
 
We also sought to know whether activities of political parties cause violent conflicts 
in Ebiraland. In a nutshell, the responses to the question “Activities of political parties 
provide avenue for clashes among their supporters” are as depicted in Table 25 below: 
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Table 25 Activities of Political Parties and clashes among supporters 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Strongly Disagree 132 15.5 16.1 16.1 
  Disagree 84 9.9 10.2 26.3 
  Undecided 70 8.2 8.5 34.8 
  Agree 302 35.5 36.7 71.5 
  Strongly Agree 233 27.4 28.3 99.9 
  Total 822 96.7 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
 233 (28.3 percent) strongly agreed to the statement 302 (36.7 percent) agreed 70 (8.5 
percent) undecided 84 (10. 2 percent) disagreed 132 (16.1 percent) strongly disagreed. 
In summary 65percent strongly and merely agreed that political parties‟ activities 
provide avenue for clashes among supporters. It can be deduced from the above that 
activities of political parties are also one of the drivers of conflicts in Ebiraland. 
Election results are a litmus test of the popularity and acceptability of political office 
seekers. Since acquisition of political power is often considered the gateway to 
economic prosperity as stated in the introduction to Chapter One of this study, 
politicians often see victory in an election as a do or die affair. Hence electoral defeat 
appears a difficult pill to swallow which may be contested through violence. In order 
to test whether election results‟ have implications for violent conflicts in Ebiraland, a 
question was designed in this manner- “election results can lead to violent conflicts”. 
Table 26 shows the responses of our respondents to the question. 
Table 26 Electoral results and violence 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 132 15.5 15.9 15.9 
  Disagree 101 11.9 12.2 28.1 
  Undecided 66 7.8 8.0 36.1 
  Agree 283 33.3 34.2 70.3 
  strongly agree 246 28.9 29.7 100.0 
  Total 828 97.4 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
246 (29.7 percent) strongly agreed that election results can lead to violent conflicts, 
283(34.2 percent) agreed, 66 (8.0 percent) undecided, 101(12.2 percent) disagreed, 
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132(15.5 percent) strongly disagreed that election results could lead to violent 
conflicts. In all 63.9 percent agreed both (strongly andd merely). The finding above 
suggests that there is a linkage between election results and violent conflicts in 
Ebiraland. 
 
Politics is all about struggle for power, resources, and values among others. We 
sought to establish whether there is a link between struggles for power among groups 
and conflicts in the region. Hence, we put up a statement- “there is a deep-seated 
struggle among warring groups to acquire, use and retain power and conflict in 
Ebiraland”. Table 27 below detailed the responses.  
 
Table 27 Struggle among Groups for Power and Conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 65 7.6 7.9 7.9 
  Disagree 123 14.5 14.9 22.8 
  Undecided 107 12.6 13.0 35.8 
  Agree 287 33.8 34.9 70.7 
  strongly agree 241 28.4 29.3 100.0 
  Total 823 96.8 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
 241(29.3 percent) strongly agreed, 287(34.9 percent) agree, 107 (13.0 percent) 
undecided, 123(14.9 percent) disagreed, 65 (7.9 percent) strongly disagreed. The 
results got from the interview confirm this fact. A traditional ruler from Ihima 
Jeremiah (2011) asserted that “the politicians in most cases when they strive to win 
election often degenerates into violence as their followers become violent to each 
other”. 
 
5.4 INTRA AND INTER-PARTY CLASHES 
This section attempts to gain insight into the dynamics of intra and inter-party 
political disagreement and its implications for conflicts in Ebiraland. The issue of 
political disagreement among political elites within and between parties may be 
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pursued violently.  Tables 31, 32 and 33 capture the responses of the respondents to a 
set of questions in this line of thought. 
 Thus, in order to examine the role of intra-party conflict especially during election 
and violence in Ebiraland a question was posed- “political competition within a party 
for elective post often results in violence‟‟. Responses to this question are detailed in 
Table 28 below: 
Table 28 Intra-party Political Competition and Violenec 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Strongly disagree 50 5.9 6.0 6.0 
  Disagree 87 10.2 10.5 16.5 
  Undecided 62 7.3 7.5 23.9 
  Agree 364 42.8 43.8 67.7 
  Strongly agree 269 31.6 32.3 100.0 
  Total 832 97.9 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
 269 (32.3 percent) respondents strongly agreed to the statement that intra-party 
competition for political offices has implication on violence in Ebiraland, 364 (43.8 
percent) merely agreed, 62 (7.5 percent) were undecided, 87 (10.5 percent) disagreed 
and 50 (6.0 percent) strongly disagreed. In summary 76.1 percent of the total 
respondents agreed (strongly and merely). With 76.1 percent of our respondents 
agreeing to the the question raised authenticates the fact that intra-part squabble has 
implications on unrest in Ebiraland. 
 
 A follow- up item intended to assess the role of inter-party conflicts in violent    
conflicts in Ebiraland through this statement- “Political Competition between parties 
are pursued violently” the results are as presented in Table 29. 
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  Table 29 Competition between parties and Violence 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 strongly disagree 54 6.4 6.5 6.5 
  Disagree 85 10.0 10.2 16.7 
  Undecided 54 6.4 6.5 23.2 
  Agree 390 45.9 46.8 70.0 
  strongly agree 250 29.4 30.0 100.0 
  Total 833 98.0 100.0   
     
 Source: Author (2011)  
To the above question, 250 (30.0percent) strongly agreed that political competition 
between parties are pursued violently, 390 (46.8percent) merely agreed, 54 
(6.5percent) undecided, 85 (10.2percent) disagreed and 54 (6.5percent) strongly 
disagreed. In all 76.8percent agreed (strongly and merely). This implies that inter-
party competion for political power is among the factors that generates conflicts in the 
land.    
Lastly, under this section the researcher intend to probe into the interface between the 
politics of winners take it all (winner geting all advantages derivable from winning in 
an election to a political office) and loosers lose it all (missing all benefits accruable 
to political office as a result of electoral defeat) syndrome in Nigeria‟s politics and its 
implication on violence in Ebiraland. This is premised on the fact that local politics is 
a mirror of national politics in most countries. Hence the question “winners take it all 
in multi-party system like Nigeria has implication on violent conflicts in Ebiraland”. 
Table 30 below sums up responses of our respondents to the statement:  
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Table 30 Winners take it all violent conflict  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 57 6.7 6.9 6.9 
  Disagree 105 12.4 12.7 19.6 
  Undecided 89 10.5 10.8 30.4 
  Agree 333 39.2 40.3 70.6 
  strongly agree 243 28.6 29.4 100.0 
  Total 827 97.3 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
 
 243 (29.4 percent) strongly agreed that indeed it did (that winers take it all approach 
to politics in Nigeria has implication for violence in Ebiraland), 333 (40.3 percent) 
merely agreed, 89 (10.8 percent) were undecided, 105 (12.7 percent) disagreed and 57 
(6.9 percent) strongly disagreed. In all, 69.7 percent agreed (strongly and merely) to 
the statement. It can be deduced from the findings above that politics and violence in 
Ebiraland are a fall out of violence-oriented politics at the national level. 
 
5.5 INTERVENING VARIABLES BETWEEN POLITICS AND CONFLICTS 
This section attempts to shed light on some intervening variables between politics and 
conflict. Under this section, the following factors were discussed in relation to conflict 
in the region. They include youth unemployment, poor educational background and 
economic gain of conflict, struggle for land, masquerade festival, and struggle for 
chieftaincy titles. The essence is to find out if the variables listed above among others 
serve as intervening factors between politics and conflicts in Ebiraland. The 
researcher  explored the youth as the first variable. Thus, Tables 34-35 examined 
youth unemployment, poor educational background and economic gain correlates of 
conflict. One significant issue here is that socio-economic milieu created by the state 
is fundamental to the issue of youth involvement in violent conflict. This prompted us 
to inquire from our respondents the issue of youth unemployment as the basis for 
youth involvement in violent conflict in Ebiraland. The table below is the presentation 
of the responses of the respondents to this assertion. 
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 Table 31 Youth Unemployment and Conflicts  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 34 4.0 4.1 4.1 
  Disagree 39 4.6 4.7 8.8 
  Undecided 19 2.2 2.3 11.1 
  Agree 166 19.5 20.0 31.0 
  strongly agree 574 67.5 69.0 100.0 
  Total 832 97.9 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)   
 It is important to know that 547(69.0 percent) strongly agreed that unemployment 
among youths has implication for their involvement in violent conflicts in Ebiraland, 
while 166 (20.0 percent) merely agreed, (2.2 percent) undecided (4.7 percent) 
disagreed (4.1 percent) strongly disagreed to the postulation. In other words 89 
percent agreed (strongly and merely). This confirms the fact that youth unemployment 
plays a cardinal role in violence in Ebiraland. The response from interview and Focus 
Group Discussion conducted revealed that youths are the tools of violent conflict in 
Ebiraland because of unemployment. The unanimous position by our respondents was 
that when Ajaokuta Steel Company and Itakpe Iron Ore Company were functioning, it 
absorbed quite a number of youths in Ebiraland. In fact, Ajaokuta Steel Company 
absorbed not less than 10,000 workers and cases of violence in Ebiraland were 
reduced to the bearest minimum. But with the moribund state of the two companies, 
youth have become willing tools in the hands of politicians who frequently use them 
for their selfish political gains. Some of our respondents argued that politicians in 
Ebiraland do not believe they can win election without using the youth as thugs. 
Closely in line with the above is the statement “Poor educational background and 
economic gain are the main motivation for youth involment in violence”. The results 
are shown below: 
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Table 32 Poor educational background and economic gain  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 46 5.4 5.5 5.5 
  Disagree 49 5.8 5.9 11.4 
  Undecided 30 3.5 3.6 15.0 
  Agree 227 26.7 27.2 42.2 
  strongly agree 483 56.8 57.8 100.0 
  Total 835 98.2 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)   
On this question, 483 (57.8percent) strongly agreed 227 (27.2percent) merely agreed 
30 (3.6percent) undecided 49 (5.9percent) disagreed 46 (5.5percent) strongly 
disagreed. In summary, 85percent agreed (strongly and merely) that poor educational 
background and economic gain from conflicts were some of the factors responsible 
for conflicts in the land. The position of respondents interviewed corroborated the 
above. It can be gleaned from their position that the prevalent family style in 
Ebiraland has implication for poor educational condition of quite a number of youths. 
This is because an average Ebira man marries many wives with chain of concubines. 
Thus, they keep procreating without proper plan to care for such children.  Many of 
such children live with their maternal grand parents. These children are neither in 
school nor learning any trade and are not under parental control. Roaming about the 
streets, some end up as thugs for politicians. Observations of the respondents during 
Focus Group Discussion, (2011) showed that if a youth is given 1,000 naira, it is 
enough to make such a youth kill in the interest of the benefactor. 
 
Having looked at youth factor in violent conflict in Ebiraland, the focus now is on 
another variable which is land. This is predicated on the fact that land has generated 
protracted conflicts in some regions as a result of value attached to it. This prompted 
us to inquire from our respondents if they think economic values of land, land 
ownership and inter-group struggle for land has implications on violent conflicts in 
Ebiraland. Tables 33 to 35 present analysis on the impact of land on conflict in the 
region. Table 33 below is a summation of responses to the statement “economic 
values of land has increased struggle for land ownership”,   
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Table 33 Economic values of land 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 strongly disagree 69 8.1 8.3 8.3 
  Disagree 117 13.8 14.1 22.4 
  Undecided 84 9.9 10.1 32.5 
  Agree 278 32.7 33.5 66.0 
  strongly agree 282 33.2 34.0 100.0 
  Total 830 97.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
282 (34.0 percent) strongly agreed 278(33.5 percent) merely agreed to the assertion, 
84 (10.17 percent) undecided 117(14.1 percent) disagreed 69 (8.3 percent) strongly 
disagree to the postulation. The percentage of those that strongly and merely agreed is 
67.5percent.  This shows that there is struggle for land in the area. We now beam our 
searchlight on wether struggle for land is one of the drivers of conflicts in the area. 
The responses of the respondents to the statement “land ownership system breeds 
conflicts in Ebiraland” are given in Table 34 below: 
Table 34 Land ownership and conflicts  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 101 11.9 12.3 12.3 
  Disagree 249 29.3 30.2 42.5 
  Undecided 105 12.4 12.7 55.2 
  Agree 216 25.4 26.2 81.4 
  strongly agree 153 18.0 18.6 100.0 
  Total 824 96.9 100.0   
        
       
Source: Author (2011)  
153(18.6percent) strongly agreed 216(26.2percent) merely agreed 105(12.7percent) 
undecided 249 (30.2 percent) disagreed 101(12.3percent) strongly disagreed. In 
summary, only 44.8percent agreed (strongly and merely).  The findings above show 
that land dispute is not a major factor of conflicts in the region. 
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To further capture the relevance of land ownership on violent conflicts in Ebiraland, 
the question was reframed in a different way as “inter-.group struggle for land 
ownership (between groups/individuals) is often attended with violent conflict”. The 
statement was responded to in the manner contained in Table 35 below: 
Table 35Inter-group struggle for land and conflicts 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 121 14.2 14.6 14.6 
  Disagree 252 29.6 30.3 44.9 
  Undecided 111 13.1 13.4 58.2 
  Agree 201 23.6 24.2 82.4 
  strongly agree 146 17.2 17.6 100.0 
  Total 831 97.8 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
146 (17.6 percent) strongly agreed to the assertion 201(24.2 percent) merely agreed 
111(13.4 percent) undecided 252 (30.3 percent) disagreed 121(14.6 percent) strongly 
disagreed with the statement above. In all, only 41.8 percent agreed (strongly and 
merely). The implication of our findings is that land ownership, acquisition and use 
have no major role in communal conflicts in Ebiraland. 
Another variable the researcher sought to find out whether it interferes with politics 
and conflict is the masquerade festival (which is a major part of the larger culture of 
the Ebiras). It has been shown in Chapter Two of the study that, culture which is an 
agent of socialization could provide a convenient platform for violent conflict. In an 
attempt to examine the validity of this proposition, a number of statements were used 
to probe into the relationship between masquerade festival and violent conflicts in 
Ebiraland.  Tables 41 to 44 present the implications of masquerade festivals on violent 
conflict in Ebiraland. The first statement on the list is “politicians and groups political 
interests make masquerade festival conflict prone”. The responses of our respondents 
are contained in Table 36 below: 
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Table 36 Politicians, groups’ political interests and masquerade festival 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 85 10.0 10.3 10.3 
  Disagree 146 17.2 17.8 28.1 
  Undecided 81 9.5 9.9 38.0 
  Agree 215 25.3 26.2 64.1 
  strongly agree 295 34.7 35.9 100.0 
  Total 822 96.7 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
295(35.9 percent) strongly agreed that politicians and group political interests make 
masquerade festival conflict prone 215(26.2 percent) merely agreed to the statement 
81(9.9 percent) undecided 146 (17.8 percent) disagreed 85(10.3 percent) strongly 
expressed disagreement to the statement. In summary, 62.2 percent agreed (strongly 
and merely) that politicians and group political interests as demostrated during 
masquerade festival have implication for violence in the land.  
The results of a similar question designed to assess the role of masquerade festival in 
political groupings in the area is revealed in the Table 37 below: 
Table 37 Group Political Affiliation and Masquerade Festivals 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 115 13.5 14.0 14.0 
  Disagree 222 26.1 27.0 41.0 
  Undecided 84 9.9 10.2 51.2 
  Agree 215 25.3 26.2 77.4 
  strongly agree 186 21.9 22.6 100.0 
  Total 822 96.7 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
 186 (22.6 percent) strongly agreed that political affiliation of groups are often 
demonstrated in masquerade festivals. 215(26.2 percent) merely agreed to the 
assertion; 84 (10.27 percent) undecided 222 (27.0 percent) disagreed 115 (14.0 
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percent) strongly disagreed to the statement. The total percentage of respondents that 
agreed (strongly and merely) is 48.8 percent. 
As a follow up to this, the issue of political acceptability and supremacy was looked 
into within the context of masquerade festivals as depicted in Table 38 below:  
Table 38 Political acceptability and supremacy  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 138 16.2 16.8 16.8 
  Disagree 195 22.9 23.7 40.5 
  Undecided 154 18.1 18.7 59.2 
  Agree 204 24.0 24.8 84.0 
  strongly agree 132 15.5 16.0 100.0 
  Total 823 96.8 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
The responses of the respondent to the question, “Political acceptability and 
supremacy are pursued through masquerade festival”. From the Table above, it is 
observed that, 132 (16.0 percent) strongly agreed that political acceptability and 
supremacy are pursued through the masquerade festival, 204 (24.8 percent) merely 
agreed 154 (18.7percent) undecided 195 while 333 responses representing (40.5 
percent) have contrary view. The total number of those who strongly agreed and 
merely agreed is (48.8 percent). It is deducible from the above that masquerade 
festival only plays a nominal role in political acceptability and supremacy in 
Ebiraland. 
The researcher also sought to know whether superiority and power contest between 
masquerade groups is a major cause of conflicts in the area. To this end, this question 
was asked- “superiority and power contest between masquerade groups is a major 
cause of conflicts in Ebiraland”. Below is the tabular analysis of our respondents: 
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Table 39 Superiority and power contest between masquerade groups  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 110 12.9 13.3 13.3 
  Disagree 113 13.3 13.7 27.0 
  Undecided 84 9.9 10.2 37.1 
  Agree 243 28.6 29.4 66.5 
  strongly agree 277 32.6 33.5 100.0 
  Total 827 97.3 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
 In this item, it is observed that, 227 (33.5 percent) strongly agreed to the assertion 
243 (29.4 percent) merely agreed 84 (10.2 percent) undecided 113(13.7 percent) 
disagreed 110 (13.3 percent) strongly disagreed to the question. A total of 62.9 
percent strongly and merely agreed. The implication of our finding is that superiority 
and power contest among masquerade groups in Ebiraland is one of the sources of 
conflicts in the area.  
Table 40 below illustrates the percentage of responses to the question on whether 
masquerade festivals provide avenue for the expression of political interests and 
alliances 
 
Table 40 Masquerade festivals and expression of Political Alliances 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 strongly disagree 216 25.4 26.1 26.1 
  Disagree 137 16.1 16.5 42.6 
  Undecided 75 8.8 9.1 51.7 
  Agree 244 28.7 29.5 81.2 
  strongly agree 156 18.4 18.8 100.0 
  Total 828 97.4 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
 
156 (18.8 percent) strongly agreed that it did 244 (29.5 percent) merely agreed 75(9. 
1percent) undecided 137(16.5 percent) disagreed 216 (26.1 percent) strongly 
disagreed to the assertion. The total number of percentage of the respondents that 
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agreed (strongly and merely) is 48.3 percent. Thus, it is deducible from the above that 
there is no strong relationship between masquerade festivals and expression of 
political alliances. 
Furthermore, in order to gain deeper insight into the role of masquerade festival and 
conflicts in Ebiraland, the statement was raised “Politicians often draw the support of 
masquerade groups to advance their interests”. The results are presented in Table 41: 
Table 41 Politicians often draw the support of masquerade groups 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 105 12.4 12.7 12.7 
  Disagree 118 13.9 14.2 26.9 
  Undecided 96 11.3 11.6 38.4 
  Agree 308 36.2 37.1 75.5 
  strongly agree 203 23.9 24.5 100.0 
  Total 830 97.6 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
203 (24.5 percent) strongly agreed 308(37.1 percent) merely agreed 96(11.6 percent) 
undecided 118(14.2 percent) disagreed 105(12.7 percent) strongly disagreed.Total 
percentage of those that agreed (strongly and merely) is 61.6 percent. We understand 
from the findings above that politicians in Ebiraland are in the habit of drawing 
support from masquerade groups to further their political interests which may results 
in the polarization and politicization of masquerade groups, with implication for 
violence. 
Table 42 is the presentation of the respondents‟ reactions to the question “Political 
affiliation and views of public praise singers during festivals often promote conflicts 
in Ebiraland”. 
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Table 42 Political affiliation and views of public praise singers during festivals 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 101 11.9 12.1 12.1 
  Disagree 122 14.4 14.7 26.8 
  Undecided 82 9.6 9.9 36.7 
  Agree 243 28.6 29.2 65.9 
  strongly agree 284 33.4 34.1 100.0 
  Total 832 97.9 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011)  
284 (34.1 percent) are strongly of the view that there is a correlation between political 
affiliation and views of public praise singers during festivals and conflicts in 
Ebiraland, 243 (29.2 percent) merely agreed to the statement 82 (9.9 percent) 
undecided while 223 representing (26.8 percent) are of contrary opinion.The total 
percentage of respondents that strongly and merely agreed is 63.3 percent. The 
submission above is a reflection of (one of the respondents interviewed) Uveida 
(2011) who avers that one of the causes of conflicts in Ebiraland is hinged on public 
praise singers recounting the negative past of opposing clan(s) during masquerade 
festivals couhed in abusive tone. 
In the same vein, another statement was used to test the veracity of the above position 
“masquerade festivals are used to pursue personal and clan conflicts” The results from 
Table 43 below show that: 
Table 43 Masquerade Festivals and Personal/ Clan conflict 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 111 13.1 13.4 13.4 
  Disagree 122 14.4 14.7 28.0 
  Undecided 44 5.2 5.3 33.3 
  Agree 234 27.5 28.2 61.5 
  strongly agree 320 37.6 38.5 100.0 
  Total 831 97.8 100.0   
        
       
Source: Author (2011) 
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320(38.5 percent) strongly agreed that masquerade festivals are used to pursue 
personal and clan conflicts while, 234(28.2 percent) merely agreed to the assertion 
44(5.3 percent) undecided 122(14.7 percent) disagreed 111(13.4 percent) strongly 
disagreed to the question. Total percentage of the respondents that strongly and 
merely agreed is 66.7percent. The import of this is that masquerade festivals in 
Ebiraland is a veritable tool for the pursuit of personal and clan politics.  
Responses to the previous question on the use of masquerade festival to pursue 
personal and clan conflicts in Ebiraland prompted us to inquire from our respondents 
if they think strict control of masquerade activities will reduce conflicts in Ebiraland 
as shown in Table 44 below: 
Table 44 Control of Masquerade Activities and Reduction in Conflicts 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 84 9.9 10.1 10.1 
  Disagree 86 10.1 10.3 20.4 
  Undecided 27 3.2 3.2 23.7 
  Agree 205 24.1 24.6 48.3 
  strongly agree 430 50.6 51.7 100.0 
  Total 832 97.9 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
 
Majority responded overwhelmingly in affirmative 76.3percent strongly and merely 
agreed. From the various tables above, it can be deduced that masquerade festival is 
one of the drivers of conflicts in Ebiraland. Some of our respondents during interview 
and Focus Group Discussion also attested to this fact. For example, Ohinoyi of Ebira 
Alhaji Ado Ibrahim as stated before observed that there are three major causes of 
conflicts in Ebiraland. They are: politics, clan differences and masquerade festival 
although politics dominates other factors in Ebiraland. Yusuf (2011) reveals that 
masquerade festivals in Ebiraland are associated with “heavy competition among 
artists and there must be winners and losers and in the course of somebody trying to 
be a winner violence ensues”. Thus, he sees violence in Ebira politics as a carry-over 
from masquerade festivals. 
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In the same vein, another respondent interviewed, Uveida (2011), as stated before 
observed that competition among artists gives rise to political violence. This is often 
the case when a masquerade recount the negative past of opposing clan(s) violence is 
triggered. 
The above position was also supported by the observations from Focus Group 
Discussions (2011) that when elders were in control of masquerades with rules and 
regulations guiding their operations, violence was at a low ebb. Clannish conflicts 
ensued as masquerades became organised around clan lines leading to masquerades 
throwing verbal misiles at opposite clans. 
The next variable sought to investigate the interplay between politics and conflict in 
Ebiraland from the angle of struggle for chieftaincy titles. A statement was designed 
to probe the relationship between struggle for chieftaincy title and conflicts in Ebira: 
“struggles for chieftaincy title are one of the bases for conflicts in Ebiraland”. Table 
45 presents the analysis of the respondents‟ opinions: 
Table 45 Struggles for Chieftaincy Title 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 103 12.1 12.4 12.4 
  Disagree 182 21.4 21.8 34.2 
  Undecided 72 8.5 8.6 42.9 
  Agree 270 31.8 32.4 75.3 
  strongly agree 206 24.2 24.7 100.0 
  Total 833 98.0 100.0   
     
Source: Author (2011) 
  
From Table 45 above, it is observed that, 206 (24.7 percent) strongly agree that 
struggle for chieftaincy title is one of the bases for conflict in Ebiraland, 270 (32.4 
percent) merely agreed to the postulation 72(8.6 percent) undecided 182 (21.8 
percent) disagreed 103(12.4 percent) strongly disagreed to the statement. In summary, 
57.1percent affirmed strongly and merely that struggles for chieftaincy title has a role 
in conflicts in Ebiraland. However, observation during interview with Okaraga (2011) 
reveals that struggles for chieftaincy title and conflicts are more relevant to Ihima 
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group of district than other places in Ebiraland because chietaincy title has generated 
more violence in the area than other places in the land. 
We also sought to know whether the acceptability or otherwise of the central ruler in 
Ebiraland is a major factor of conflicts in the land. To this end the statement “lack of 
acceptable central leadership in Ebiraland is responsible for conflicts in the 
community” the responses as presented are contained inTable 46. 
Table 46 Lack of acceptable central leadership  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly  67 7.9 8.1 8.1 
  Disagree 85 10.0 10.3 18.4 
  Undecided 45 5.3 5.4 23.8 
  Agree 228 26.8 27.5 51.3 
  strongly agree 402 47.3 48.6 99.9 
       
  Total 828 97.4 100.0   
        
       
Source: Author (2011)  
To the above question, 402 (48.6 percent) strongly agreed 228(27.5 percent) merely 
agreed 45(5.4 percent) undecided 85(10.3 percent) disagreed 67 (8.17 percent) 
strongly disagreed. A total of 86.1 percent overwhelmingly affirmed that lack of 
acceptable central leadership in Ebiraland is responsible for conflicts in the 
community. This finding established the fact that the choice of the present Ohinoyi of 
Ebiraland Alhaji Ado Ibrahim does not enjoy the support of majority of the Ebira and 
thus has potential to generate conflicts in the land. In addition, since his choice is not 
acceptable to majority of the Ebiras, he can do little or nothing in his capacity to 
resolve conflict in the land as some of the respondents interviewed saw him as 
government appointee and not the true choice of Ebira people.   
Assessing the role of government in the creation of additional stool like Ohis and 
violent conflict in Ebiraland as shown in Table 47 a statement was raised, 
“Government creation of traditional stool like Ohis has implication for violent 
conflicts in Ebiraland”.  (See Table 47 below):  
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Table 47 Government creation of traditional stool 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 strongly disagree 244 28.7 29.4 29.4 
  Disagree 139 16.4 16.7 46.1 
  Undecided 70 8.2 8.4 54.5 
  Agree 197 23.2 23.7 78.2 
  strongly agree 181 21.3 21.8 100.0 
  Total 831 97.8 100.0   
       
Source: Author (2011) 
  
to this question, 181(21.8 percent) strongly agreed to the question 197 (23.77 percent) 
merely agreed to the assertion 70 (8.4 percent) undecided 139 (16.7 percent) 
disagreed 244 (29.4 percent) strongly disagreed to the statement. In all 45percent of 
our total respondents strongly and merely agreed that the creation of Ohi has 
implication for violence in Ebiraland. However, the creation of the Ohi stool and 
violence in Ebiraland is more peculiar to Ihima Group of District. This was observed 
during interview with Okagara who saw the creation of Ohi and the subsequent 
elevation of the position above his office as a slight on him and his office. 
5.6 Intervention Mechanisms 
There have been several mechanisms of managing conflicts in Ebiraland. According 
to Tenuche (2002b), these mechanisms can be classified into formal and informal 
methods. The control measures put forward by local and state government can be 
categorized as formal while the informal mechanisms are spareheaded by non-
governmental organizations. These two methods will be discussed briefly. 
The Local Government Council Chairman is the Chief Security Officer of the local 
government area in Ebiraland. The Chairman of Ebira Traditional Council is the 
Ohinoyi of Ebiraland. The Divisional Police Officers in all the local government 
councils in the area are automatically Security Committee members including the 
officers in charge of Customs and State Security Service, Prisons and Immigration. 
During crisis it is expected that security structure at the local government area should 
be able as a matter of fact contain the situation but this seldomly happens. This is 
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often predicated on complaints of lack of fund to address security situation in the area. 
The request for funds to tackle the alarming spate of violence in Ebiraland from the 
state government appears to be meeting brick wall because the state government 
appears not to be cooperating in this regard on the pretext that such funds have been 
misappropriated in the past. 
 
The inability of the local council chairmen to control violence in the area can be 
situated within the context of democratization process of the local government 
councils. As earlier stated, the various positions in the local councils in Ebiraland are 
being rotated among the various clans and sub-clans in the area. This has engendered 
absolute loyalty to clan and sub-clan groups in the area at the expense of the overall 
council. Consequently, attempts by the councils at curtailing violent conflicts are 
jeopardized by clannish and sub-clannish sentiments. For instance, it was discovered 
that local government chairmen do protect culprits (from their clans) from arrest and 
ensure their release from detention. Interfering with the course of justice on such 
primordial grounds as clannish affiliation has been a major bane in curtailing the 
violent conflicts in Ebiraland. In addition, members of panels and committees that 
were set up to determine the culpability of people involved in various violence 
discovered to their chagrin that their recommendations were not implemented 
particularly when their reports indicted the loyalists and clan groups of the authorities 
at the local council (Audu 2009). 
 
Similarly, the Kogi State Government has intervened in violent conflicts in Ebiraland 
at one time or the other. Its intervention usually takes the form of deploying law 
enforcement agents like the police and the army to trouble spots to contain the 
situation. Various panels and committees have been set up at the instance of the 
government with the aim of identifying culprits and making recommendations to 
forestall future occurrences. Some of the panels and committees include: Justice 
Ekundayo Panel on the Modality for Appointment of Ohinoyi of Ebiraland in 1978, 
the committee to find acceptable modality for the appointment of Ohinoyi of 
Ebiraland in 1997, the Judicial Panel of Enquiry to determine the causes of violent 
crisis between the Adavi Eba and Uppuvete in 2001, the Justice Ochimana Panel on 
the violent crisis in Ebiraland in 2002.  
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Some peace brokering committees have equally been involved in this effort. They 
include the Eminent Persons Group, headed by Rev, George Bako, other committees 
worth mentioning include late Yunusa Kadir, Justice Medupin to which government 
even issued white paper (Yahaya 2010), Rev. Anthony Akande Peace Committee set 
up in March 2008 and the recent A.C Alli Panel among others. The efforts of all the 
aforementioned panels and committees have not engendered peace in Ebiraland 
because reports and white papers of these panels and committees were never 
implemented by government. The aforementioned panels according to Raji (2012) 
were just cover up. The various governments of Kogi State headed by Igala from 
inception till date are not interested in peace in Ebiraland. If Ebira are at peace then 
they will be able to challenge the Igalas as they will ensure that political power shift 
from the East (Igala land) Kogi to the central (Ebiraland) Kogi. The governments are 
not interested in peace in Ebiraland as the return of peace to Ebiraland will forestall 
Igala agenda of domination. The various panels from onset were not planned to 
succed. In fact, nothing is heard about them.  
 
However, the former Chairman of Okene Local Government Alhaji Yahaya Karaku is 
seen as a harbinger of peace in Ebiraland as a result of his Invaluable contributions 
towards bringing peace to Ebiraland even though he incurred a colossal loss in the 
crisis. In fact, eight (8) of his family members were killed, his two houses and a car 
were burnt. During his administration as the Chairman of Okene Local Government, 
Yahaya Karaku invested N48 million to empower about 500 youths in his Local 
Government Area as joblessness among the youths was one of the factors identified to 
be responsible for their restiveness. The monetary empowerment was to make them 
self reliant and also turn their attention from violence, thereby, forestalling any 
attempt to entice them with money to perpetrate evil.  
 
 Next on the agenda of Karaku was the disarmament project which was supervised by 
the State Commissioner for Police and representatives of government and other 
security agencies. Through this effort, 50 youths voluntarily disarmed/repented. They 
were among the youth that enjoyed financial empowerment. Karaku used his position 
to get appointments from the state government for some of these youths that 
disarmed. He also put in place youth monitoring group who supervised the judicious 
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use of the empowerment funds by beneficiaries. He also monitored the activities of 
unrepentant youths who were using their weapons to further commit crime like 
robbery. In this regards, not less than 10 youths were apprehended and handed over to 
the police (Nigeria Image, 2012). It is disappointing to discover that we did not hear 
of such moves been made by other Local Government Chairmen in Ebiraland.  
At this juncture, it will be necessary to juxtapose our propositions in Chapter one with 
our findings. 
5.7 Validity of Propositions 
In this section, we shall examine the propositions formulated for the study vis-à-vis 
our findings. 
5.8.1Table 48 presents participants‟ responses on the determining factors of violent 
conflicts in Ebiraland 
Variables Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree 
F percent F Percent F Percent F Percent F percent 
Identity Politics Factor 
Clannish sentiment 25 3.0 39 4.6 28 3.3 303 36.1 445 53.0 
Clan affiliation to foster political 
ambition 
165 19.9 106 12.8 85 10.2 257 31.1 217 26.1 
Clan identities of political office 
seekers 
144 17.5 125 15.2 82 9.9 254 30.8 220 26.1 
Contest for political supremacy 
among clans 
124 15.0 113 13.6 60 7.1 254 30.6 278 33.5 
Struggling To Acquire Use Retain Power Factors 
Competition for political office 59 7.2 63 7.7 39 4.7 312 37.9 350 42.5 
Violence is more intense, frequent 
during election 
22 2.7 41 5.0 41 5.0 311 37.6 412 49.8 
Electoral process provide avenue for 
clash among rivals 
132 16.1 84 10.2 70 8.5 302 36.7 233 28.3 
Struggles among group for power 65 7.9 123 14.9 107 13.0 287 34.9 241 29.3 
Intra-Party And Inter Party Clashes Factor 
Political competition within a party 
factor 
50 6.0 87 10.5 62 7.5 364 43.8 269 32.3 
Political competition between parties 
factor  
54 6.5 85 10.2 54 6.5 390 46.8 250 30.0 
Political differences and struggle for 
power factor 
76 9.3 146 17.8 96 11.7 259 31.6 242 29.5 
Economic and socio-cultural factors 
Unemployment  34 4.1 39 4.7 19 2.3 166 20.0 574 69.0 
Poor education and economic gain of conflict 46 5.5 49 5.9 30 3.6 227 27.2 483 57.8 
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View of public praise singers during 
masquerade festival 
101 12.1 122 14.7 82 9.9 243 29.2 284 34.1 
Personal and clan conflict pursued through 
masquerade festival 
111 13.4 122 14.7 44 5.3 234 28.2 320 38.5 
Strict control of masquerade will reduce 
conflict 
84 10.1 86 10.3 27 3.2 205 24.6 430 51.7 
Struggle for chieftaincy and local power 
position  
103 12.4 182 21.8 72 8.6 270 32.4 206 24.7 
Lack of acceptable central leadership 67 8.1 85 10.3 45 5.4 228 27.5 402 48.6 
Source: Researcher’s Analysis 
5.7.1 Juxtaposition of Propositions and Findings 
Proposition 1: 
 There is a significant relationship between identity politics and violent conflicts. 
A list of identity factors that might influence conflicts in Ebiraland was included in 
the questionnaire and the participants were asked to express the extent of their 
agreement with each of them. Analysis of the respondents‟ opinions shows that 
clannish sentiment is a major identity factor that causes conflict in Ebiraland as 
reflected in the table above. However, other identity factors that influenced conflicts 
in Ebiraland include the use of clan affiliation by politicians to foster individual 
political ambition, clan identities of political office seekers and contest for supremacy 
among clans in Ebiraland. 
Our finding is in tandem with the findings of some scholars. For example, Hilker 
(2008) argues that resultant effect of identity politics is noticeable in the diverse 
reactions it has generated across political spectrum. In fact to Hilker identity politics 
provides a convenient platform of group mobilization into collective action which 
may be violent or non-violent in nature. Akinteye (1999) in his study of Igbo-Ora in 
Nigeria argues that groups are often caught in the web of cross cutting political and 
economic cleavage which may give fillip to mobilization of collective violence at sub-
group level. These internal cleavages may be traceable to clan or tribe-based loyalty 
which can be exploited for manipulation by opportunistic political entrepreneurs. 
Somalia is a homogenous society but clan politics and manipulation of clan 
differences for political power culminated in clan based civil war (Sereo, 2003). One 
observable fact is that the elite are culpable of negative identity construction of the 
“others” and these antagonistic identities construct perpetuate conflict and increase 
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violence. Faeron and Latin (2002:846) clarify “Violence has the effect, intended by 
the elites, of constructing group identities in more antagonistic and rigid ways. These 
newly constructed (or reconstructed) ethnic identities serve to increase support for the 
elites who provoked the violence while favouring the continuation of escalation of 
violence”. 
Proposition 2 There is a significant relationship between deep seated struggles 
among warring groups to acquire, use and retain power and conflicts. 
A number of factors premised on competition for political power were listed for the 
participants to see whether there is a strong correlation between deep-seated struggles 
among warring groups to acquire, use and retain power and conflicts in Ebiraland. It 
is clear from the table above that elite competition and actions of political or group 
entrepreneurs drive conflicts. Competition for political power among elites often lead 
to construction of identity based politics so as to garner support for their selfish goals. 
For example, with respect to the statement “there is a deep seated struggle among 
warring groups to acquire, use and retain power and conflicts” 64.2 percent of the 
respondents agreed that there is a nexus between deep-seated struggle for power and 
conflicts in Ebiraland.  
The character of Ebira politicians in the struggle for power is a reflection of the 
character of the Nigerian politicians. Thus, violent politics has become a recurring 
decimal since Nigeria‟s independence. It is necessary to state that the aftermath of 
colonial politics of divide and rule is the emergence of parochial and disunited elite 
manifesting via ethnic chauvinism. This scenario essentially turns politics to warfare 
in which struggle for control and use of state power is overvalued (Olaopa, et al 
2009). 
A historical excursion into Nigeria‟s political history from pre-independence till date 
reveals that the country has witnessed quite a number of violent conflicts whose 
foundation is traceable to desperate tussle for political power. The Kano riot of 1953, 
Action Group crisis of 1959, Census crisis 1962-63, the Federal election crisis of 
1964, Western election crisis of 1965, and series of crises that dogged the path of the 
Second and the aborted Third Republic,  as well as the various crises that characterize 
the present Fourth Republic. Borrowing a leaf from Olaopa et al (2009), politics 
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appears the most lucrative endeavour, hence the contest for political office is fierce 
and the method is brutal. To an average Nigerian politician, political post is a job 
rather than a service to humanity. 
The economic benefit(s) associated with state power makes contest for it assumes 
zero sum game. In fact, Nigerian politicians have “become more desperate and daring 
in taking and retaining power; more reckless and greedy in their use and abuse of 
power; and more intolerant of opposition, criticism and efforts at replacing them” 
(Alemika, 2011:26).  Similarly, Egbo, (2001) postulates that struggle for political 
office is characterized by bloodletting, indecency and disregard for all norms of 
civilized behaviour because political office is seen as an end in itself and not a means 
to an end. 
In the same vein, Ake (1996) asserts that the character of the states in Africa is quite 
antithetical to the politics of moderation. Indeed the feature of politics in Africa is that 
of lawlessness and extremism because the nature of state power makes the capture of 
it irresistibly attractive. While the winners in the competition win everything, the 
losers lose everything. Thus, nothing can be worse than losing as nothing can be 
better than winning. Given this scenario, everyone seeks power by every means which 
could be legal or otherwise and those already in power try to keep it by all means, 
hence the emergence of politics with expediency. 
One interesting observation is that though politics is like the game of sport in which a 
winner or loser emerges yet it is quite different from it. This is because in the game of 
sport at times there can be draw; no winner no loser. Even in situation in which a 
winner must emerge, it is possible to repeat the event or competition till a clear 
winner emerges. This is not always the case in politics: 
Politics is an attempt to access, influence or control political 
power. This is either by individual or through group relationship. 
Regardless of the pattern of the competition, there should always 
be a winner and runners-up (losers). This model is more and easily 
attainable in sports competition. When or where there are 
conflicting outcome that did not produce one winner, the event or 
competition could be repeated until a clear winner emerges. 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case in political competition 
(Ali, 2011). 
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In the same vein, Ajayi (2007:9) describes politics as a game of soccer that hinges 
on contest for supremacy. This is necessarily because both entail “the struggle for 
the control, use and retention of power even though the nature of such power 
differs from one another. Both phenomena involve the elements of conflict”. 
Politics is inexorably linked with conflict because “the degree of power or 
privileges an individual or group is able to control is largely determined by his 
ability to subdue opposition in the contest for such power”. The picture painted 
above cannot but result in politics and game of power becoming volatile and do or 
die affairs hence pursue with violence.  
Proposition 3 
There is a significant relationship between intra and inter-party clashes and 
communal unrest.  
The results of the table above show that intra-party and inter-party clashes have 
implication for communal unrest. For instance, the responses of our respondents to the 
statement political competition within a party have implication for communal unrest 
in Ebiraland indicates that 43.8 percent agreed while 32.3 percent strongly agreed. 
Thus, a total of 76.1 percent of the respondents are in agreement.  76.8 percent also 
affirmed that competition between parties breeds violence in Ebiraland. It is necessary 
to state at this juncture that there is a consensus among scholars, politicians and the 
public that political parties form a critical pillar for the entrenchement of democratic 
culture and practices. However, one of the major challenges facing political parties in 
Nigeria is internal conflicts and fierce contest for power within and among political 
parties. Therefore, it is not suprising that intra and inter-party conflicts often revolve 
around elections. Madueke (2006) asserts that central to intra-party conflicts in 
Nigeria is the issue of control of political power and access to resource otherwise 
referred to as self serving pathological conception of politics. Thus, in the face of 
rabid and uncontrolled selfish ambition by politicians and hegemonic tendencies of 
party leaders, intra party squabbles become an inevitable occurrence- a trend which 
has continued to play itself out in partisan politics.  
 
From the work of Muhammed (2008) and Osaghae (2002), intra and inter- party 
conflicts have been an endemic feature of Nigerian politics from independence till 
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date with implication for violence. Some of the violent conflicts orchestrated by intra 
and inter-party competition include the Action Group (AG) crises between Awolowo 
and Akintola which degenerated into a serious political conflict that engulfed the 
entire Western region, leading to a state of emergency. Second, the Western election 
crises of 1965 that led to unprecedented electoral violence in the region; the UPN and 
NPN crises in Ondo state in the Second Republic over governorship election. A 
cursory look at the Fourth Republic quickly brings to the fore some cases of intra and 
inter-party conflicts. Anifowose and Akinbobola (2005) note that although intra-party 
feud is evident in all the parties; however, that of the PDP and ANPP seem to be 
greater. Little wonders that the PDP is seen as a marriage of strange quarrelsome bed 
fellows who do not only misunderstand one another but are regularly feuding (Aina, 
2002). The PDP crisis in Ogun State from 2007-2011 buttressed the above position. In 
addition, a good example of inter-party conflicts in the Fourth Republic is that of 
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Akwa 
Ibom over governorship election. The death toll was about twenty (20) with about 
1300 brand new tricyle and some other valuable properties destroyed (The Punch, 
2011)  
Proposition 4 
 There is a significant relationship between economic and socio-cultural factors and 
violent conflicts.  
 To this proposition, a list of economic and socio-cultural factors that might 
precipitate conflicts that were listed include youth unemployment, poor education and 
economic benefits derivable from conflicts, views of public praise singer during 
cultural festivals, chieftaincy title, and lack of acceptable central leadership in 
Ebiraland. To all these, the general consensus of our respondents is in affirmative. For 
example, 89 percent of our respondents are of the opinion that umemployment among 
youths has implications for their involvement in violent conflicts in Ebiraland, 85 
percent agreed to the question that poor educational background and economic gain 
are of paramount importance in understanding youth involvement in violence. Land 
issue seems not to be a major concern in conflict going by the responses of our 
respondents, while the remaining questions border on culture.  In fact, 77.3 percent of 
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the respondents agreed that strict control of masquerade activities (a dominant part of 
Ebira culture) will reduce incidence of conflicts in Ebiraland.  
Some of the findings above are in tandem with the position of some scholars who 
submit that umpmployment is primarily youth umemployment (Fashoyin, 1993; 
Anyawu et al 1997; UN, 2005). When young people are jobless, have few 
opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for 
groups seeking to mobilize violence (USAID, 2005). Politicians, public and party 
officials, are fond of recruiting, financing and arming jobless youths to fight 
opposition figures and their supporters (Saka, 2010). Some of the reasons adduced for 
youth involvement in violence include poor education (Fashoyin 1993), lack of skills 
for profitable engagement (UN, 2005) economic incentives from violence (USAID, 
2005). 
 In addition, we discovered in the course of this research that culture is essential to 
understanding conflicts in Ebiraland. This is because most of our respondents 
believed that masquerade festival which is a major part of Ebira culture and struggle 
for chieftaincy titles are some of the key drivers of conflicts in the land. In the same 
vein, LeBaron and Pillay (2006) assert that culture is inextricable from conflict 
though it does not cause it and that culture may play a central role in a conflict or it 
might influence a conflict subtly and gently. They added that research or practice 
addressing conflict that do not take culture into account have missed the largest part 
of the iceberg (the part beneath the surface). In the literature, the popular position is 
that cross-cultural contact or differences in culture divide groups and increase 
differentiation resulting in conflict.  This run counters to our findings. Because Ebira 
people have the same culture but politicization of masquerade festival an aspect of 
Ebira culture has resulted in the cultural festival being violent-oriented. 
  
5.8 DISCUSSIONS ON FINDINGS 
This section distills our major findings. Our submissions here cut across the various 
sections and reflect our findings from extant literature, survey including both 
questionnaire administrations, follow up interviews as well as Focus Group 
Discussion. From our analyses of conflict in various countries, communal conflict in 
Nigeria and Ebiraland, violence seems to be the predominant route to political power, 
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or better still violent conflict is often exacerbated by political activities. Violence 
appears to be a variant of struggle for political power. Democracy is supposed to 
reduce political violence as election serves as a veritable platform to elect political 
leaders based on the wishes of the people but it is not so in Africa. Rather the advent 
of democratic government has increased the spate of violent conflict.  Identity-based 
politics, privileges attached to political offices, widespread poverty, struggle for 
economic resources, values, status cum elite manipulations of their various ethnic or 
sub-ethnic groups for their selfish interest and many others combined to amplify 
violent conflict in developing democracies. The communal conflict which is our case 
study predates the independence of the Nigerian-State. The origin of the conflict is 
traceable to British colonial domination of people grouped in the area now referred to 
as Nigeria. There was no evidence of communal hostilities among the clans that 
constituted Ebira community before colonial incursion into the area. 
 
The colonization of Ebiraland started between 1902-1917. However, although 
colonialism laid the foundation of communal conflicts in Ebiraland, politics and 
political competition in Ebiraland especially from 1979 to date have exacerbated the 
spate of conflicts in the area. Pre-colonial administration in Ebiraland was purely 
indigenous system of self- rule, anchored on clan system. The administrative structure 
of clan operated in a hierarchical and pyramidal order in which the most senior clan 
chief automatically becomes the clan head. 
Sani (1999:21) argues that “no single clan or group owes any form of central 
allegiance to any other clan or age group”. He added that: 
The Ebira clan system is an intricate web of socio-economic and 
political relations. No member of one clan is allowed to assume 
and bear the title of another clan. This partly explains why the 
Atta from the “Aniku” clan could not assume and bear the title of 
the “Ozumi” or the Ohindasi clan. The constituent clan units vary 
in size, type and territorial spread in each village or ward; you 
have different clan and age group whose settlements have no 
territorial boundaries (Sani, 1997:21-22). 
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He concluded that: 
the clan and age group members in respect of each clan and age 
group live and function within overlapping geographical 
territories whether as administrative wards, districts or local 
government areas. It takes a very discerning observer with 
penetrating insight into the family and matrimonial life patterns 
of the people to distinguish between one age group and 
dominant clan or the other in a particular unit of settlement in 
each of these administrative sub-areas (Sani, 1997:22). 
 In other words, each clan was autonomous. However, the appointment of Atta 
Ibrahim by the British as the paramount ruler of the Ebiraland without taking into 
cognizance the variegated nature of the clan configurations, sow the seed of conflict 
which ipso facto with the passage of time snowballed into violent conflict through 
politicking. 
 Equally, Atta Ibrahim Chogudu Onorueiza became powerful and autocratic (Raji 
2011). His reign marked the introduction of force labour and imprisonment of 
opponents in Ebiraland. This led to a plot by ex-military men in Ebiraland to dethrone 
him. Political activities in the 50s presented this opportunity. It is necessary to state at 
this juncture that during the preparation for independence in 1960, three political 
parties were dominant in Nigeria- the Northern People Congress (NPC) in the north, 
Action Group (AG) in the west and the National Council for Nigerian Citizens 
(NCNC) in the east. Politically, Ebiraland is located in the north and was under the 
grip of NPC then. The NPC in Ebiraland became fractionalized into pro-Atta and anti-
Atta groups. The anti-Atta group formed the Igbira Tribal Union (ITU) led by World 
War 1 veterans and the Roman Catholic Mission, while pro-Atta formed Igbira 
Progressive Union (IPU). This political division in Ebiraland culminated in eventual 
abdication of the throne by Atta Ibrahim Chogudo in 1954 (Audu, 2009). Atta‟s 
position was taken over by one of his opponents, Sani Omonori, who was succeeded 
by the incumbent Alhaji Ado Ibrahim. 
 
 It is worthy of note that, democratization of party politics has brought in its wake 
conflicts in Ebiraland. Politics in Ebiraland in the 1950s was characterized by 
violence. Some of the people interviewed believe that politics in Ebiraland still tow 
the 1950 political divide. This visibly reflected in the politics of the second republic 
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which was characterized by violence, arson, destruction of lives and properties. From 
the interview conducted, it is discernable that the violence that attended politics in 
Ebiraland in the 1950s was a child play when compared with that of the second 
republic. The latter was characterized by the use of guns and burning of houses. One 
of those interviewed Raji (2011) noted that it was during the Second Republic politics 
that thuggery became a major feature of Ebiraland and the situation has grown from 
bad to worse. Raji further asserts that there were many associations of thugs during 
the Second Republic. However, the prominent amongst them were the “Edo” and 
“Dio” groups, fighting on the side of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). He noted 
that violence in the Second Republic was basically on political competition between 
UPN and NPN in Ebiraland. 
  
Bello (2011) during an interview equally stated that competition for political offices 
either at federal, state or local government levels has continued to tow clan lines 
especially from the Second Republic till date with implications for violence. Suffice 
to say that competition for political power between the major political parties in 
Ebiraland- People‟s Democratic Party (PDP) and Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) 
in the Fourth Republic is also a major factor of conflicts in the land. Perceived 
marginalization of Ebira people in governance, the uneven development and 
distribution of resources of the state as claimed by most Ebiras that were interviwed, 
culminated in complaints/agitations for power shift or rotation. 
 
The agitation for power shift was enthusiastically embraced by the majority of Ebira 
people that constitutes the Kogi Central. Quite a number of them defected from the 
PDP to ACN in order to actualize their dream as this would have been difficult under 
the auspices of PDP. This was because it would be pretty difficult for the Central 
Senatorial district to present a candidate with political clout that will be able to defeat 
Ibrahim Idris a candidate of Igala extraction. Notwithstanding, it is necessary to state 
that the support the ACN got from the central was further strengthened by the choice 
of Senator Muhammed Ohiare as its governorship candidate and Alhaji Salihu Ohize 
as the party‟s Senatorial Candidates. Senator A.T Ahmed who founded the power 
shift movement eventually died making the leadership of the movement to fall 
squarely on Senators Ohiare and Ohize. It is necessary at this juncture to state that 
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there were some notable Ebira politicians like the Deputy Governor Chief Philip 
Salawu, Ambassador Amuda Yusuf, Ambassador Usman Bello, General Salihu 
Ibrahim, Chief Patrick Adaba, Alhaji Yahaya Karaku and a host of others that 
remained in PDP. 
 
The do-or-die nature the power shift agitation has assumed, championed by the 
majority of Ebiras in ACN, in a bid to force a one party system on Ebira people of the 
Central Senatorial district especially during the 2007 gubernetorial election, 
orchestrated, the incessant clashes of the two main political groupings in the land. The 
aftermarth was a chain of political crises that involved killings, arson and wanton 
destruction of properties, especially when Senator Ohiare, the AC now ACN 
candidate lose gallantly to his PDP counterpart in the general election in 2007. 
Although the AC now ACN lose out in the gubernatorial election, yet, it continued to 
detest the the rulership of the PDP in Kogi Central as evident in the rejection of the 
appointment of Yahaya Karaku in Okene Local Government. The same scenario was 
also played out in the appointment of Hon. Ahmed Raji of PDP as a care-taker 
Chairman of Adavi Local Government. This development resulted in fierce crisis 
between supporters of the ACN and PDP both in Okene and Adavi. In short, the 
appointees used Lokoja as their functional base while the crises rages on in their home 
land.  
   
As the crises pummeted, Alhaji Karaku incurred colossal lost as 8 of his family 
members were killed, his two houses and one of his cars were burnt. During this 
period, Ebiraland especially, Okene became the theatre of war as thugs took over 
control of security, unleashing terror of unimaginable proportion on innocent citizens. 
It got to a stage Okene and parts of Adavi became uninhabited by its citizens most 
especially notable politicians from both PDP and ACN. While prominent politicians 
from the ACN fled to Abuja where Senator Ohiare/Salihu Ohize operated from, 
notable PDP politicians in the land took refuge in Lokoja, the state capital controlled 
by the PDP government in the state. 
 
As the crisis graduated, politicians from ACN seem to be losing strength and interest 
with their armed youth wing that have become uncontrollable by their employers (the 
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leaders of the party). It was in this state of disenchantment and disorganization of the 
ACN that the PDP controlled government conducted local government election which 
they won using the state‟s machineries. The PDP gradually asserted her authority and 
dominance in the area with the aid of government machines while the ACN was 
palyed out with only the ACN youth wing organizing pockets of resistance (National 
Image News, 2012). Presently if not all, most of the political offices at local, state and 
federal in Ebiraland are occupied by the PDP. For instance, Senator Obatemi 
representing the Central Senatorial district at the senate is from PDP, the former 
speaker Momoh Jimoh Lawal appointed on 16th October 2012 are Ebiras and both 
from PDP, all the former Local Government Chairmen in Ebiraland and the present 
care-takers of councils in the land are all from PDP. 
 
In summary, it can be deduced that, while the colonial substructure orchestrated the 
stage for violence in Ebiraland, the complexity and prolongation of the conflicts find 
expression in the activities of politicians who have turned the area to a war torn zone 
in their contest for political offices. 
 
Another finding of the research is that there is no acceptable model of ascension to the 
throne of Ohinoyi of Ebiraland. Unlike in other places especially among the Yoruba 
in which ascension to the throne is hereditary, the first paramount ruler of Ebiraland 
was a colonial appointee. Sani Omonori the second ruler was enthroned after an 
electoral contest, in which he had a total of 342 out of the 386 total votes cast by a 
representative committee of the five districts of Ebiraland constituted by colonial 
masters for election into the paramount position. This arrangement appears to have 
been discontinued for no obvious reason. The incumbent Ohinoyi (Ado Ibrahim) is 
seen as government appointee and not the choice of the people; therefore, he does not 
command the respect of the people nor enjoy their cooperation.  
 
The legitimacy crisis later became a matter of judicial adjudication, in which the court 
declared the position of the Ohinoyi vacant in its judgement, the incumbent was not 
validly appointed. We also found out that there are no king makers or royal family 
(es) or ruling clan(s) in Ebiraland. Any Ebira male adults can aspire to be the Ohinoyi 
of Ebiraland. Thus, to resolve leadership tussle surrounding the traditional stool, it 
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was agreed before the incumbent Ohinoyi ascended the throne that the position would 
be rotated among the five districts (Okene/Okengwen, Adavi, Eika, Ihima and 
Eganyi) that constitute Ebiraland. However, the implementation of this rotational 
principle among the aforementioned five districts is dogged with much controversy 
and appears to have become deadlocked. This was because when it was the turn of 
Ihima in Okehi district to ascend the throne, the incumbent Ado Ibrahim from Adavi 
used his wealth and government support to usurp the throne in June 1997. Another 
discovery made during this study is that some of the respondents interviewed (both 
Ebira and non Ebira) believe that an average Ebira man is pugilistic- an attitude that 
underlies the violent disposition of most conflicts in the land. 
 
Similarly, the researcher found that politics has exercabated the divisions among the 
various clans in Ebiraland which has led to the zoning of political offices at local 
government and state levels between and among major clans in each district, with the 
senior clan taking the lead. There is also an arrangement on rotation of federal 
political offices that are zoned to the Kogi Central Senatorial District, made up of 
mostly the Ebira. While rotation of political offices among major clans in a district 
has helped to douse inter-clan conflict, it has also triggered intra-clan conflicts, 
especially in candidate selection for political offices. 
The study also shows that the politicians and the youths are the major perpetrators of 
violence in Ebiraland. While much is being done to re-orientate the youths towards 
embracing peace, no significant effort is put in place to address the role of the 
political class in the community. According to Ebira Vonya (2006) and interview 
conducted with Audu (2011), well-meaning Ebiras at home and in the Diasporas are 
making strident efforts to educate the non-educated youths in Ebiraland by giving 
them scholarships, but much  has not been done to provide jobs for the unemployed 
youths. 
In addition, in order to bring about sanity in politics in Ebiraland, there is an 
agreement among the Ebiras that the minimum academic qualification for elective 
posts be introduced, for example for the position of local government councilor 
minimum of diploma certificate is required. This has made so many Ebira youths and 
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some adults as well to start enrolling for both full time and part time programmes in 
some higher institutions in the state. 
The creation of additional stool (Ohi) seems to have generated much controversy 
especially in Ihima district. Thus, the creation of Ohi by government as a stool was 
born out of a petition by a group of people seeking additional traditional title holders 
in Ebira land. Government responded by setting up a committee. The outcome of 
which was the introduction of the Ohi stool. However, the matter generated some 
litigations. In particular, the Obobayin of Ihima from Emani clan (Okaraga) felt 
slighted by a hierarchical arrangement that placed Ohi above him.  
Another factor that aided conflict in the area is state recognition of traditional title 
holders and the privileges attached to such titles, like salary, official cars and other 
pecuniary allowances. Such material considerations have made the struggle for those 
traditional stools violent and crisis-laden. 
Another finding of the study is that the political structure of the state has contributed 
to friction in Ebira land. Kogi State is a miniature Nigeria with three major ethnic 
groups: the Igala in the Eastern part of the state, Okun–Yoruba in the West and Ebira 
that constitute the central senatorial district. The tripartite structure has not augured 
well for two of the three groups in the state. The Igala group has perpetually occupied 
the governorship position of the state from inception till date, and in terms of state and 
federal appointments the Okun- Yoruba and Ebira have always felt cheated. Social 
amenities have not been equitably distributed among the three major ethnic groups in 
the state. 
The response to the statement “the political structure of the state has implication on 
unrest in Ebira land” saw 80 agreed that it did.  This perceived marginalization gave 
fillip to the evolvement of the Ebira agenda that an Ebira man should emerge as 
governor of Kogi State. The opportunity came during the 2007 governorship election, 
when Senator Ohiare contested under the platform of the Action Congress (AC) now 
ACN against Ibrahim Idris a People Democratic Party (PDP) flagbearer. Ohiare‟s 
campaign did not go beyond Kogi Central Senatorial District. In fact, he did little or 
nothing in the Eastern and Western Senatorial Districts of the State as far as campaign 
was concerned, and he lost gallantly. Although Ebira people did not engage the Igalas 
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in a fight, they saw the Ebiras that supported Igala candidature as traitors who 
frustrated Ebira agenda and consequently unleashed mayhem on them and their 
properties in Ebiraland. For example Phillip Salau‟s house, the running mate of 
Ibrahim Idris who later became the Deputy Governor of the state was one of the 
several torched. 
 
It is important to stress that at the inception of Kogi State, its ethnic mix, gave it a 
perjorative description as a bubbling cauldron of small groups (Ajayi, 1997). 
Therefore, the present problem bordering on a fair share of resources among the 
various ethnic groups in Kogi State is not a surprise. Ajayi (1994) pointed out that the 
heterogeneity of a state like Kogi should be exploited for positive development, but 
only achievable in atmosphere of fair play, justice and equity on the part of all, 
especially in the distribution of socio-economic and political resources. In otherwords, 
to allay the fears of the so-called “minorities”, the allocation of societal values must 
take into consideration the divergent views of the various groups in Kogi State. 
In fact, when the idea of creating Kogi State was conceived, a particular group now 
occupying parts of the Kogi West registered their objections by showing their 
unwillingness to be part of the envisaged union. It sent a memorandum to the 
presidency in 1987 putting their objections more bluntly:  
If we are included in Kogi State most of our manpower will be 
marginalized because they will be quotarised. Many will be retrenched 
and many will go (sic) and serve under junior officers who get (sic) high 
posts through quota system (Olorunnishola, 1989 cited in Ajayi 
1997:33).  
The group went further to state that: 
There are many secondary schools in Oyi LGA (14.05%) of the 
population than there are in Igala area (53.5%) of the population. For 
them to catch up no new school may be opened in Oyi in the forseeable 
future. Indeed, children from these areas may be sent to school, which 
we built with our sweat, denying our own students (Ajayi, 1997:33). 
In deed, Ajayi (1997) has demonstrated that, marginalization of other ethnic groups 
by the Igalas started with AbubakarAudu the first governor of the state. The situation 
has not changed ever since. Ajayi concluded that feelings of neglect and alienation of 
some segments of the state from the “engine room” of government cannot but 
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generate resentment given the pivotal role of the institution in public policy making 
and implementation. 
Another identified reason for conflict which is a reflection of the failure of the state is 
the inability of the government to control the rate at which arms were being ferreted 
into the area for use in conflicts, as well as the ineffectiveness of the security agent to 
forestall a breakdown of law and order. These two factors were identified along with 
others by our respondents as being responsible for the escalation of conflicts in the 
region. On one hand, some of the sophisticated weapons used were imported by 
politicians because it is obvious that youths cannot buy such arms and ammunition. 
In the same vein, Raji (2011) stated that:  
Politicians at state and federal level promote thuggery and sponsor 
mayhem. They promote jungle type of politicking by buying guns, 
enticing youths with money. The youths mask and use guns. This has 
been the pre-occupation of the outgoing senators and the present 
chairman of Okene Local Government. They are very much involved 
in the crises in Ebiraland. 
 
Similarly, Momoh Jimoh Ahuraka made a confession that “I am in deep pains as a 
result of my past activities with my political fathers for the past two weeks I could not 
stay in the school; the ghosts of the innocent people we killed are chasing me with 
whips forcing me to have sleepless nights. I had to back out when I discovered that 
our politicians are not interested in Ebira people‟s affairs but their selfish interests” 
(http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/politics/2011/sep/14/politi...) it is 
disheartening that politicians are the one buying guns for students to burn houses and 
kill their opponents for mere elective office. Abdulazeez Farouk, one of the few 
industrialists Ebira have, and who was a victim of the arson visited on his home in 
Okene said “Today, my sadness is that I am ashamed to say I am from that part of the 
country. Any God fearing person from that part ought to share my view” 
(http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/politics/2011/sept/14/politi...) 
 
On the other hand, allegations were rife that the state government led by an Igala 
between 2003 -2011 was actually interested in conflict in Ebiraland and as such did 
little in addressing the festering conflict. Obeitor (2011) believes that if Ebira is at 
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peace they will be united to challenge the domination of Igala ethnic group who has 
been ruling the state since inception. Obeitor accused the government of not doing 
much. Thus, he posited that “the major problem is that government is yet to take a 
decisive action on politicians aiding and arming the youth, the government knows 
them but is not ready to take action, if they are arrested and dealt with, conflict will be 
over. May be government is supporting such politicians”. 
 
The festering conflict brought to the fore the weakness of the Nigeria Police Force in 
managing conflict situation. One of our respondents even accused the police of 
profiting from the violence in Ebiraland. Furthermore, Obeitor expressed 
disappointment over the role of the Police in the crisis. According to him, “rather than 
taking the bull by the horn, they are taking side. Nobody was prosecuted. No major 
political offenders. Whenever political thugs were arrested political warlords go and 
bail them. The political warlords are above the law and the security agency is not 
helping matters”. Raji (2011) expressed sadness that “Police shows culprits escape 
route and gain financially from it.”  
 
It was also pointed out during indepth interview that the crisis in Ebiraland has been 
lingering because when government set up a fact-finding committee to broker peace, 
people were afraid to tell the truth or identify the perpetrators of violence in the 
community for fear of reprisal attacks. During interview it was stated in a frantic term 
that when there are no facts, violent conflict cannot be resolved and that what has 
been done presently is a temporary palliative measure because in no time the crisis 
might resuscitate. Furthermore, we found a correlation between the involvement of 
the youth in violence and the break down of family values. An average Ebira, it was 
discovered has many wives and still has concubines. Large families engender other 
social problems including child neglect and illiteracy arising from inability to send 
children to school. The uneducated youth consequently become ruthless and willing 
tools in the hands of desperate politicians. The Kogi State Commissioner of Police, 
P.C Aghanya lamented this situation as follows: “these boys carrying arms terrorizing 
the entire society are not Igalas and they are not Okuns; they are Ibira (sic) boys”. He 
further stated that no one was ready to give information as regards the “criminals who 
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live in their midst” 
http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/politics/2011/sept/14/politi 
 
The involvement of the youths in violent conflicts in Ebiraland has equally been 
attributed to high rate of unemployment occasioned by the collapse of industries in 
the locality. For instance, the moribund state of Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Company and 
Itakpe Iron-Ore Deposit, which hitherto employed well over 15,000 workers mostly 
from Ebiraland are now in comatose and the workers, mostly youths have been 
thrown into the unemployment market. The problem is compounded by the statist 
economy structure, a situation in which the government is the only substantial 
employer of labour. The problem is worsen when the output of school leavers is 
compared with the new jobs available and the fact that People are no longer interested 
in farming. The effects, among others are youth restiveness and violence in the land. 
President Goodluck Jonathan promised the Ebira during his campaign for office to 
bring the companies back on their feet. The same was reiterated during the 
governorship campaign in 2011.  
 
The relationship between youth unemployment and violence is not limited to 
Ebiraland. In fact, it is a reflection of the general character of the country. Statistics 
from the Ministry of Youth Development show that 28.14 million youths in the 
country, representing 42 percent of the youth population, are unemployed as at 2011. 
The statistics also indicate that 80 percent of the unemployed youths have only 
secondary school certificates and below. This ugly state of affairs has had and 
continues to have a very negative effect on the society in form of youth restiveness, 
involvement in social vices like armed robbery, kidnapping among others (The Sun, 
2011).  
 It was also discovered that existing literature on the relationship between culture and 
conflict see cultural differences as the basis for conflict. However, the results suggest 
the contrary. That is ties of similarity (similar culture) rather than differences quite 
often give rise to conflict. This is because despite the fact that Ebira people have the 
same culture epitomizes by masquerade festival (which form part of the larger culture 
of the Ebira) yet conflict is still prevalent. This is predicated on the fact that 
masquerade festival has become political tool that politicians use against their 
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opponents. In short, Politics has brought division in Ebiraland, pitching one clan 
against another and politicians amplifying clan differences to draw support for their 
political ambition with devastating consequences. 
 
It is necessary to mention that although there is no record of casualties, violent 
politics in Ebiraland has resulted in heavy casualties in form of destruction of lives 
and property, burning of houses and markets including commercial and private 
vehicles worth millions of naira (Oricha, 2008). For instance pa Aturu Jimoh, 70, 
claims he lost all he laboured for in his life to crisis in Ebiraland and that it was 
difficult for him and his family to start anew. Alhaji Aliyu Mohammed, a victim of 
one of the crises in Okene is now squatting with his ralations in Lokoja. He describes 
the crisis this way:  
The political crisis in Kogi can be described as terrible; the 
devastating effect of it in Ebiraland is beyond anybody‟s 
imagination. In my 65 years of existence on this planet, I have 
never seen a crisis that consumes a father and his son at the same 
time and almost an entire family. In some cases, property worth 
millios of naira were destroyed with ignominy (cited in Ahmed, 
2012). 
 
In the same vein, Malam Ahmed Ogembe, an indigene of Ebiraland based in the U.S, 
says he and his kinsmen abroad would have loved to return and invest at home but for 
the fear of political crisis in the area. He concluded that Ebiraland is seen by most 
people as a crisis-ridden and not safe for people to live peacefully and contribute to 
the development of the area (cited in Ahmed 2012).  
 
Going by the conduct of the 2011 elctions and the 2012 governorship election, there 
seems to be temporary peace in the land. Unfortunately, it has been observed that a 
new dimension of human elimination has quietly been introduced in the form of 
assassination. Prominent persons in Ebiraland have been assassinated recently by 
unknown gunmen, the list include a traditional title holder Chief Avinebe, the Ovopa 
of Ebogogo gunned down in his house; Chief Mohammed, the Ohimonovo of Kuroko 
killed in his palace; Chief Enesi, the Ohireba of Obangede gunned down in his palace; 
James Jimoh Ochamayi, the former Principal of Etahi Community Secondary School 
recently appointed as a Director in the Ministry of Education in Lokoja; Chief Jaguda 
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the undisputed lead-night-masquerade in Ebiraland who was ambushed by gunmen on 
his way from where he and his supporters had gone to practice their melodious songs 
in preparation for Eche-ebe festival among others (Adeiza, 2012).  
 
The youths that were once hired by politicians as thugs according to Adeiza (2012) 
are responsible for the recent assassinations. As a result of relative peace in Ebiraland, 
these youths became redundant and of course they must survive without regular jobs 
have taken to assassination and armed robbery in the land. All the important banks in 
the land have suffered vicious attack and robbed with attendant loss of human, money 
and properties. In fact, the banks are all shut down, thereby paralyzing economic 
activities in the land. These are some of the consequences of violent politics in 
Ebiraland. 
At this juncture it is necessary to look at the implication of violent-oriented politics to 
Nigeria‟s integration. In the case of Ebiraland our case study, attempt has been made 
to see how competition for political power among clans and politicians reinforced by 
economic and socio-cultural factors have turned the area to a war zone. However, it is 
necessary to state that the nature of political competition in Nigeria at large makes 
politics coterminous with violence thereby, posing a serious challenge to national 
integration. Over the years, Nigeria has suffered from ethnically charged political 
conflict epitomized by competition for political power among the major ethnic 
groups. For analytical purposes it is germane to situate it within a historical context.  
Going down memory lane reveals that, the colonialists that brought the various groups 
under a monolithic grid now called Nigeria laid the foundation of divisive politics in 
the country by amplifying the differences between the various ethnic groups. But 
Nigerian leaders who gained power from the colonialists after independence had 
opportunity to redress this trend but rather preferred to utilize the existing colonial 
administrative structures for their selfish interests. Sadly, the same divide and rule 
tactic employed by the colonialists was later modified by the Nigerian “nationalists” 
in their quest for power and prestige, crystallizing in ethnic nationalism as against true 
nationalism that would have enhanced the integration of the various ethnic groups 
(Ekanola, 2006). Suffice to say that the way and manner politics was played by the 
foremost leaders, actually validated the fact that, these earliest political elites were not 
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interested in uniting the country but rather wanted to keep the country permanently 
divided along ethnic lines for their selfish political ends. As they competed for power, 
prestige and associated benefits, these foremost political elite sought support from 
members of their ethnic groups through accentuation of ethnic differences and 
demonizing members of other ethnic group (Ekanola, 2006).  
Dent (1971:452) stated that a prominent northern political leader once confessed that 
“they had to teach the people to hate Southerners, to look at them as people depriving 
them of their rights, in order to win them over”. Albert (1999) also observed that the 
fear and anxiety of losing out by the Northern nationalist leaders in the struggle for 
power and prestige, in the fledgling Northern and the Southern protectorates under the 
same legislative system in 1947 by the Richards constitution compelled the Northern 
elite to appeal to religious and ethnic sentiments. This was done to unite the Hausa-
Fulani constituency against the Southern people. Ekanola (2006) noticed that although 
the effort of the Northern political elite was successful as they continue to dominate 
the political landscape of the country, but the implication of this is that it took ethnic 
hostility to a new level and Nigeria has not been able to wriggle out of its debilitating 
effects.  It has greatly impeded the chances of Nigeria becoming a united country in 
the true sense.  
It is essential to note that it is not only the Northern political elite that are culpable, 
practically all political elite from other parts of the country did the same, 
indoctrinating members of their ethnic groups to see people from other ethnic groups 
as different people they must contend with in their efforts for survival and attainment 
of sectional interests. Thus, the earlier political elite in their competition for political 
power discouraged their followers from developing a sense of commitment towards 
the Nigerian nation-state and this spelt doom in the integration of the disparate ethnic 
entities in the country. For instance in 1948, Sir Ademola Alakija, the then President 
of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa stated that “this big tomorrow for the Yoruba is the future 
of our children how they will hold their own among other tribes of Nigeria” (cited in 
Coleman 1986:346). 
The nationalists‟ manipulation of ethnic sentiments for the benefits of political 
support also reflected in the formation of political parties. Political parties were 
formed along ethnic and regional lines. For instance, there was the Northern People‟s 
 
 
 
255 
 
Congress (NPC), formed by the Northern educated elite in 1949. The National 
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), formed by Herbert Macaulay and 
Nnamdi Azikwe, started as a national political party, but it was quickly taken over by 
Nigerians of the Igbo extraction. In the West, there was the Egbe Omo Oduduwa 
which quickly metamorphosed into a political party in 1951, by the name of the 
Action Group, dominated by the Yoruba Nation. These regional political parties 
sought to advance regional and ethnic interests as against the overall interest of the 
country (For details see Sklar, 1963; Oyibo, 1971; Oyediran, 1981; Coleman, 1986; 
Ejimofor, 1987; Osaghae, 2002 and Ekanola, 2006). The key political figures in each 
region used political party in their region to wage ethnic wars against their opponents 
in other regions. For instance, in summing up his judgment on the treasonable felony 
preferred on Chief Awolowo and others, by Balewa government, Justice Sowemimo 
noted the increasing tendency on the part of politicians in the various political parties 
to employ violent means in politics which further disunited the country. He stated 
that: 
On the evidence before me, it would appear that politics generally 
in Nigeria has been conducted with a certain amount of bitterness. 
It appears that a person belonging to a party becomes an enemy of 
another who belongs to a rival party. Political parties are 
equivalent… to warring camps, elections are conducted with party 
thugs protecting the campaigners and this state of affairs has been 
described to have assumed a pitch that no method would be spared, 
however vindictive or extreme by any rival political party as 
against another in order to score over one or the other (cited in 
Anifowose, 2011:33). 
 
The implication of the above scenario is that, the political area of Nigeria from pre-
independence till date has been characterized by a struggle to control and exploit the 
offices of the state by all means. This is because the wealth of the country is virtually 
monopolized by the Federal Government; every group tries to make sure that it does 
not lose out in the struggle to control the government (Bah, 2002). That was why 
issues like the self-government motion moved by the late Anthony Enahoro under the 
auspices of Action Group (AG) in 1953 that Nigeria should become an independent 
state in 1956 was vehemently resisted by the Northern political elite who felt they had 
not got enough educated people to step into the shoes of the colonialists. This resulted 
in the Kano Riot in 1953 when supporters of the motion felt that the Northern elite 
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were not saying the minds of the northern people that it would be better to take the 
motion to the people themselves. 
 
Another good instance was the Census controversy between 1962-1963. The census 
that was supposed to be a purely demographic issue based on accurate head-count of 
people became a political tool towards maximizing access to power and resources. At 
the end of the day, a northern victory was achieved as the whole exercise turned out in 
their favour, but it had serious damaging effect on inter-ethnic relations. It is sad to 
note that there has not been any positive change in this regard since then. Instead, the 
relationship among the various ethnic and religious groups has grown from bad to 
worse in spite of all pretenses to the contrary. Ekanola (2006) notes that rather than 
integrating into a cohesive community having a common sense of national identity 
and destiny, evidence today points out to the contrary as citizens of Nigeria appear to 
be returning more and more to primordial affiliations for the purpose of identity, 
loyalty and security. Instead of forming a monolithic entity to face the challenges of 
development in a world that is becoming more competitive, Nigerians are preoccupied 
with waging ethnic and religious wars, struggling for political power and control of 
resources, resisting marginalization by dominant ethnic groups. 
 
 The unassailable carnage witnessed during the 1964 General election, 1965 Western 
election, the way and manner the first coup was plotted and the subsequent coups, the 
civil war, and the 1979 and 1983 General elections, the annulment of June 12, 1993 
election and the crises that dogged the annulment, together with the accentuation and 
the magnitude of inter-ethnic and religious violence in the Fourth Republic are all 
eloquent testimonies to the fact that, the end of divisive politics and its implication on 
national integration is not yet in sight.         
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1 Summary 
In this chapter, attempts are made to first make a general summary of the work and 
then proffer policy suggestions to effectively manage the conflict. The rationale 
behind this effort is deduced from the view that “it is an intellectual obligation not 
only to analyze the problems of society but also to proffer solution” (Ademoyega 
2003:47). This study has examined politics and communal conflicts in Ebiraland. This 
became necessary as a result of violence-orientated politics in the region. 
From the findings in the preceding chapters it can be deduced that the causes of 
conflict in Ebiraland are multivariate. Although the imposition of central 
administration in the hitherto clan autonomous system laid the foundation of social 
crisis in the area,  democratization and its attendant struggles for political power 
constitute a major factor behind inter-personal and inter-clan skirmishes. 
 
Further interrogation of the source of conflict led to a design of some set of questions. 
The questions were intended to enable the researcher to come to terms with the 
political, cultural and socio-economic factors that drive conflict in the area. To 
achieve this and other objectives, the study combined both qualitative and quantitative 
data gathering techniques, including primary sources as surveys, interviews and Focus 
Group Discussion. The secondary sources derive from documented materials such as 
books, journals, conference reports, periodicals including newspapers and magazines 
as well as internet sources. One thousand and two hundred copies of questionnaire 
each containing forty-one items questions were administered in the selected areas of 
violent conflict in Ebiraland. 
 
 Apart from the survey, some notable individuals in Ebiraland were identified and 
interviewed so as to obtain useful information for the study. The list includes the 
Ohinoyi of Ebiraland Alhaji Ado Ibrahim, President of Ebira People‟s Association 
Alhaji Obeitor, Obobayin of Ihima (a herbalist and traditional ruler) where violence 
was most volatile, Obobayin of Ihuonwa (a traditional ruler), Mr. Raji Zubairu (a clan 
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spokesman for Oziogu clan), and Mr. Saliu Usman (Registrar Kogi state Polytechnic, 
Lokoja) whose house was completely burnt down. Others include politicians like 
Ambassador Usman Bello, Senator Balogun Mr. Uvieda Isiaka of Deputy Governor‟s 
office Lokoja. Also interviewed were some scholars that have conducted research on 
Ebiraland like Dr. M.S Audu, Dr Sani Habibu Angulu, and civil servants like Mr. M.J 
Yusuf (a state permanent secretary in the ministry of works) among others. In addition 
to this method, Focus Group Discussion was also conducted. The respondents were 
classified according to their sexes. Each group was further stratified into adult and 
youth. No group had less than eight respondents or more than eleven participants. 
Lastly, documented materials were also consulted to support some of the findings 
derived from the primary sources of data. 
 
One major finding of this study is that, although competition for political power 
among politicians and clans constitutes the major cause of conflict in the land, there 
are other causative factors. These include the politicization of cultural activities such 
as masquerade festivals and the increasing rate of youth unemployment occasioned by 
the collapse of the Itakpe Iron-ore Deposit and Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Company. 
Both companies, located in Ebiraland were once providers of employment 
opportunities mostly for Ebira indigenes. Many of these indigenes have become 
willing tools in the hands of perpetrators of violence. 
 
Another finding of the study is the uneven political structure of the state which puts a 
particular ethnic group (Igala) in a vantage position vis-à-vis other groups in the state 
owing to their numerical strength. The Igala have been governing the state since 
creation. The implication of this to violence in Ebiraland is that in an attempt to 
wrestle power from the Igala, the Ebira people came up with an agenda that it was the 
turn of an Ebira man to be the governor of the state. However, Senator Ohiare the 
Ebira candidate for the governorship election in 2007 lost to an Igala indigene, which 
made youths in Ebiraland to unleash terror on the Ebiras that supported the 
candidature of an Igala man who eventually won the election. 
It was also discovered from the study that an average Ebira man is pugilistic. He tends 
to display aggressive tendency under minor provocation. 
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Another discovery made from the study is the prevalence of polygamy and its 
attendant large family sizes and the dwindling resources to provide for the needs of 
those families. This social malaise has exercabated in the society the poverty level, 
illiteracy and deprivations, and in the process engendered an army of unemployed 
youth as instrument for violent conflicts.  
 
The creation of Ohi additional stool in Ebiraland has been partly responsible for 
violence in the Ihima District of Ebiraland. Findings from the field revealed that 
governments at various levels have not really done much to solve the problem in 
Ebiraland. In fact, government attitude over the years has been very poor and the 
status quo remains without addressing the fundamental causes of the problem. While 
government had set up several Panels of inquiry or committees what has been lacking 
is the will to execute their recommendations. Some of our respondents claimed that 
government has indeed encouraged the continuous conflict in Ebiraland in order to 
forestall a united opposition against the domination of the state‟s political space by 
the Igala. 
 
It is our contention that past efforts to manage the conflict failed because of 
government indecisive posture and inability to get to the root of the matter. Lastly, the 
role of the Nigerian police is very unenviable. The Nigeria Police Force only exploits 
the conflicts as an opportunity to make money. No major offender, even thugs 
arrested were granted bail courtesy of their sponsors. 
6.2 Conclusion 
The central theme of this work has been “Politics and Conflicts in Ebiraland, Nigeria 
(1977-2007). The research is an attempt to examine the impact of politics on violent 
conflicts in Ebiraland. The justification for this exercise is premised on the prevailing 
violence in the land, especially during political activities that has led to the description 
of Ebira people as being lawless and violent. In the pristine past, the people had lived 
under segmented clan arrangement without central leader. However, the British 
incursion in the 19th century and the subsequent establishment of a centralized 
political arrangement halted the relative political stability that hitherto pervaded the 
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land. Democratization process characterized by intense rivalry among politicians and 
clan groups for political power exacerbated the spate of violence in the land. 
 
The first objective is to find out the impact of clan identity on conflicts in Ebiraland. 
Going by the findings in this study, it can therefore, be concluded that although clan 
differences may divide, it is not sufficient for conflict if there is no element of 
politicization and power struggle among politicians belonging to different clans. This 
is also in line with the second objective that deep-seated struggle among groups to 
acquire, use and retain power have implication for conflicts in Ebiraland. The third 
objective revolves around the idea that intra and inter party clashes have contributory 
role on violence in Ebiraland. From the findings, it can be concluded that politics is a 
major driver of conflicts in Ebiraland and is a reflection of the inherent and endemic 
conflict of the Nigerian state. This is because from independence till date, political 
activities have generated more conflicts in the country than any other factors. Most 
conflicts that appear religious or ethnic have political undertone as reflected in the 
study. This is not to say that economic and socio-cultural factors are not embedded in 
the conflicts. For instance, youth unemployment, poor educational background and 
economic benefits from conflicts, masquerade festival, struggle for ch ieftaincy titles 
among others are economic and socio-cultural factors that are very relevant in 
discussing violent conflicts in Ebiraland. Lastly, although there seems to be a relative 
peace in Ebiraland giving the peaceful conduct of the 2011 elections, that may turn 
out to be a phyrric victory as the root causes of violence have not been adequately 
addressed. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
The study made the following recommendations: 
Since youth unemployment is a major factor fueling conflicts in Ebiraland, the 
government should embark on youth mass employment. This can be done by 
resuscitating the moribund Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Company and Itakpe Iron Ore 
Deposit both in Ebiraland. It has been stated in the study that when these two 
companies were functioning, violence was not common in Ebiraland as many youths 
in the area were employed then in the companies. However, when the companies 
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became moribund and the staff thrown out of employment which also closed doors for 
other youths to be employed, youths in the area now became willing tools in the hands 
of politicians to perpetrate violence for their political interests. 
 
There is need for government regulatory measure on masquerades and other 
traditional festivals. It has been demonstrated in the study that when the idea of 
masquerade having a guarantor that could be held liable in situation of breach of 
peace before a masquerade can perform was introduced, masquerade festivals were 
not fraught with violence. Hence, the need for government to re-introduce such 
measure to check violence inclination of traditional festivals in Ebiraland.  
The prevalence of violence-oriented politics in Ebiraland calls for the building of the 
culture of peace in Ebiraland. It is necessary to educate Ebira people that if somebody 
acts violently against another person, it is possible that such violent act may be 
inadvertently on wrong assumption which may be impossible to reverse. For instance, 
killing someone cannot be reversed ditto with many forms of physical or serious 
psychological violence. 
 
It should be understood that when violence is used it results in counter-violence and 
the possibility of escalating beyond control is very real. Violent means ipso facto 
results in violent ends. While non-violent means aimed at addressing the problem that 
result into violent conflict, violent means only focus on persons rather than problem. 
In other words, there is need to sensitize Ebira people to see themselves as a peaceful 
people (as the name Ebira connotes good manner) with norms that emphasize 
cooperation and resolution of conflicts with dialogue, negotiation and non-violence. 
There is need to build the culture of tolerance, understanding, mutual obligation, open 
communication among the people and clans in Ebiraland. There is need to transform 
violent competition for political power into cooperation for shared goals. Since peace 
education is very integral to building the culture of peace, educated Ebiras should 
organize workshops for adults, youths and children at periodic intervals with the aim 
of inculcating the culture of peace in them. 
 
Such workshops should be designed through talks and speeches with the aim of 
changing adversary image people must have formed against opposing politicians and 
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clans. It should be skewed towards changing negative relationships between clans to 
positive one. The workshop should provide general knowledge about conflicts, its 
causes and how to cultivate general attitudes about peace, forgiveness and non-
violence by bringing to the awareness of the people the consequences of violent 
conflicts. 
Rotation of political offices among the elite groups in Kogi State is also 
recommended to mitigate acrimony in inter-group relations. This will put an end to 
allegation of domination of a particular ethnic group in ethnic ratio as far as political 
offices are concerned in Kogi State. 
Justiciable distribution of resources and amenities among the various ethnic groups in 
the state will go a long way to bring harmonious relationship in Kogi State. 
6.4 Contributions of Study to Knowledge 
1. The study has demonstrated the utility of eclectic model for the explanation of 
conflict. This is a unique contribution to conflict as a field of study because 
most previous studies utilized one or two theories which do not possess 
explanatory power for the various dimensions of conflict. Thus, this model 
helps to elucidate the complexities of etiology of conflict. It is a mono-plural 
framework that incorporates political, economic, socio-cultural factors of 
conflict. The superiority of this model, as stated before, to others is in its 
comprehensiveness and inclusiveness of other models, in providing the basis 
for the analysis of multiple factors of conflict. 
 
2.  The study has contributed to bridging the knowledge gap in the literature on 
conflict studies by combining qualitative and quantitative methods of data 
analysis that involves interview, focus group discussion and questionnaire 
administration (survey). This is hardly the case in previous studies on conflict 
as most previous studies utilized qualitative method of data analysis.  
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3. The study has demonstrated the juxtaposition of various factors- political, 
economic, socio-economic and cultural as the catalysts of various dimensions 
of conflict. This is consequent upon the position in the literature that a mono-
causal based explanation of conflict is inadequate for understanding not only 
conflict in Ebiraland, but also any incidence of conflict at whatever level. The 
juxtaposition of various factors-political, economic, socio-economic and 
cultural among others provides a more realistic basis for understanding 
complex social phenomena. 
 
4. The study has shown that cultural homogeneity as hypothesized by some 
scholars especially Samuel Huntington is not sufficient reasons for peace. This 
is because cultural homogeneity can also be susceptible to conflict if 
politicized by some political elements as demonstrated by the study. If cultural 
homogeneity alone has the capacity to foster unity, then there wouldn‟t have 
been conflict in Ebiraland in the first instance as culture would have served as 
a cord of unity or harmony. 
 
 6.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
1. Further research in this area should focus on the impact of politics and 
violence on the socio-economic prospects of Ebiraland as this was not within 
the purview of the present study. Efforts on studies that will bring the 
implications of politics and violence on the socio-economic prospect of 
Ebiraland to the limelight will be a step in the right direction as it will educate 
the Ebiras on the evil of violent oriented politics on their socio-economic 
prosperity. This knowledge may make them to re-think, thereby, shuning 
divisive and acrimonious politics. 
2. Also, there is need for research on non-violent means to conflict resolution in 
Ebiraland. This is very necessary in the sense that two wrongs cannot make a 
right. Alternative dispute resolution mechanism will serve as a panacea to 
frequent conflict in Ebiraland. 
3. Another area that requires further exposition is inter-group relations in Kogi 
State. Kogi State is miniature Nigeria. Inequality in resource allocation is a 
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delibitating factor in inter-group relations in Kogi State. There is need for 
further study in this area so as to come up with recommendations that will 
bring harmony in the relationship among the various groups that constitute 
Kogi State. 
4. Further research in this area should focus on the impact of violent conflict in 
Ebiraland on her neighbours. This becomes necessary because the impact of 
violent conflict in Ebiraland on her neighbours remains a virgin area that 
requires exposition. No doubt some Ebiras have fled their community because 
of frequent conflict and had settled in neighbouring towns. In what way or 
ways has this influx affected their host communities? 
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Appendix  
Fieldwork Pictures 
Front View of the Palace of Ado Ibrahim the Ohinoyi of Ebiraland 
 
 
The Palace of Alhaji Ado Ibrahim the Ohinoyi of Ebiraland 
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One of the masquerades performing (the picture was taken during field work at Ihima) 
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Some of the burnt buildings in Ihima, fallout of communal conflicts 
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Some of the participants during focus group discussion 
 
Another set of participants during focus group discussion 
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Questionnaire 
 
Department of Political Science and International 
Relations, 
Covenant University, 
P.M.B 1023, 
Ota,  
Ogun State. 
 
Dear Respondent, 
I am a PhD student of Covenant University currently researching on Politics and Conflicts: A 
Study of Ebiraland, Nigeria (1977-2007). The research intends to investigate the political 
and socio-economic dimensions of conflicts in Ebiraland. We therefore, solicit your 
participation in this study in form of expressing your opinion (s) on the issues raised in this 
questionnaire. I will appreciate if you could answer the questions the way things were and are 
and not the way things ought to be. It is mainly for research purposes and your response will 
be treated with utmost confidentiality. 
Thanks for your participation and response. 
JOSHUA, Segun. 
PhD Student/Researcher 
Instruction: please tick the appropriate box in the area provided. Thank you. 
1. Sex:    Male (  )    Female  (  ) 
2. How old are you as at last birth day? 18-30  ( ) 31-40 (  ) 41-50 ( )  51-60 ( ) 61 and 
above ( ) 
3. Marital status:  Single (  ) Married (  ) Divorced (  ) Separated (  ) Widowed (  ) 
4. Occupation: Civil Servant (  ) Farmer (  ) Trader (  ) Student (  ) others (please 
specify) 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. Academic Qualification: No Education (  ) Primary Education (  ) Junior Secondary 
Education (  ) Senior Secondary Education (  ) Tertiary Education (  ) others please 
specify ………………........ 
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6. Local Government Area: Adavi (  ) Ajaokuta (  ) Okehi (  ) Okene (  ) others specify 
………………….. 
7. Your Religious affiliation: Christian (  ) Islam (  ) Traditionalist (  ) others please 
specify …………………. 
On a scale of 1 to 5: 5- strongly agree; 4- agree; 3-undecided; 2-le of 5: disagreed; 1- 
strongly disagreed; please indicate by a tick option that describes your opinion on 
each item. 
 
SECTION B: IMPACT OF POLITICS ON CLAN AND COMMUNAL 
CONFLICT 
 
SN. 
 
 
STATEMENTS 
OPTIONS 
SA A U D SD 
1. The contest for political power is one of the factors 
responsible for conflict in Ebira land 
     
2. Individual personality is the main political issue in Ebiraland      
3 Clannish sentiment is the main issue in Ebiraland      
4. Conflict between clans provides local politicians opportunity 
to stress their relevance 
     
5. Differences in political party alliances between clans often 
degenerate into conflict in Ebiraland  
     
6. Differences in political party affiliation of community leaders 
and the community often results into conflict 
     
7. Exercise of political supremacy between clans leaders often 
lead to violent conflict 
     
8. Differences in political party affiliation of clan leaders is a 
cause of inter-clan confrontation 
     
9. Each clan is often affiliated to a political party      
10. The use of clan affiliation to foster individual‟s political 
ambition often result in inter-clan conflict 
     
11. Clan identities of political office seekers is a main cause of 
inter-clan conflict 
     
12. Contest for political supremacy among clans has implications 
for conflict in Ebira land 
     
 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEEP SEATED STRUGGLES  AMONG WARRING 
GROUPS TO ACQUIRE, USE AND RETAIN POWER AND CONFLICT  
13. Privileges attached to political offices encourage violent 
contest for elective post 
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14  competition for political office is a main cause of violent 
conflict in Ebiraland 
     
15 Violence is more intense and frequent in Ebiraland during 
election times 
     
16 Political elite employ violence to mobilize people along group 
line for their political advantage. 
     
17 The political structure of the state has implication on unrest in 
Ebiraland 
     
18 Perceived domination of the state apparatuses by a section of 
the state promotes conflicts in Ebiraland  
     
20 Political Parties activities provide avenue for clashes among 
rival supporters 
     
21 Political elite in Ebiraland are likely to reject an electoral 
results where they have lost which may lead to violence 
     
22 There is a deep seated struggles among warring groups to 
acquire, use and retain power and conflict in Ebiraland 
     
LINKAGE BETWEEN INTRA AND INTER-PARTY CLASHES AND 
COMMUNAL UNREST 
23 Opposing groups in political contest are enemies at war SA A U D SD 
24 political competition within a party for elective post  often  
results in violence 
     
25 Political competition between parties are pursued violently      
26 Winners takes it all in multi-party system like Nigeria has 
implication on violent conflict in Ebiraland 
     
ECOMONIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL VARIABLES INTERVENING BETWEEN 
POLITICS AND CONFLICTS IN EBIRA LAND 
27 Unemployment is the basis of youth involvement in violent 
conflict in Ebiraland 
     
28 Poor educational background and economic gain are the main 
motivation for youth involvement in violence 
     
29 Economic values of land has increased struggle for land 
ownership 
     
30 Land ownership system breeds conflicts in Ebiraland      
31 Inter-group struggle for land ownership ( between 
groups/individuals) is often attended with violent conflict 
     
32 Politicians and groups political interests make the masquerade 
festivals conflict prone 
     
33 Political affiliation of groups are often demonstrated in 
masquerade festivals 
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34 Political acceptability and supremacy are pursued through the 
masquerade festivals 
     
35 Superiority and power contest between masquerade groups is 
a major cause of conflict in Ebiraland 
     
36 Masquerade festivals  provide avenue to express political 
interests and alliances 
     
37 Politicians often draw the support of masquerade groups to 
advance their interests 
     
38 Political affiliation and views of  public praise singers during 
festivals often promote conflicts in Ebiraland 
     
39 Masquerade festivals is used to pursue personal and clan 
conflicts 
     
40 Strict control of masquerade activities will reduce conflicts in 
Ebiraland 
     
41 The struggle for chieftaincy and local power positions is one 
of the bases for intra-ethnic conflict in Ebiraland 
     
42 Lack of acceptable central leadership in Ebiraland is 
responsible for conflict in the community 
     
43 Government creation of traditional stool like Ohis has 
implication for violent conflicts in Ebiraland 
     
 
SECTION C 
Instruction: Please give precise answer to the following questions. You may give 
practical examples where possible. 
1. What efforts have the local leaders and state made in resolving violent conflicts in 
Ebiraland? 
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
2. How effective have those conflict resolution mechanisms been? 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ......................................................................................................................................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
3. What would you suggest to be done in bringing permanent peace to Ebiraland? 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………
……….…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICIANS, TRADITIONAL RULERS, CLAN HEADS 
AND SOME EMINENTS EBIRAS,  
1. When did violence first occur in Ebira land? 
2. How many cases of violent conflict have you witnessed in Ebira land? 
3. What do you think are the major causes of violence in Ebira land? 
4. Have the politicians in the cause of pursing their political ambition contributed to 
conflict in Ebira land? 
5. Can you give examples to prove that politicians play key role in conflict in Ebira 
land? 
6. Has there been any conflict as a result of politics i.e. during election? 
7. Are there occasion in which struggle for traditional stool result in conflict?    
8. Honestly speaking would you say Ebira people are violent or peace loving? 
9. In all the conflict you have experienced where their loss of lives or property? 
10.  Has there been attempt at resolution? 
11. In your own opinion how will you assess the effectiveness of the resolution methods? 
12. Are there local conflict management methods that you think have not been used 
adequately in managing the conflict? 
13. What do you think should be done to address continuous violent conflict in Ebira 
land? 
 
QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION 
1. When did crises in Ebira land start? 
2. What are the causes of violent conflict in Ebira land? 
3. Is there any relationship between contest for political power and conflict in Ebira 
land? 
4. Do you think the political structure of the state has impact on conflict in Ebira land? 
5. Do you think Masquerade festival in Ebira land is of relevance to conflict in the land? 
6. Is there any connection between the struggle for traditional stool and conflict in 
Ebiraland? 
7. Do you think youth unemployment has any impact on conflict in Ebira land? 
8.  Has there been attempt at resolution? 
9. How effective were those conflict resolution mechanisms been? 
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10. What do you think should be done to bring lasting peace to Ebira land? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
